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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the extent to which a company‟s corporate governance 
quality is related to (a) its voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information, 
(b) the incentives factors that affect the relationship and (c) whether this relationship 
is stronger in the presence of an in-house qualified company secretary. The 
hypotheses development of this research study is based on Dye‟s voluntary 
disclosure theory and agency theory.  
A broad corporate governance quality index that captures the four main factors of 
effective corporate governance is adopted from the Minority Shareholder Watchdog 
Group (MSWG) in Malaysia. It consists of two main components: basic compliance 
score (BCS) and international best practices score (IBP). In this research, the BCS 
component is used to measure the level of a company corporate governance quality 
and the IBP component is a proxy for voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
information.  
Using a sample of 275 publicly listed companies in Malaysia, the empirical results 
indicate that companies with high corporate governance quality are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose corporate governance information in annual reports. This result 
suggests that Dye‟s voluntary disclosure theory holds in Malaysia, a country that is 
characterised by weak legal protection, highly concentrated ownership and strong 
cultural factors. 
Capital market transactions (issuance of new share and debt capital) and stock-based 
incentives (stock-based compensation and CEO shareholdings) are the two incentive 
factors that are examined in this research. The findings suggest that stock-based 
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compensation statistically and positively affects the relationship between corporate 
governance quality and voluntary disclosures. However the other incentive factors do 
not affect the relationship.  
This study also examines the relationship between in-house qualified company 
secretaries and voluntary disclosures. It does this by distinguishing between two 
types of company secretaries, namely professional qualified versus license holders 
and in-house versus external. However, no evidence is found to support the 
hypothesis that in-house qualified company secretaries promote voluntary 
disclosures. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research question and objectives 
One of the major implications of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 is that foreign 
investors shied away from affected countries including Malaysia (Claessens & Fan 
2000). Investors and managers have long debated whether poor corporate governance 
is an important contributor to economic downturns. A recent study by Leuz, Lins and 
Warnock (2009) provides new evidence that foreign investors do indeed invest less 
in poorly governed firms that reside in countries with weak legal institutions. This 
implies that improvement in corporate governance practices, including their 
disclosure is a potential lever for attracting more foreign investment.  
Investors have now become more cautious and monitor companies‟ corporate 
governance closely before making any investment decision (McKinsey & Company 
July 2002). According to a global investor opinion survey in 2002, institutional 
investors put corporate governance on a par with financial indicators when 
evaluating investment decisions. The survey found that 63 percent of investors avoid 
investing in companies with poor corporate governance and 31 percent avoid 
investing in countries with poor corporate governance quality. Investors are also 
prepared to decrease their stock holdings in companies and countries with poor 
corporate governance standards (McKinsey & Company July 2002). Thus, improving 
companies‟ corporate governance is one way to strengthen consumer confidence and 
trust in a stock market. 
Companies with better corporate governance can use their annual report disclosures 
to provide assurance to investors of lower investment risks (Kanagaretnam et al. 
2007) and improve investor confidence in a company‟s accounting reports (Bhat et 
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al. 2006). According to Coombes and Watson (2000), investors are increasingly 
basing their investment decisions on companies‟ corporate governance information. 
Companies with strong corporate governance have better chances to survive 
especially during the period of economic downturns (Mitton 2002). As such the need 
to rank companies‟ corporate governance has become increasingly important with 
investors seeking indicators of good governance. 
Many independent local and international agencies have developed tools to measure 
companies‟ corporate governance quality. In Malaysia the Minority Shareholder 
Watchdog Group (MSWG) has developed a corporate governance index which 
facilitates an assessment of the quality of companies based on their corporate 
governance practices. A recent study by the MSWG and University of Nottingham 
Malaysia Campus (UNMC) found that more publicly listed companies in Malaysia 
are voluntarily disclosing information in accordance with international best practices 
in their annual reports (MSWG & UNMC 2007). This suggests that Malaysian 
companies are now not only complying with the minimum mandatory corporate 
governance disclosure requirements but are also disclosing more information 
voluntarily, especially in relation to corporate governance. 
However, there is variation in the extent of voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance information between publicly listed companies in Malaysia (MSWG & 
UNMC 2007). Voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information is defined 
as corporate governance information that is over and above the Malaysian Codes on 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) recommendations and Bursa Securities Listing 
Requirement (BSLR) guidelines. High quality corporate governance cannot be 
directly observed because it is a set of activities within an organisation. However it 
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can be signalled to investors through mandatory and voluntary disclosures in annual 
reports. Disclosure of this extended corporate governance information is purely 
voluntary as at present there are no regulations that require companies to disclose this 
information. Hence it is important to understand which incentive factors motivate 
some companies to voluntarily disclose this kind of information in their annual 
reports beyond existing mandatory and voluntary practices.  
The main research question addressed in this study is: what are the incentive factors 
that influence the voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information in annual 
reports of Malaysian listed companies?  
The following sub-questions have been developed in order to answer the main 
question: 
1. Are companies with high quality corporate governance practices more likely 
to voluntarily disclose corporate governance information in their annual 
reports? 
(a) Does the presence of an in-house qualified company secretary in a 
company‟s corporate governance structure influence voluntary 
disclosures of corporate governance information in annual reports? 
(The presence of an in-house qualified company secretary is assumed to 
be an additional indicator of corporate governance quality). 
2. Are companies more likely to voluntarily disclose corporate governance 
information in their annual reports prior to the issuance of new equity or 
debt? 
3. Do stock-based incentives motivate managers to voluntarily disclose 
corporate governance information in annual reports? 
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The objective of this study is to examine voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance information in annual reports of Malaysian publicly listed companies. 
This study focuses on a specific type of voluntary disclosure, that of corporate 
governance information in companies‟ annual reports, which is over and above the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) and Bursa Securities Listing 
Requirements (BSLR). Bhat, Hope and Kang (2006) suggest that information about a 
firm‟s governance disclosures is very useful in assisting a user to assess the quality 
of information, especially in environments where financial reporting is less 
transparent. Companies can choose to voluntarily disclose this information in their 
annual reports in order to enhance disclosure transparency.  
The annual report is chosen not only because it is a main document that contains 
company information for stakeholders but also because it is mandatory for all public 
companies listed on the Bursa Securities Malaysia Berhad (BSMB) to prepare (Bursa 
Malaysia Berhad 2001b). Previously, compliance to the principles and best practices 
of corporate governance recommended by MCCG was not mandatory. However, in 
June 2001 the revised BSLR made it mandatory for all companies listed on the 
BSMB to disclose in their annual report the extent to which they have complied with 
and explain any departure from the MCCG. Since compliance and explanation rules 
have been adopted in the Malaysian setting managers have been given freedom to 
choose on how much corporate governance information is to be supplied and 
disclosed in their annual reports, thus making disclosures somewhat voluntary. 
The voluntary disclosure theory first proposed by Dye (1985) is applied in the study 
to a different type of voluntary disclosure information than appears to have been 
tested in prior research. This study tests Dye‟s voluntary disclosure theory by 
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investigating whether companies with higher corporate governance quality are more 
forthcoming with voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information. In this 
study high corporate governance quality refers to a company whose corporate 
governance mechanisms closely conform to the MCCG and BSLR 
recommendations.  
This study also investigates whether the presence of an in-house qualified company 
secretary in a company‟s corporate governance structure influences its voluntary 
disclosure practices. Prior studies on corporate governance and voluntary disclosures 
focus more attention on roles of directors, auditors and audit committees. In contrast, 
this study attempts to examine the role of the company secretary as a guardian of 
corporate governance. In Malaysia, a company secretary is normally required to 
assist the board of directors and management in preparing annual reports of a 
company. In the course of discharging his or her responsibility, a company secretary 
is expected to advise the board of directors and top management of a company in 
relation to compliance with the MCCG and the BSLR. A company secretary is also 
expected to encourage directors and management of a company to adopt voluntary 
disclosure practices about corporate governance information in their annual report. In 
acknowledging the importance of the company secretary‟s role, the MCCG and the 
BSLR further require listed companies to provide all directors of a company with 
advice and services of a company secretary.  
This study also intends to measure how capital market transactions (issuance of new 
share and debt capital) and stock-based incentives (stock-based compensation and 
CEO shareholdings) impact the relationship between companies‟ corporate 
governance quality and companies‟ voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
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information. Signalling and agency theories are used as a basis to explain the impact 
of these two incentive factors on the association. According to signalling theory, 
external investors have less information about a firm‟s future prospects compared to 
a firm‟s managers who normally posses superior information. This information 
asymmetry problem may cause difficulties for a firm in terms of increasing external 
finance if it is not resolved (Healy & Palepu 2001). Therefore, managers of a firm 
who expect to increase external financing in the future have an incentive to provide 
voluntary disclosures to reduce this information asymmetry problem and lower the 
cost of raising external capital. On the other hand, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue 
that stock-based incentives are able to align managers‟ interests with shareholders‟ 
interests to reduce agency problems. Managers who are rewarded with stock-based 
incentives have an incentive to use voluntary disclosures to reduce the possibility of 
devaluation of stock and firm value.  
Therefore the need to study the relationship between corporate governance quality 
and voluntary disclosures practices in Malaysia stems from the growing importance 
of corporate governance information and the lack of existing literature which address 
incentives to voluntarily disclose corporate governance information. The sections 
that follow provide the institutional setting, motivation for the research, definition of 
key terms, contributions of the study, delimitation of scope and an outline of the 
dissertation. 
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1.2 Institutional setting 
1.2.1 Development of corporate governance in Malaysia 
Progress in reforming corporate governance in Malaysia started in 1998 when an 
independent committee was established to deliver a report and a set of corporate 
governance codes applicable to the Malaysian capital market environment (Report on 
Corporate Governance  February 1999). The codes were published in 2000 and are 
known as the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG). The MCCG 
outlines principles and best practices for corporate governance. The principles for 
corporate governance consist of four main parts: board of directors, directors‟ 
remuneration, shareholders, and audit and accountability. Compliance with the 
MCCG principles and best practices at that time was not mandatory. The MCCG was 
revised in 2007 with the aim to improve the quality of corporate governance of 
publicly listed companies by adding criteria for directors‟ qualifications, as well as 
strengthening audit committees and internal audit functions. 
Bursa Securities Malaysia Berhad (BSMB) has also played a part in efforts to 
enhance corporate governance in Malaysia by revamping its listing requirements. 
For, instance Chapter 15 of the revamped listing requirements addresses issues on 
corporate governance and one of the major requirements is that a listed company 
must ensure that its board of directors discloses the level of compliance and explains 
any deviation from the MCCG‟s recommendations (Bursa Malaysia Berhad 2001a). 
These revised listing requirements became effective on 30 June 2001.  
In July 2004, BSMB launched its Best Practices in Corporate Disclosure (BPCD) 
with the aim of raising standards of corporate governance amongst Malaysian 
companies. These BPCD are a set of guidelines aimed at assisting companies to 
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move beyond minimal compliance into exemplary levels of disclosure with the hope 
of cultivating and instilling a spirit of disclosure and best practices as voluntary 
behaviour (Bursa Malaysia Berhad 2004). The BPCD provides guidance and 
assistance to companies in complying with their disclosure obligations under the 
BSLR. Compliance with BPCD guidelines is purely voluntary. However, BSMB 
strongly recommends that companies adopt these guidelines and integrate them into 
their own disclosure practices, policies and procedures. The BPCD are intended to 
aid in building and maintaining corporate credibility and investor confidence in 
Malaysia‟s capital markets (Bursa Malaysia Berhad 2004).  
The key objectives of the BPCD include among others, to promote and maintain 
market integrity and investor confidence; to ensure companies provide equal access 
to material information in an accurate, clear, timely and complete manner and to 
avoid selective disclosure; to propagate the exercise of due diligence to ensure that 
information disseminated will be as far as possible accurate, clear, timely and 
complete; to instil in companies that they have in place an efficient management of 
information procedure that promotes accountability for the dissemination of material 
information; to encourage companies to take advantage of advances made in 
information technology in disseminating information; and to encourage companies to 
build good investor relations with the investing public that inspire trust and 
confidence (Bursa Malaysia Berhad 2004). 
In addition, the Government of Malaysia and the regulatory bodies have made 
reforms to other related laws. These include the Securities Commission Act 1993 
(SCA), Securities Commission (Amendment) Act 2000, Securities Industry Act 1983 
(SIA), Securities Industry (Compliance with Approved Accounting Standards) 
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Regulations 1999, the Malaysian Code on Take-overs and Mergers 1998, and 
Companies (Amendment) Act 2007 (Tie 2003). These initiatives were established 
aiming to embed good corporate governance culture within publicly listed 
companies. 
The development of corporate governance in Malaysia is also supported by two 
independent organisations. These are the Malaysian Institute of Corporate 
Governance (MICG) and the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG). The 
MICG was established by the Malaysian Government with the aim of raising 
awareness and practice of good corporate governance. It was established in March 
1998 by the High Level Finance Committee of Corporate Governance. The MSWG 
was established in 2000 with the purpose of enhancing shareholder activism and 
protecting minority interests. It has evolved into an independent corporate 
governance research and monitoring organisation, which provides advice to both 
individual and institutional minority shareholders on voting at companies‟ general 
meetings. Since 2005 the MSWG has published a survey report on corporate 
governance compliance of listed companies in Malaysia. 
All of the above efforts are aimed towards improving companies‟ corporate 
governance practices and making corporations more responsible, efficient and 
profitable. It is hoped that this will boost investors‟ confidence, thus leading the way 
for a more efficient capital market. Indirectly, it is also expected that these efforts 
will improve Malaysia‟s economic growth through direct investment from foreign 
investors.  
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1.2.2 Company secretary role in corporate governance 
In Malaysia, a company secretary is an officer of the company with substantial 
authority in the administrative area. The roles and responsibilities of a company 
secretary are derived directly from companies‟ articles and the Companies Act 1965. 
In respect of corporate governance issues, a company secretary is expected to carry 
out the following duties and responsibilities: Advisory – advising the board, 
chairman and all directors of a company on matters relating to compliance 
obligations under the law; Compliance – leading teams in secretarial best practice in 
ensuring compliance with law and regulation; and Communication – establishing 
efficient internal communication of Board decisions and external reporting (Kang 
2005).  
In acknowledging the importance of the company secretary‟s role, the MCCG in its 
Best Practices for the board of directors provides that: 
Extract from the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
Part 2 - Best Practices in Corporate Governance 
XI Boards should be entitled to the services of a company secretary who must 
ensure that all appointments are properly made, that all necessary information 
is obtained from directors, both for the company’s own records and for the 
purposes of meeting statutory obligations, as well as obligations arising from 
the Listing requirements of Exchanges or other regulatory requirements.  
XIX Access to Information 
Directors should have access to all information within a company whether as a 
full board or in their individual capacity, in furtherance of their duties. 
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XX  Access to Advice 
There should be an agreed procedure for directors, whether as a full board or 
in their individual capacity, in furtherance of their duties to take independent 
professional advice at the company’s expense, if necessary. 
XXI  All directors should have access to the advice and services of the company 
secretary. 
XXII  Directors should appoint as secretary someone who is capable of carrying out 
the duties to which the post entails and their removal should be a matter for the 
board as a whole. The board should recognise that the Chairman is entitled to 
the strong and positive support of the company secretary in ensuring the 
effective functioning of the board. 
(Finance Committee on Corporate Governance March 2000, pp. 11-2) 
 
In addition, the Bursa Securities Listing Requirements (BSLR) further requires listed 
companies to provide all directors of a company with advice and services of a 
company secretary. An illustration of the BSLR is given below: 
Extract from Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements on corporate governance 
Chapter 15, para 15.04 Rights of directors 
Unless otherwise provided by or subject to any applicable laws or these 
Requirements, a listed issuer must ensure that every director has the right to the 
resources, whenever necessary and reasonable for the performance of his duties, at 
the cost of the listed issuer and in accordance with a procedure to be determined by 
the board of directors, including but not limited to: 
12 
 
a) obtaining full and unrestricted access to any information pertaining to the 
listed issuer; 
b) obtaining full and unrestricted access to the advice and services of the 
company secretary; and  
c) obtaining independent professional or other advice.  
(Bursa Malaysia Berhad 2001a, p. 1501) 
 
Overall, company secretaries can be considered as one of the guardians of corporate 
governance. Company secretaries have extensive administrative, compliance and 
advisor roles to management and boards. Therefore it is important to ensure that only 
qualified and capable persons are appointed. In Malaysia matters relating to the 
qualification and disqualification of a company secretary are provided under the 
Malaysian Companies Act 1965. Section 139 of the Act requires all companies to 
have a company secretary or secretaries who must be a natural (human being) person 
of full age and who has a principal residence within Malaysia (Malaysian Companies 
Act 1965). The first company secretary must be named in the memorandum or 
articles of the company and any subsequent appointment of a company secretary 
must be made by directors. The company secretary must be present at the registered 
office of the company during the normal office hours at which the registered office is 
to be open to members of the public (Kang 2005). Further, Section 139A of the 
Companies Act 1965 provides that no person shall act as a secretary of a company 
unless - 
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(a) he is a member of a professional body, or any other body, which has 
for the time being been prescribed by the Minister by notification 
published in the Gazette; or  
(b) he is licensed by the Registrar for that purpose. 
 
Further the Act also specifies the person who shall be disqualified or can no longer 
act as the company secretary. As provided under section 139C(1) a person shall be 
disqualified to act as a secretary if: 
(a) he is an undischarged bankrupt; 
(b) he is convicted whether within or without Malaysia of any offence 
mentioned in subsection 130(1); 
(c) he ceases to be a member of the body prescribed by the Minister 
under section 139A; or  
(d) he ceases to be a holder of a valid licence issued under section 139B.  
 
Kang (2005) explains that any person who continues to act as a secretary of a 
company after he is disqualified shall render himself and every director who 
knowingly permits him to act in that capacity guilty of an offence against the 
Companies Act 1965. 
 
1.3 Motivations 
Given this setting, there are four main motivations for this research. First, Malaysia 
has been chosen as the focus of this study not only because it is a developing country 
with an emerging capital market but also because of its mandatory and non-
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mandatory corporate governance disclosure environment, which is similar to most 
Asian countries (Nowland 2008b). The Malaysian setting is also characterised by 
having weak legal protection (La Porta et al. 2002), highly concentrated ownership 
(Claessens et al. 2000; Thillainathan 1998) and strong cultural factors (Haniffa & 
Cooke 2002). Testing the voluntary disclosure theory proposed by Dye (1985) in this 
type of setting will reveal whether it is also applicable to Malaysia. Most prior 
studies have applied this voluntary disclosure theory in developed countries such as 
the U.S. (Clarkson et al. 2008; Langberg & Sivaramakrishnan 2008). The results of 
this study will provide evidence as to whether this voluntary disclosure theory holds 
in developing countries such as Malaysia. To summarise, the Malaysian corporate 
governance rules provide a good setting to test Dye‟s voluntary disclosure theory on 
corporate governance information practices since Malaysia has both mandatory and 
non-mandatory corporate governance disclosure guidelines.  
Second, the results of the study may reveal which factors are useful in providing 
incentives for managers of companies to increase voluntary disclosures. Stock-based 
incentives are expected to provide better alignment with shareholders‟ interests and 
reduce agency costs. Thus findings from the study can help remuneration committees 
in making recommendations on the types of compensation packages that could be 
offered in future in order to motivate managers to voluntarily disclose more 
information in annual reports.  
Third, this study is expected to provide a better understanding on whether company 
secretaries can play a more effective role in improving a company‟s compliance and 
disclosure practices. This is important since company secretaries have a very close 
relationship with directors and management which places them in an excellent 
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position to provide advice in relation to compliance with mandatory and non-
mandatory aspects of corporate governance. The results of this study are expected to 
be useful to boards of companies in choosing which type of company secretary to 
employ for the benefit of a company. 
Fourth, it is expected that results of the study provide useful insights for regulators in 
Malaysia especially to Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad (BMSB) and the 
Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) in deciding whether the current 
comply-or-explain requirements of the MCCG and the BSLR have been effective in 
raising the minimum levels of corporate governance disclosure. Results also indicate 
which companies are expected to be the least and most likely to comply with 
mandatory as well as non-mandatory requirements of corporate governance 
disclosure practices. Thus, they can assist regulators to control companies that need 
more monitoring.  
 
1.4 Definitions 
Definitions used by researchers in previous studies are normally not standardised. 
Therefore definitions of key terms in this section are used to establish the position 
taken in this dissertation. The following definitions of key terms are presented here: 
corporate governance; corporate governance quality; and voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance information. 
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Corporate governance 
This research adopts the definition from the Malaysian High Level Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCC) in defining corporate governance. The 
FCCC is an independent committee that is responsible for publishing a report and a 
set of corporate governance codes that are most suited for Malaysia. The FCCC 
proposed a definition of corporate governance as: 
The process and structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of 
the company towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate 
accountability with the ultimate objective of realising long term shareholder 
value, whilst taking into account the interest of other stakeholders (Report on 
Corporate Governance  February 1999, p. 52). 
This definition is chosen because the setting of the study is Malaysia and the MCCG 
is the document regulating corporate governance in Malaysia. The MCCG definition 
is based on the Cadbury Report and recommendations made by the Hampel Report 
(Ow-Yong & Kooi Guan 2000). In the UK, the Cadbury Committee first issued a 
report in respect of the financial aspects of corporate governance of UK companies in 
1992. This committee made recommendations as to definition of corporate 
governance as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled” 
(Cadbury Committee Report 1992). The Hampel Committee‟s final report has 
widened the Cadbury Committee‟s definition of corporate governance to include the 
“importance of corporate governance in its contribution both to business prosperity 
and accountability” (Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance 1998).  
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Corporate governance quality 
According to Beekes and Brown (2006, p. 422) “a company‟s corporate governance 
quality increases as additional, common corporate governance standards are met”. 
Hence, a company with high corporate governance quality is a company that 
possesses and meets common corporate governance standards set by authorities. In 
the case of Malaysia, these common standards are captured in the basic compliance 
score disclosures that represent company conformance to the MCCG and BSLR 
guidelines. For the purpose of this study, corporate governance „quality‟ refers to the 
total score obtained by a company in relation to its compliance with 40 key corporate 
governance variables based on the principles and best practices enjoined by the 
MCCG and BSLR. That is, its Basic Compliance Score (BCS). These corporate 
governance variables are reflective of four major sections of the MCCG principles 
and best practices: Board of Directors, Directors‟ Remuneration, Shareholders, and 
Accountability and Audit. Thus the BCS can be viewed as a comprehensive measure 
of an individual company‟s corporate governance quality. As indicated on page 2, 
„high quality corporate governance cannot be directly observed because it is a set of 
activities within an organisation‟. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
higher the BCS score obtained by the company the higher its corporate governance 
„quality‟ will be. 
Voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information 
Voluntary disclosure is defined as “disclosures in excess of requirements - 
representing free choices on the part of company management to provide accounting 
and other information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users of their annual 
reports” (Meek et al. 1995, p. 555). This definition is adapted for this research 
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because disclosure of this type of information (corporate governance information) is 
considered to be at the discretion of a firm‟s managers since there are no mandatory 
requirements for them to do so. Thus voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
information is defined as corporate governance information in companies‟ annual 
reports, which is over and above the Malaysian Codes on Corporate Governance 
(MCCG) recommendations and Bursa Securities Listing Requirements (BSLR) 
guidelines. 
 
1.5 Expected contributions 
This study expects to make a number of contributions to the literature on corporate 
governance. First, there are no known studies that have examined the relationship 
between corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance information in annual reports. This is true for both developed and 
developing countries. In addition, the proposed study is expected to add to the 
broader corporate governance literature by examining the company secretary‟s role 
in relation to voluntary disclosures. Previous studies have investigated the role of 
other guardians of corporate governance such as directors and auditors in respect of 
voluntary disclosures. However, prior studies appear to have neglected to examine 
the company secretary‟s guardian role in corporate governance. Investigating the role 
of the company secretary is appropriate since the MCCG and BSLR expressly 
provide for directors to have access to the advice of a company secretary. 
Second, this research is also expected to make a contribution to the voluntary 
disclosure literature by testing Dye‟s voluntary disclosure theory in the Malaysian 
setting. As such the results of the study could provide evidence that tests Dye‟s 
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voluntary disclosure theory, which suggest that a good quality company (in this case 
a well-governed company) is more prepared to voluntarily disclose more information 
(corporate governance information) to distinguish itself from a poor quality company 
(poorly-governed company). Most prior studies of voluntary disclosure look at 
incentive factors as independent variables that affect voluntary disclosure of financial 
and non-financial information in annual reports (Collett & Hrasky 2005; Healy & 
Palepu 2001; Meek et al. 1995). However, in this study specific incentive factors 
(capital market transactions and stock-based incentives) are applied to voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information and are considered as moderating 
variables rather than independent variables. Including these incentive factors as 
moderating variables enables a determination of which of these variables affects the 
relationship between corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance information. 
Third, this study is expected to contribute to the corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure literature in terms of measurement tools used to capture corporate 
governance and voluntary disclosure. The study uses a more comprehensive measure 
of corporate governance quality compared to prior studies that commonly use one or 
more governance mechanisms only. In addition, the study also adopts a more 
extensive and robust measure of voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
information than previous studies. Indexes used to measure corporate governance 
quality and voluntary disclosures of corporate governance are based on the MSWG 
corporate governance scorecard which consists of Basic Compliance Score (BCS) 
and International Best Practices (IBP) components. Furthermore, the study spells out 
the definition of an in-house qualified company secretary, which is then used to 
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develop a tool to measure the in-house qualified company secretary variable. It does 
this by distinguishing between a professional qualified company secretary and a 
license holder, and an in-house versus an external company secretary. 
Fourth, this research project anticipates contributing to the corporate governance 
literature in Malaysia by examining voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
information during the time period following the introduction of the BPCD in 2004. 
Previous Malaysian research has studied voluntary disclosure during earlier time 
periods. For example (1) before the Asian Financial crisis 1997-1998 (Hossain et al. 
1994), (2) before the introduction of the MCCG i.e. 1995-2000 (Haniffa & Cooke 
2002) and (3) immediately after the implementation of MCCG i.e. 2001‟s data 
(Ghazali & Weetman 2006). Some researchers recommend that the study of 
voluntary disclosures should be extended to the period after 2001 (Ghazali & 
Weetman 2006).  
 
 1.6 Delimitations of scope 
There are three main delimitations of scope placed on this study. First, the study‟s 
fields of corporate governance and voluntary disclosure are extremely broad and the 
scope of this study will only encompass a small part of the wider area. The aims of 
this research are to investigate the relationship between corporate governance quality 
and voluntary disclosure, the impact of incentive factors on the relationship and 
whether an in-house qualified company secretary promotes voluntary disclosure 
practices. Other aspects of corporate governance and voluntary disclosure are beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. 
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Second, the study does not test whether corporate governance quality or voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information have improved over time or as a 
result of increased regulatory requirements or guidance. The relationships examined 
in this research pertain to just one year, 2007, and it is not the intention of this 
research to make time series comparisons.  
Third, this study focuses on a specific geographical region and the sample of this 
study is limited to publicly listed companies in Malaysia. Therefore the results only 
reflect what was happening in that region in relation to a specific sample within a 
specific timeframe and cannot be generalised to apply to a broader context. 
Fourth, the study looks at annual report disclosures in relation to dependent, 
independent, moderator and control variables. As such other forms of media are not 
used as source of data and are beyond the scope of this study. 
Finally, even though certain relationships between variables are calculated, this study 
is not causal in nature and will not be examining the complex cause and effect 
relationships between variables. This type of analysis falls beyond the scope of this 
research.  
 
1.7 Outline of the dissertation 
Chapter 2 deals with theory and literature review that are relevant to this research. 
First, it identifies and describes the theories used to underpin this research. Second, 
literature on incentive factors affecting voluntary disclosure is analysed. Third, prior 
research into voluntary disclosure is reviewed commencing with a discussion of 
research involving voluntary disclosure in general and then focusing on voluntary 
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disclosure of corporate governance information. Fourth, a review of corporate 
governance literature is briefly discussed. Fifth, prior literature on corporate 
governance quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices is 
examined. Sixth, a review of the company secretary literature is covered with 
specific emphasis placed on characteristics of in-house qualified company 
secretaries. Finally, gaps in the literature are identified and presented. 
Chapter 3 explains and presents the research design. The conceptual model of the 
study is presented and then hypotheses are developed. 
Chapter 4 describes and justifies the research method employed in this study. First, 
various sections describe the measurement of constructs for dependent, independent, 
moderating and control variables. Second, the population, sample selection and data 
collection sources are explained. Third, the data analysis methods are detailed. 
Chapter 5 contains an analysis of the data and presents results obtained. First, 
descriptive statistics provide some general observations about data collected. Second, 
correlations results are discussed and explained. Third, results of tests of interaction 
effects are presented and discussed. Fourth, regressions results are analysed and 
evaluated for each hypothesis. Finally, results of additional analysis are presented, 
including tests for assumptions of linearity, homoscedasticity as well as normality. 
Chapter 6 presents a discussion of major findings from this study in view of previous 
research and literature. Conclusions from major findings are then discussed. Finally, 
recommendations, limitations and future research directions in relation to both 
theoretical aspects and practical implications are expressed.  
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2 Theories and Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The aims of this chapter are to review the theories and prior literature that are 
relevant to the research. The Chapter is organised as follows: the main theories of 
voluntary disclosure are briefly discussed in the next section. Section 2.3 presents 
and discusses reasons why signalling and agency theory are relevant to this research 
project. Section 2.4 presents prior literature on incentives for voluntary disclosure. 
Section 2.5 reviews the prior research on voluntary disclosure in general and then 
specifically on voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information. Section 2.6 
reviews corporate governance and voluntary disclosure literature globally and in 
Malaysia. Section 2.7 presents the prior literature on company secretaries in terms of 
their roles and responsibilities as guardians of corporate governance. Section 2.8 
concludes the Chapter by highlighting the gaps in the literature. 
 
2.2 Theories of voluntary disclosure  
This chapter commences with an outline of voluntary disclosure theories as these 
theories underpin the study‟s conceptual model. The majority of voluntary disclosure 
theories are concerned with the role of disclosure in capital markets. Theories of 
voluntary disclosure can be broadly categorised into two main groups: economic-
based theories (includes agency theory, proprietary costs theory and signalling 
theory) and socio-political theories (such as political economy theory, legitimacy 
theory and stakeholder theory). Each of these groups is discussed in the following 
sections. 
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2.2.1 Economics based theories 
Agency theory 
Agency theory is commonly used in the corporate governance literature to explain a 
firm‟s or manager‟s disclosure decisions. Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed 
agency theory which explains the principal-agent relationship between managers and 
shareholders. The separation of „ownership and control‟ in a firm creates agency 
conflicts. These conflicts are exaggerated further by information asymmetry 
problems. This is another aspect of agency theory that explains the core insight of a 
firm‟s disclosure choices. Managers as insiders are considered to be in an informed 
position because they possess private information about the firm‟s future value. On 
the other hand, shareholders who are outsiders have to bear the risk of losing their 
money due to a lack of information.  
An important aspect of agency theory is the need to control the behaviour of 
managers through monitoring mechanisms such as corporate governance and 
voluntary disclosure. The adoption of these governance mechanisms enables 
shareholders to mitigate agency problems and at the same time reduce agency costs 
associated with any decrease of firm value as well as monitoring and bonding costs. 
Stock-based incentives are another monitoring and bonding mechanism that are 
argued by agency theory to be able to reduce agency costs (Jensen & Murphy 1990). 
Managers that are paid in the form of stock ownership by the firm are more likely to 
make decisions that are in the best interest of the firm and its shareholders. This is 
known as incentive alignment.  
Several empirical studies have relied on Jensen and Meckling‟s (1976) agency theory 
to explain the link between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. For 
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example Dey (2008) investigates the association between corporate governance and 
agency conflicts. He claims that corporate governance is one of the possible 
mechanisms that are able to reduce agency costs especially in a firm with high 
agency conflicts. In a similar vein, enhancing a firm‟s corporate governance is more 
likely to ensure that managers do not deviate from their duties to shareholders 
(Farber 2005). Others have investigated the relationship between agency theory and 
voluntary disclosure of financial information and non-financial information. For 
example, Bassett, Koh and Tutticci (2007) apply agency theory in explaining 
managers‟ decisions to disclose employee stock options. They argue that managers 
may have an incentive to convince shareholders that they are acting optimally by 
disclosing voluntarily, if they know that shareholders will seek bonding and 
monitoring activities to control their behaviours. The same argument is also used in 
investigating voluntary disclosure of risk management and internal control reporting 
(Bronson et al. 2006).  
Agrawal and Gershon (1987) investigate the relationship between stock-based 
incentives and the firm‟s decisions on investment and financing. The findings of the 
study are consistent with agency theory arguments that stock-based incentives are 
able to reduce agency problems. Stock-based incentives are also found to be able to 
provide the necessary incentives to managers in making strategic decisions on the 
frequency and quality of firms‟ disclosures (Nagar et al. 2003). A study that 
investigates the association between voluntary disclosure and insider trading found 
that managers with stock-based incentives will use voluntary disclosures as a 
mechanism to protect themselves from insider trading allegations (Neo 1999). Thus 
these studies have shown that stock-based incentives are able to increase the 
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alignment of managers‟ interests with the shareholders, reduce agency problems and 
monitor managers‟ behaviours.  
Signalling theory 
Signalling theory is focused on information asymmetry problems among parties that 
are involved in the allocation of firm funds. Information asymmetry problems occur 
when one party (manager) has more information than the other party (investor) 
(Akerlof 1970; Levin 2001) about a firm‟s quality and how this relates to a firm‟s 
future profits. In this situation investors with no information about firm quality will 
then value all stocks at the same price which is a weighted average of their general 
perceptions. Hence managers of high quality firms will have incentives to provide 
additional disclosure to signal a firm‟s quality to investors in order to avoid 
depreciation of a firm‟s stock value. Firms that do not disclose additional information 
are viewed to be of poor quality. In addition, a less informed investor will create an 
adverse selection effect which lowers their willingness to trade in a firm‟s stock and 
this in turn will reduce the liquidity of a firm‟s stock (Leuz & Wysocki 2008). To be 
effective, the signal must not be easily copied by another firm and must conform to 
the actual quality of the firm (in terms of firm share value) (Morris 1987).  
Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Whalen (2007) have studied the direct relationship between 
corporate governance and information asymmetry around quarterly earnings 
announcements. The results of their study show that better governed firms provide 
assurance to investors about the lower risks involved in investing in their firm as a 
result of an increase in disclosure. Furthermore, managers also have incentives to 
provide voluntary disclosures as a way to reduce information asymmetry and gain 
benefits from the lower cost of capital (Botosan 1997; Dhaliwal et al. 2009; Sengupta 
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1998), increase in capital market liquidity (Healy et al. 1999) and higher firm value 
(Lang et al. 2009). A recent study by Wei-Peng, Huimin, Tsui-Ling and Soushan 
(2010) find that firm needs for external financing can improve the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm value. Collett and Hrasky‟s (2005) study 
shows that firms tend to increase voluntary disclosure in annual reports prior to 
financing activity. As such firms also become more strategic in making disclosure 
decisions especially in terms of the timing of disclosures. This suggests that firms 
planning to raise external financing will have more incentive to make improvements 
to the overall quality of their corporate governance and use voluntary disclosures to 
signal their strong governance. 
Dye (1985) developed a voluntary disclosure theory based on the information 
asymmetry problem that exists between managers and investors. The voluntary 
disclosure theory of Dye (1985) predicts that good quality firms will disclose their 
information more completely to distinguish themselves from poor quality firms. He 
argues that managers will disclose all of their non-proprietary information whether 
good or bad to avoid the firm‟s value being depreciated. However, there are three 
main reasons for management failure to disclose non-proprietary information. The 
first reason is that investors are uncertain about whether management possesses a 
firm‟s private information, and as consequence managers may be successful in 
hiding „bad‟ information. The second reason is that managers possess an enormous 
amount of private information which may include both proprietary and non-
proprietary information. In the situation where private information contains 
proprietary information, managers will normally choose not to disclose it. The third 
reason originates from the agency relationship between managers and shareholders. 
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Non-disclosure of non-proprietary information by managers is considered the best 
solution if disclosure of this information worsens the agency relationship between 
them (Dye 1985). Dye‟s voluntary disclosure theory is well accepted and has been 
used extensively in voluntary disclosure literature. 
Several empirical studies support Dye‟s (1985) voluntary disclosure theory. In a 
study of voluntary disclosure of bad news, Skinner (1994) extends Dye‟s voluntary 
disclosure theory by suggesting that good firms will disclose more good news to 
distinguish themselves from bad firms. He suggests that firms are motivated to 
voluntarily disclose good news in a desire to signal to investors that the firm is doing 
well. By contrast, bad news disclosure is influenced by a need to prevent litigation 
costs and a reduction of firm value. Clarkson, Richardson and Vasvari (2008) test 
Dye‟s voluntary disclosure theory using the level of voluntary environmental 
disclosures of US companies. Their results show that superior environmental 
performers are more likely to disclose environmental performance information 
voluntarily. This result is consistent with the expectation of Dye‟s voluntary 
disclosure theory which suggests that good quality firms will disclose more 
information. Similar results are also produced in a study by Langberg and 
Sivaramakrishnan (2008) who examine the impact of the financial analyst‟s role on 
voluntary disclosures. All of these studies provide support to the argument that good 
quality firms will signal their „quality‟ through voluntary disclosures.  
2.2.2 Socio-Political theories 
Socio-political theories consist of political economy theory, legitimacy theory and 
stakeholder theory (Patten 2002). These theories anticipate that the relationship 
between environmental performance and the level of voluntary disclosure is opposite 
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to that predicted by Dye‟s voluntary disclosure theory - firms tend to increase 
disclosure when their quality is poor. These theories suggest that social and political 
factors faced by firms determine their levels of social disclosures. Specifically 
legitimacy theory argues that a firm‟s economic legitimacy is observed by the 
market, while social legitimacy is observed by public policy practices. If firms 
believe that their social legitimacy is being threatened, then they would have an 
incentive to become actively involved in public policy practices by providing 
additional disclosure and reporting as a legitimizing device (Cho & Patten 2007).  
There are number of reasons why these theories may not be relevant to this research. 
First, the predictions of the above theories tend to relate to voluntary disclosures of 
environmental and corporate social responsibility rather than to voluntary disclosure 
of corporate governance information. Second, corporate governance information is 
mainly useful to investors (i.e. capital providers) rather than to other stakeholders of 
the company because it provides information on how well a firm operates internally 
and the reliability of its accounting and reporting. This information is of more 
concern to investors than to the broader set of stakeholders. Third, the main 
incentives to disclose under socio-political theories are related to legitimising firm 
activity as well as responding to pressure from various social and political groups 
rather than the mechanisms used to monitor manager behaviour. On the other hand, 
the main incentive to disclose corporate governance information voluntarily is to 
reduce information asymmetry problems and to act as a mechanism to monitor 
manager behaviours. As such, socio-political theories are not as relevant as signalling 
and agency theories to explain voluntary disclosures of corporate governance 
information which the main focus of this research. 
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2.3 Why signalling and agency theories are relevant to this research 
Signalling and agency theories are relevant to this research project as they are able to 
explain the conditions under which a company is likely to voluntarily disclose 
corporate governance information. As mentioned earlier, a „good‟ quality firm, in 
this case a better governed firm in terms of corporate governance quality, is more 
likely to disclose more information (corporate governance information) voluntarily 
compared to a poor quality firm. Better governed firms are claimed by Dey (2008) to 
possess higher inherent agency conflicts. He has shown that firms with high agency 
problems have a tendency to improve corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosures in order to mitigate agency conflicts within the firm. Furthermore, a 
study by Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Whalen (2007) has also found evidence which 
shows that better governed firms are likely to improve corporate governance and 
voluntary disclosures to reduce information asymmetry problems between managers 
and investors around quarterly management earnings forecasts announcements. Thus, 
in this respect voluntary disclosures can serve two main purposes. The first is to 
signal firm quality which subsequently reduces information asymmetry and 
secondly, to act as a monitoring mechanism which lowers agency conflicts. 
Healy and Palepu (2001) have used agency, signalling and proprietary cost theories 
in their review of empirical studies of disclosure in capital markets. Empirical studies 
of financial and non-financial accounting disclosures have also used agency and 
signalling theories in examining firms‟ and managers‟ voluntary disclosure choices 
(Deumes & Knechel 2008; Mitchell 2006; Watson et al. 2002). It seems therefore 
that greater insights can be gained into why managers voluntarily disclose corporate 
governance information by drawing on signalling and agency theories.  
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Apart from the above discussion, there are four reasons why agency theory and 
signalling theory complement each other. First, information asymmetry problems are 
a necessary condition for signalling theory, and without them the need for signalling 
does not exist (Morris 1987). While, „separation of ownership and control‟ as well as 
monitoring costs in agency theory imply information asymmetry problems between 
managers and shareholders. Thus, in both theories the condition of information 
asymmetry is present and not conflicting with each other. 
Second, signalling theory mentions the concept of „quality‟. Agency theory does not 
mention the concept of quality but uses the concept of firm value. However, if the 
concept of quality is taken from the market perspective then quality can also be 
considered in terms of a firm‟s future value. As such these theories are compatible 
with each other because the main focus of these theories is to maximise profits.  
Third, the agency costs in agency theory refer to monitoring and bonding costs 
(Gaffikin 2008). Monitoring costs are costs incurred by shareholders to monitor 
managers‟ behaviours. These costs include resources used to employ an effective 
board of directors, contract auditors and establish various board committees. 
Bonding costs are incurred by managers to bond themselves to act in a manner that 
serves the interests of shareholders. These are costs related to time and effort that 
managers put in to prepare additional reports or disclosures for shareholders. 
Information asymmetry leads to costs in the form of opportunities foregone by 
managers of good quality firms if they are raising equity or debt capital (Botosan 
1997; Sengupta 1998). Less will be paid for a firm‟s equity or debt capital if 
information asymmetry is high compared to when there is little or no information 
asymmetry. According to Morris (1987), for signalling and agency theories to be 
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consistent, signalling costs must be borne by managers. Consistent with agency 
theory, signalling theory also assumes that managers of good quality firms will bear 
the cost of devaluation of a firm‟s share price and litigation cost if a firm fails to 
disclose both good news and bad news. As such agency costs (bonding costs) and 
information asymmetry costs which are borne by managers can provide incentive for 
them to disclose more information for the purpose to reduce such costs.  
Fourth, three common bonding devices in agency theory are management 
compensation packages, contractual debt agreements and dividends. All of these 
bonding devices, as illustrated by Morris (1987), act as signals as well as bonding 
devices that encourage managers to disclose more information. Signalling theory is 
concerned with types of signals (good or bad news) that reflect firm quality. This 
signal can cover all aspects of firm quality, for example quality of corporate 
disclosures, quality of boards and auditors, attractive dividend policy and attractive 
compensation packages, which if disclosed can signal firm quality. In the absence of 
signalling (non-disclosure), the investors will assume that those firms are of poor 
quality and this will consequently lower the firms‟ stock value. Therefore managers 
of firms have incentives to disclose either good or bad news to avoid devaluation of 
their firms‟ stock. Consistent with agency theory, all of these signals can also act as 
monitoring and bonding devices. 
Based on the above discussion, there is some degree of consistency, complementarity 
and compatibility of these theories with each other. Thus, this research will apply 
signalling and agency theories in building a conceptual model that explain company 
decisions to adopt voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information.  
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2.4 Incentives for voluntary disclosure 
Prior to the voluntary disclosure literature being reviewed in more in-depth, the 
factors that influence disclosure decisions of managers are considered. This section 
provides discussion on several incentives that influence managers to make voluntary 
disclosures. It then highlights the incentives that are relevant for this research.  
2.4.1 Incentives for voluntary disclosure in general 
Some of the incentive factors that influence firm voluntary disclosure decisions have 
been discussed earlier in agency and signalling theories section. Among others, the 
main incentives for managers to make voluntary disclosures are to reduce 
information asymmetry and agency problems which can then reduce the monitoring 
costs and increase firm value. Healy and Palepu (2001) have classified these 
incentive factors into six categories of motivations, which are also known as 
determining factors (Collett & Hrasky 2005; Gandia 2008) and reasons (Sheridan et 
al. 2006) for voluntary disclosure. These incentive factors are capital market 
transactions, corporate control contests, stock-based incentives, litigation costs, 
proprietary costs and management talent signalling.  
Under capital market transactions, managers of firms that intend to raise external 
finance through issuance of new equity and debt have incentives to voluntarily 
disclose additional information to reduce information asymmetry problems between 
inside and outside investors. By disclosing voluntarily, the information asymmetry 
problem can be reduced, which consequently lowers the cost of capital for a firm to 
raise external finance. 
The corporate control contests argument is that shareholders normally blame 
managers for a firm‟s poor accounting and stock performance. Hence, managers will 
34 
 
use voluntary disclosures to explain the reason for poor firm performance, to reduce 
the possibility of undervaluation or avoid losing their jobs.  
Stock-based incentives can encourage managers to disclose their private information 
to avoid insider trading allegations. There are two forms of stock based-incentives: 
stock-based compensation and CEO/management shareholdings. Firms that offer 
stock-based compensation as part of total compensation packages for managers have 
incentives to adopt voluntary disclosure to reduce stock depreciations and increase 
firms‟ values. Managers who own stock in a firm are less likely to misappropriate a 
firm‟s resources because they would suffer the same loss as other shareholders if 
their stock value depreciated (Fama & Jensen 1983). It is suggested that stock-based 
incentives may be able to align managers‟ interests with shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). 
The threat of shareholder litigation can encourage firms‟ managers to increase as 
well as reduce voluntary disclosures. Managers of firms with bad earnings news have 
incentives to disclose that information earlier to reduce the tendency of legal action 
taken by shareholders against managers for failure to adequately provide or disclose 
timely information. The threat of litigation can also potentially reduce incentives for 
managers to provide voluntary disclosures of forward-looking information such as 
earning forecasts. 
With regards to management talent signalling, managers have incentives to make 
voluntary disclosures of positive information to signal their management talent in 
anticipating and responding to future changes to investors as well as to potential 
employers. Investors will see this information as a favourable assessment of a 
manager‟s ability. For example managers of a firm that report positive profits will 
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send a signal to potential investors and employers that they have superior skill and 
talent. As such they expect better compensation contracts will be offered to them in 
the future. However there have been limited studies into this type of incentive. 
For proprietary costs it is predicted that managers may be reluctant to voluntarily 
disclose information if they believe that the information may be harmful to their 
competitive position. In contrast to the five previous incentive factors, proprietary 
costs assume that there is no conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. 
In addition, the degree and nature of competition may influence the incentives a firm 
has to voluntarily disclose information.  
Capital market transactions and stock-based incentives hypotheses basically are 
based on agency and signalling theories which focus on the aspect of information 
asymmetry and agency problems that need to be overcome by managers. Thus these 
incentives (capital market transactions and stock-based incentives) can also act as a 
signal as well as a monitoring and bonding device that can help managers to reduce 
these problems. However the other incentive factors (corporate control contests, 
litigation costs, proprietary costs and management talent signalling) are primarily 
based on signalling theory to explain the conditions under which managers make 
voluntary disclosures. Further discussion on the reasons why capital market 
transactions and stock-based incentives are possible incentives that explain voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information in the Malaysian context is presented 
in the next section. 
2.4.2 Incentive to voluntarily disclose corporate governance information 
From the discussion of the various incentive factors that motivate managers to 
voluntarily increase disclosure of information, the study now focuses on relevant 
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incentives for voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information based on 
prior literature.  
Proprietary information is a firm‟s private information that has elements that are 
sensitive to future value (financial and market) which can cause a firm to suffer 
losses if such information is disclosed to the public (Dye 1985, 1986). For example, 
firm product and market strategies are types of information that are associated with 
proprietary costs that can affect firm future earnings if they are exposed to 
competitors. In contrast, voluntary disclosures of corporate governance information 
have minimal proprietary costs since this information is probably not of great worth 
to firm competitors (Labelle 2002). 
It is also difficult to claim that voluntary corporate governance disclosures might be 
linked with attempts to avoid litigation costs (Collett & Hrasky 2005; Ghazali & 
Weetman 2006). According to Sheridan, Jones and Marston (2006) the litigation cost 
hypothesis is more relevant to companies operating in the U.S. rather than in 
developing countries such as Malaysia. This is because investor protection rights and 
legal institutions in these countries are weaker compared to developed countries 
(Claessens & Fan 2000; La Porta et al. 2002; Mitton 2002).  
Furthermore, Malaysian companies are characterized by a high concentration of 
ownership and family owned businesses which suggest that there is no active market 
for corporate control and takeovers (Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Haniffa & Hudaib 
2006; Thillainathan 1998). As such the corporate control hypothesis is not likely to 
explain voluntary disclosure in the Malaysian context.  
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Currently empirical studies into management talent signalling are limited in terms of 
providing concrete support for this type of incentive. Hence, the proprietary cost, 
litigation cost, corporate control contest and management talent signalling 
hypotheses offer the least likely potential explanation for voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance information in Malaysia. 
The capital market transactions hypothesis suggests that the benefits of an increase in 
voluntary disclosures reduces investors‟ investment risks (Bushman & Smith 2001); 
increases numbers of investors following (Healy & Palepu 2001) and reduces 
information asymmetry (Lang & Lundholm 2000). Empirical studies on the 
association between voluntary disclosure of corporate governance and capital market 
transactions have also provided strong support for the arguments that capital market 
transactions provide an incentive to firms to increase corporate governance 
disclosures. Firms anticipating issuance of new capital in the future are found to be 
more forthcoming to disclose corporate governance information in annual reports 
(Bujaki & McConomy 2002; Collett & Hrasky 2005). The benefit of lower cost of 
raising capital is suggested as one of the reasons that encourage managers to provide 
more information (Botosan 1997; Chen et al. 2007; Eng et al. 2001).  
Stock-based incentives propose that voluntary disclosure is used by managers to 
reduce the possibility of a reduction of a firm‟s value in a situation where managers 
are offered stock-based incentives as part of their total remuneration packages. As 
suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), managers who own equity in a firm do 
not have the same incentives to misappropriate a firm‟s resources, since they would 
suffer directly from reduced share value while managers who do not own equity in a 
firm would not suffer the same consequences. Prior studies that link stock-based 
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incentives and voluntary disclosure have used agency theory to explain the 
relationship. For example, a study by Armando (2000) suggests that once controlling 
owners (managers) obtain effective control of a firm, their cash-flow rights will also 
increase. These cash-flow rights serve as a credible commitment to managers who 
own equity in a firm to improve the alignment of interest between managers and 
shareholders and mitigate the effects of entrenchment. A consistent result was also 
produced by a study which examined the association between disclosure activities of 
managers and stock-based incentives of US companies (Nagar et al. 2003). The 
results of the study suggest that stock-based incentives are able to mitigate the 
agency problem and enhance alignment of managers‟ interests with those of 
shareholders. 
In this study, it is argued that incentives for companies to disclose corporate 
governance information are to reduce agency costs, information asymmetry problems 
and market devaluations. Based on the above analysis, capital market transactions 
and stock-based incentives are expected to be more likely to explain the incentives 
that encourage managers of firms to voluntarily disclose corporate governance 
information in annual reports. 
 
2.5 Voluntary disclosure literature 
The two major streams of literature relevant to this research are voluntary disclosure 
in general and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information in 
particular. This section provides an overview of prior literature in these areas, with 
the emphasis being on voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information, 
which is closely aligned with the focus of this research. 
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2.5.1 Voluntary disclosure in general 
Voluntary disclosure involves inclusion and reporting of various types of voluntary 
disclosure in either annual reports or in other disclosure media such as company 
newsletters, press releases, and company and stock exchange websites. Prior studies 
have given considerable attention to the disclosure, reporting and provision of 
additional information contained in annual reports (Barako et al. 2006; Collett & 
Hrasky 2005; Gray et al. 1995; Hossain et al. 1995; Langberg & Sivaramakrishnan 
2008; Mitchell 2006; Watson et al. 2002). The annual report is regarded as the 
primary document that contains a vast amount of corporate information in relation to 
the strategic, financial and non-financial activities of a company. According to Meek, 
Roberts and Gray (1995) strategic and financial information have obvious decision 
relevance to investors. Non-financial information is generally directed more towards 
a company‟s social accountability and is aimed at a broader group of stakeholders 
than just the investors. As such, the annual report is used for different reasons by 
various groups of people namely investors, creditors, financial analysts, regulators 
and government and non-government agencies.  
Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995) examine voluntary disclosure of three types of 
information contained in annual reports of multinational corporations from the USA, 
UK and continental Europe. They divided voluntary disclosure information in annual 
reports into three categories. The first category is strategic information. This 
information relates to a firm‟s corporate information, corporate strategy, acquisitions 
and disposals, research and development, and future prospects. The second category 
is non-financial and consists of information about directors, employee, social policy 
and value added information. The third category is financial and is comprised of 
segmental information, financial review, foreign currency and stock price 
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information. They conclude that the factors affecting a firm‟s disclosure decisions 
are expected to vary by type of information. This suggests that the determining 
factors affecting a firm‟s voluntary disclosure practices are different depending on 
the type of information disclosed.  
Prior studies on voluntary disclosure in relation to strategic and financial information 
in annual reports tend to focus on the reporting of financial ratios (Mitchell 2006; 
Watson et al. 2002) and management earnings forecasts (Ajinkya et al. 2005; 
Karamanou & Vafeas 2005). Another group of studies examines voluntary disclosure 
of non-financial information, which specifically looks at disclosure of corporate 
governance information (Bujaki & McConomy 2002; Collett & Hrasky 2005); 
reporting on internal risk management and control systems (Bronson et al. 2006; 
Deumes & Knechel 2008); employee stock options disclosures (Bassett et al. 2007); 
environmental and corporate social responsibility reporting (Clarkson et al. 2008; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2009) in annual reports; and a firm‟s website and separate documents 
accompanying annual reports e.g. sustainability reporting.  
Studies of voluntary disclosure have identified several determining factors that affect 
a firm‟s decision to adopt voluntary disclosures. These determining factors are 
divided into three categories: firm-specific factors, governance attributes and cultural 
characteristics. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) have divided firm-specific factors into 
three main components: firm structure (size, leverage, diversification, complexity, 
assets-in-place and ownership); firm performance (profitability); and market related 
factors (industry type, listing status, auditor type, listing age and foreign activities). 
These firm-specific factors are commonly included in the prior studies of voluntary 
disclosure and are often included as additional or controlling variables in a regression 
41 
 
equation model. Prior studies that investigate the link between governance attributes 
and voluntary disclosure commonly use individual corporate governance 
mechanisms (Eng & Mak 2003; Ho & Wong 2001) or construct a one dimensional 
governance metric by summing a few governance variables (Beekes & Brown 2006; 
Dey 2008). Commonly the cultural characteristics measure looks at individual 
background such as race, religion and education background of directors (Haniffa & 
Cooke 2002) as well as the legal origin of a country in which the study is focused 
(Bushman et al. 2004). 
Previous studies have examined how firm-specific factors influence a firm‟s level of 
voluntary disclosure of information (Hossain et al. 1995; Hossain et al. 1994; Watson 
et al. 2002). Hossain, Tan and Adams (1994) investigated whether firm size, 
leverage, assets-in-place, ownership structure and type of auditors determine the 
levels of voluntary disclosures by listed companies in Malaysia. They found that firm 
size, listing status and ownership structures are significantly related to the level of 
information voluntarily disclosed by listed Malaysian companies. Hossain, Perera 
and Rahman (1995) subsequently found size and listing status to be the main 
determining factors that affect the level of voluntary reporting. They also found that 
a firm‟s level of leverage is associated with voluntary disclosure by New Zealand 
listed firms. In their study they did not examine ownership structure. Another study 
by Watson, Shrives and Marston (2002) investigated the extent of voluntary 
disclosure reporting of specific information i.e. financial ratios in annual reports of 
313 UK companies. Consistent with earlier studies, they found size to be associated 
with voluntarily disclosure levels. In addition industry type and firm performance 
was also found to be associated with voluntary disclosures of financial ratios.  
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Most studies use corporate governance variables such as presence of non-executive 
directors, separation of Chairman and CEO roles; presence of family members on 
boards, frequency of meetings and audit committees in examining voluntary 
disclosures. Eng and Mak (2003) and Ho and Wong (2001) found that an increase in 
the number of non-executive directors on a board, the presence of an audit 
committee, and the separation of CEO and Chairman roles all influence the levels of 
voluntary disclosures of all information types in annual reports. Studies into 
voluntary disclosure of strategic information reveal that the presence of effective 
corporate governance mechanisms significantly influences levels of voluntary 
disclosures. For example, Ajinka, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2005) found that the 
presence of non-executive directors and institutional investors is more likely to 
influence firms to issue management earnings forecasts.  
In a similar vein, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) investigated how effective corporate 
governance attributes are associated with voluntary disclosures of earnings forecasts. 
They captured effective corporate governance using size of board, proportion of non-
executive directors, meeting frequency of board and audit committees, directors‟ 
ownership, and institutional ownership. They reported that firms with effective 
governance mechanisms are more forthcoming in reporting and publishing 
management‟s earnings forecasts voluntarily. In addition, studies that investigate 
voluntary disclosures of non-financial information also examine the importance of 
governance attributes in explaining voluntary disclosures of corporate governance 
practices (Labelle 2002), internal risks and controls (Deumes & Knechel 2008), and 
stock option disclosures (Bassett et al. 2007). Thus, characteristics of boards of 
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directors, audit committees and auditors are used by prior studies to examine link 
between firms‟ corporate governance and voluntary disclosures. 
In relation to cultural characteristics, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) examine the 
importance of various cultural characteristics of directors including the race, religion 
and education backgrounds as possible determinants of voluntary disclosures in 
annual reports of Malaysian listed companies. They find that one of the cultural 
factors (race) is significantly associated with the extent of voluntary disclosures. 
Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) investigate whether a country‟s legal origins 
and political economy characteristics determine corporate transparency in 46 
countries. They factor analyse a range of measures capturing countries‟ firm-specific 
information into two categories: financial transparency and governance transparency. 
The empirical analysis in their study shows that a country‟s legal origins 
significantly influence governance transparency, whereas financial transparency is 
mostly determined by political economy. These studies provide some evidence on 
the relationship between race of directors and a country‟s legal system and voluntary 
disclosures.  
Economic consequences of voluntary disclosures are another important area which 
researchers have investigated in relation to the extent and quality of voluntary 
disclosures. Leuz and Wysocki (2008) divided the economic consequences of 
voluntary disclosures into two categories, which consist of 1) firm-specific benefits 
and costs; and 2) market-wide benefits and costs. Firm-specific benefits of voluntary 
disclosures are associated with improved market liquidity, reduced cost of capital 
and increased firm valuation. Empirical studies have found consistent evidence 
which supports the proposition that voluntary disclosures can benefit a firm by 
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increasing market liquidity (Healy et al. 1999), lowering the cost of capital (Botosan 
1997; Dhaliwal et al. 2009; Sengupta 1998) and improving firm value (Brown & 
Caylor 2006; Nowland 2008a). However, there are costs involved in producing this 
type of disclosure. The costs include higher direct costs (Meek et al. 1995) and 
proprietary costs (Verrecchia 1983, 1990).  
The market-wide economic consequences of voluntary disclosures can have outward 
benefits and costs to other firms in different industries through disclosure of 
proprietary information (Leuz & Wysocki 2008). Disclosure of information such as 
operating performance and governance quality provide useful benchmarks that help 
investors in assessing other firms‟ managerial efficiencies which can in turn reduce 
monitoring costs. It is also useful in helping investors to evaluate another firm‟s 
value, as well as reducing the duplication efforts of information intermediaries. This 
in turn reduces a firm‟s cost of producing information. In terms of market wide costs, 
increases in voluntary disclosure may increase the risk of losing present and potential 
investors from non-disclosing firms to disclosing firms. Furthermore, misleading 
reporting made by one firm may have a negative impact on other firms in the same 
industry. Lastly increase in disclosure may also cause high risk-tolerant investors to 
hold smaller amounts of shares due to the adverse selection effect which reduces the 
efficiency of risk sharing.  
Overall, numerous studies have been conducted to research various aspects of 
voluntary disclosure, namely, type of media used, information types, determining 
factors, and economic consequences of voluntary disclosure. In short, the governance 
attributes, firm-specific factors and cultural characteristics are among the most 
common determining factors that have been found to affect voluntary disclosure. 
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However, prior studies have also found that different types of voluntary disclosure 
will be affected by different types of determining factors. The economic 
consequences of voluntary disclosure can also play an important role in influencing 
firm‟s disclosure decisions. As such, understanding the conditions and the reasons 
for managers and companies to adopt voluntary disclosure practices specifically in 
relation to corporate governance information is essential. 
2.5.2 Voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information 
Empirical studies on voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information are 
sparse. Based on a review of the literature, there are only four other studies that have 
examined voluntary disclosure focusing specifically on corporate governance 
information. First, Bujaki and McConomy (2002) examined the factors that influence 
the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosures and the choices of disclosure 
media by Canadian listed companies. In this study, the researchers developed their 
own disclosure checklist in order to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance. This disclosure checklist is based on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSE) guidelines. Their study documents that the extent of corporate 
governance disclosures varies widely among Canadian listed companies. In 
particular companies planning to raise external finance in the near future are more 
likely than other firms to choose annual reports as their form of communication. This 
suggests that these companies are being strategic in their choice of disclosure 
medium and the extent of their voluntary disclosure practices.  
Second, and consistent with prior studies, Collett and Hrasky (2005) found evidence 
that incentives exist for some listed Australian firms to voluntarily disclose corporate 
governance information in the absence of a mandatory requirement. They also 
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developed a disclosure checklist as a proxy for the voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance information in annual reports and used capital market transactions (issue 
of new equity and debt capital) as the independent variables. The results of the study 
show a significant association between voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
practices with companies that intend to issue new equity in the future but not for 
issuance of new debt capital. Hence, firms that intend to raise external finance are 
more likely to disclose voluntarily corporate governance information in annual 
reports in order to gain benefits from a lower cost of capital.  
Third, in contrast with the above studies, Labelle (2002) examines the incentives for 
companies to engage in better quality disclosure of corporate governance practices in 
the Statement of Corporate Governance Practices (SCGP). He used the Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) corporate governance disclosure index to 
measure companies‟ corporate governance disclosures. The study did not find a 
consistent and significant relationship between disclosure quality of corporate 
governance practices and firm financing activity, firm performance or other 
corporate governance variables. He suggests that the results indicate that the 
determinants of corporate governance disclosure quality are not the same as for other 
aspects of a firm‟s financial disclosure policy. He also points out the limitations of 
the study which might be the reason for the inconsistency in the results. One of the 
reasons is the type of disclosure medium used in the study. He argues that the 
information disclosed in the SCGP is less standardised, communicates less precise 
measures of firm performance and overall represents a less credible information 
medium than the annual report. Another limitation of the study is the weakness of the 
measurement tool used to measure corporate governance practices. 
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From the above discussion, there are three main points that need to be considered in 
investigating voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information. First, the 
firms‟ disclosure strategies are generally related to corporate governance structures, 
firm-specific factors and disclosure medium. Second, there may be incentive factors 
other than financing activity that encourage firms to disclose more information. 
Finally, and most importantly, it is difficult to find a measurement tool that can 
appropriately measure the voluntary disclosure of corporate governance. There have, 
nevertheless, been very few studies which have set out with the overall aim of 
investigating the impact of incentives factors (capital market transactions and stock-
based incentives) on voluntary disclosures in developing countries. Thus more 
research is needed in this area to understand the conditions and reasons that influence 
companies to adopt voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices. 
 
2.6 Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure literature 
It is important to now examine the literature that links corporate governance to 
voluntary disclosure. The next sub-section presents a general overview of corporate 
governance literature. The second sub-section reviews corporate governance quality 
and voluntary disclosure studies globally, while the third sub-section reviews the 
prior literature on the topic in the Malaysian context. 
2.6.1 Corporate governance literature 
Generally, there are vast amounts of research which cover numerous aspects of 
corporate governance. Corporate governance research generally falls into two broad 
categories: role of corporate governance in improving firm value and performance; 
and the impact of corporate governance on voluntary disclosures. Agency theory is 
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the most common theory used in the corporate governance literature to explain 
underlying issues of various corporate governance aspects and its link to firm 
performance (Brown & Caylor 2004) and firm value (Black et al. 2006; Durnev & 
Kim 2005; Gompers et al. 2003; Klapper & Love 2004). Prior studies find that 
improvements in firms‟ corporate governance are associated with enhanced corporate 
performance and improved firm value (Brown & Caylor 2006; Durnev & Kim 2005; 
Gompers et al. 2003). Thus corporate governance is an effective mechanism to 
monitor and control managers‟ behaviour, which subsequently reduces agency costs 
and improves firm value. 
Recent studies increasingly focus on using broader approaches for measuring 
corporate governance mechanisms. For example, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
construct their own corporate governance index based on 24 corporate governance 
rules that represent the level of shareholder rights of 1500 large US companies. This 
governance index is then used to examine the relationship between the level of 
shareholder rights and firm performance. Black, Jang and Kim (2006) adopt a similar 
approach in examining corporate governance practices of Korean firms with their 
market values. On the other hand, Klapper and Love (2004) investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm value across 14 emerging 
markets. They use the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA Asia - Pacific 
Markets) corporate governance rating as a measure of a firm‟s corporate governance 
quality and find that corporate governance quality is positively related to better firm 
and stock performance. Durnev and Kim (2005) also use the CLSA corporate 
governance rating to examine corporate governance quality and firm stock value 
from 27 countries. Consistent with Klapper and Love‟s study, they find that 
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companies with higher corporate governance quality are valued higher in stock 
markets.  
Studies that link corporate governance and voluntary disclosure also used agency 
theory in explaining managers‟ disclosure decisions. It assumes that managers use 
corporate governance and voluntary disclosure as ways to reduce agency and 
information asymmetry problems between managers and shareholders (Cheng & 
Courtenay 2006; Eng & Mak 2003; Karamanou & Vafeas 2005; Kent & Stewart 
2008). Most studies find companies that adopt good corporate governance structures, 
in term of having effective board of directors, audit committees and auditors, are 
more likely to increase voluntary disclosure levels (Adams & Hossain 1998; Barako 
et al. 2006; Poh Ling et al. 2008). Therefore corporate governance is seen to provide 
some kind of incentive to managers to adopt voluntary disclosures than non-
disclosures. 
However, studies that focus on the consideration of broader corporate governance 
mechanisms and how they relate to voluntary disclosures are limited. Thus the next 
section presents review of the literature that links corporate governance quality and 
voluntary disclosures. 
2.6.2 Corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosure in general  
Most prior studies have used one or more corporate governance mechanisms (board 
of directors, audit committee and external auditors) as a measure for corporate 
governance quality and its link to voluntary disclosure. Most of these studies find 
evidence that this type of corporate governance mechanism influences companies‟ 
disclosure practices. From an agency theory perspective, the presence of independent 
non-executive directors on company boards should help reduce conflicts between 
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shareholders and company management, as they have a role in monitoring, 
overseeing and supervising board actions (Solomon 2007). Various studies have 
found a strong relationship between the proportion of independent directors on 
boards and voluntary disclosure (Adams & Hossain 1998; Ajinkya et al. 2005; 
Barako et al. 2006; Cheng & Courtenay 2006). These studies suggest that the 
presence of independent non-executive directors plays a complementary role in 
information disclosure. For this reason agency problems are expected to be reduced 
as board decisions about disclosure are monitored by independent non-executive 
directors.  
Prior studies on the role of audit committees support the argument that the presence 
of audit committees will enhance the reliability of financial reporting (Ho & Wong 
2001; McMullen 1996). A consistent result is also found in a study of Kenyan listed 
companies (Barako et al. 2006). The findings of these studies suggest that the 
establishment of an audit committee would enhance voluntary disclosure practices. 
The quality of external auditors and audit committees have also been found to have 
an impact on the likelihood of disclosures of internal control deficiencies when an 
audit of internal control is not required (Stephens 2009) and of voluntary employee 
stock options disclosures (Bassett et al. 2007). Therefore the presence of a quality 
audit committee as well as an external auditor could be expected to improve a firm‟s 
corporate governance and thus can be regarded as effective monitoring devices for 
improving corporate disclosures.  
Kent and Stewart (2008) investigate several corporate governance mechanisms 
(board characteristics, audit committees and external auditors) to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance quality and the level of disclosure during 
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the transition to International Financial Reporting Standards. They argue that using 
more than one corporate governance mechanism enables them to identify which 
governance mechanisms are more effective in increasing the level of disclosure. The 
results of their study also provide evidence consistent with prior studies that have 
identified that a firm with high governance quality (which is measured by an 
effective board of directors, audit committee and external auditor) is more likely to 
provide a greater level of financial reporting disclosures. Another study by 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) uses effective board of directors and audit committee 
to measure corporate governance quality. They also find a positive association 
between corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosures of management 
earnings forecasts.  
Studies that use a broader set of corporate governance quality measures in 
investigating the association between a firm‟s corporate governance quality and 
information disclosures are limited. Brown and Beekes‟ (2006) study is the only 
identified research that uses a broader governance set to measure corporate 
governance quality. They investigate whether corporate governance quality is 
associated with the „informativeness‟ of disclosures by Australian listed companies. 
The study uses a corporate governance index developed by experts i.e. the Horwath 
Report 2002, as a proxy for corporate governance quality. The results of the study 
provide strong support for the notion that companies with high corporate governance 
quality provide more informative disclosures than companies with lower corporate 
governance quality. 
From the above discussion, the measurement method chosen to capture corporate 
governance quality is clearly a fundamental issue. Previous studies have focused on 
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the importance of a firm‟s governance quality using one or more corporate 
governance mechanisms. Based on the above discussion and analysis of the 
empirical studies, it seems that there are no known studies that link corporate 
governance quality (using a broader set of corporate governance mechanisms) and 
voluntary disclosure specifically in relation to corporate governance information. 
Prior studies have also failed to draw on the relationship between incentive factors 
such as capital market transactions and stock-based incentives in measuring the links 
between a firm‟s corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosure. Hence, this 
study seeks to fill these gaps in the literature. 
2.6.3 Corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosure in Malaysia 
Voluntary disclosure of additional information by Malaysian companies has been 
subject to at least two prior research studies. Both of these studies used individual or 
selected corporate governance mechanisms as a proxy for corporate governance 
quality in examining the extent of companies‟ voluntary disclosure practices in 
Malaysia. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) examined the importance of a variety of 
corporate governance attributes, company characteristics and cultural factors as 
possible determinants of voluntary disclosure before implementation of the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG). Their study includes several 
corporate governance variables including proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board, family members on the board, separate roles of chairman and CEO, non-
executive chairman and cross-directorship to measure the corporate governance 
quality of Malaysian listed companies. Their study is based on 1995 annual report 
data. A voluntary disclosure index is adopted from previous studies by Hossain, Tan 
and Adams (1994) and Soh (1996). This index is used because it is relevant to the 
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Malaysian context. The voluntary disclosure index includes all items of voluntary 
disclosure information - strategic, non-financial and financial - in annual reports. The 
results of the study indicate that family members on the board and having a non-
executive chairman are significantly associated with the level of voluntary 
disclosures. One of the cultural factors (race) is also significantly associated with the 
level of voluntary disclosure. Hence it is important to consider all of the above 
determining factors in investigating corporate governance quality and voluntary 
disclosures as it has been indicated in prior studies that these factors may affect the 
extent of voluntary disclosures. 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) assess whether the introduction of the MCCG 
increased the amount of disclosure among Malaysian publicly listed companies and 
reduced the influence of insider domination on voluntary disclosures. They also use 
more than one corporate governance variable - independent non-executive directors, 
independent chairman and family member on the board - as the explanatory variables 
that motivate firms to increase levels of voluntary disclosures in annual reports. In 
addition, the study separately examines the impact of different types of ownership 
and proprietary costs on voluntary disclosure. Their study uses a voluntary disclosure 
index which is similar to Haniffa and Cooke‟s study. The results of their study do not 
show any significant relationship between any of the board of directors‟ 
characteristics and proprietary costs with regards to voluntary disclosures. However 
they found that the ownership structure, which is proxied by the proportion of shares 
held by executive directors, is associated with less voluntary disclosure. This 
suggests that directors‟ ownership has significant influence on the level of voluntary 
disclosures among listed companies in Malaysia. These unexpected results may be 
due to a firm‟s unfamiliarity with the new Bursa Securities Listing Requirements 
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(BSLR) since the researchers used 2001 annual reports data which was generated 
immediately after the implementation of the MCCG codes and the BSLR. In 
addition, the data of this study is only based on a single year, 2001, and therefore 
does not represent the true context of current voluntary disclosure practices of 
Malaysian listed companies. 
This research is different from earlier Malaysian studies in at least four respects. 
First, the study looks at a specific type of voluntary disclosure information which is 
corporate governance information in annual reports. Second, it uses a more 
comprehensive voluntary disclosure index, which does not appear to have been used 
in previous studies. This study also uses a broader measure of corporate governance 
quality that appears to not have been studied in prior studies. Both of these indexes 
are provided by the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) in Malaysia. 
The Basic Compliance Score (BCS) and International Best Practices (IBP) 
components of the MSWG are proxies for the corporate governance quality and the 
voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices respectively. Third, 
hypotheses tests are carried out to measure the effects of incentive factors - capital 
market transactions and stock-based incentives - on the level of voluntary disclosure 
of a firm‟s corporate governance quality. These incentives have not been included in 
prior Malaysian studies as factors that influence voluntary disclosures. However, in 
this research, these incentive factors are considered as the moderating variables that 
impact the association between corporate governance quality and voluntary 
disclosures. Fourth, this study also investigates the roles of company secretaries in 
improving voluntary corporate governance disclosure practices in Malaysia. 
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2.7 Company secretary 
As indicated in the review of prior literature on corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure in section 2.6, prior research has tended to focus on the board of directors, 
auditors and audit committees as the guardians of corporate governance. In this 
section, the review of prior literature is focused on the role of the company secretary 
in the context of corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in Malaysia.  
2.7.1 Company secretary role in corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure 
The company secretary is an officer of the company with considerable authority in 
the administrative area with powers and duties derived directly from the articles of 
association of the company and the Companies Act 1965 (Kang 2005). As 
commented by Thambimuthu (2007) a board will seek a company secretary‟s advice 
in relation to regulations and compliance derived from regulatory bodies such as the 
Securities Commission and Bursa Securities. Thus, it is a company secretary who 
ensures that directors and companies comply with the various requirements of the 
legislation and statutory bodies. 
From an agency theory perspective, directors, auditors and the audit committees are 
the formal monitoring mechanisms used by firms and shareholders to supervise and 
control managers‟ actions, which results in lowering agency problems. Hopkinson 
(2000) believes that the evolution of corporate governance standards will provide 
company secretaries with  opportunities to earn themselves central roles as company 
officers with responsibilities for corporate governance compliance. He comments 
that company secretaries are well placed to take on responsibilities as corporate 
governance monitors, since they already fulfil compliance functions and their 
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presence on company boards makes them privy to the highest levels of corporate 
strategy. In this context, company secretaries are also considered to be one of the 
guardians of corporate governance.  
Acknowledging the important role a company secretary plays in corporate 
governance, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) in its Best 
Practices for a board of directors provides a specific section that relates to a company 
secretary. In addition the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (BMLR) further 
requires listed companies to provide all their directors with advice and services by 
company secretaries. An illustration of the MCCG and BSLR is given in Chapter 1.  
The profession of company secretary has now been moved to a level where the 
company secretary is recognised as an adviser and as a guardian of corporate 
governance. A study by Lee (2009), examining the relationship between company 
secretaries and the effectiveness of corporate governance in Malaysia, found that the 
company secretary‟s role has become more significant since the introduction of the 
MCCG. This suggests that the role of a company secretary has developed from being 
traditionally administrative and regulated in nature to a more enhanced and extended 
one with wider duties and responsibilities in promoting corporate governance.  
To explore the importance of company secretaries‟ roles in corporate governance and 
voluntary disclosure in Malaysia, this study examines whether there is a relationship 
between company secretaries and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
information. Since prior studies of voluntary disclosure and corporate governance are 
limited in relation to the company secretary‟s role, this study draws on prior studies 
about directors, auditors and audit committee characteristics to explain how in-house 
qualified company secretaries are expected to influence voluntary disclosure 
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practices. In this study, academic and professional qualifications and whether 
secretaries are in-house or external are considered. 
Academic qualifications can be an important precursor of disclosure practice. 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) suggest that if a board of directors consists of individuals 
who have an academic qualification in accounting or business, they may choose to 
disclose more information to demonstrate accountability, improve corporate image 
and offer credibility to the management team. Recent studies have investigated the 
characteristics that are expected to contribute to the effectiveness of audit committees 
such as audit committee expertise. For example Stephens (2009) found that 
companies that have an accounting/financial expert on their audit committee are 
significantly more likely to voluntarily issue internal control reports prior to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 404 audit report. As such, this study expects that 
company secretaries who have a professional qualification are better able to advise 
management and directors in relation to compliance with the MCCG code and the 
BSLR, as well as to influence the adoption of voluntary disclosure of governance 
information. 
Whether company secretaries are in-house or external is another determining factor 
that can influence disclosures. According to Kang (2005) an in-house (inside) 
company secretary is a full-time employee of the company. On the other hand, an 
external (outside) company secretary is not an employee of the company. In this 
case, a company engages a professional secretarial firm to provide secretarial 
services to the company and pays in the form of a service fee. Prior studies on 
voluntary disclosure have focused more attention on the independence of boards and 
audit committees. Distinctions between executive (inside) and non-executive 
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(outside) directors have been highlighted (Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Rosa et al. 2004) 
and inconsistent results have been reported in prior studies (Chen & Jaggi 2000; 
Forker 1992).  
Non-executive (outside) directors are arguably able to monitor and control an 
executive director‟s behaviour (Fama & Jensen 1983). In addition to monitoring, 
non-executive directors can play roles in determining and monitoring a firm‟s 
voluntary disclosure policy (Ajinkya et al. 2005) and the issuance of earnings 
forecasts (Karamanou & Vafeas 2005). Non-executive directors are also suggested to 
be able to provide advice on strategic decisions that can improve a firm‟s 
performance (Chen & Jaggi 2000). Empirical evidence generally supports audit 
committee independence as being associated with better financial reporting quality. 
For example Turley and Zaman (2004) have found a significant association between 
audit committee independence and the quality of financial reporting.  
Executive directors (inside) also have incentives to disclose more information 
voluntarily to protect their jobs and reputation. In a situation of poor earning or stock 
performance, executive directors could use voluntary disclosure to reduce the 
possibility of firm undervaluation and poor performance in order to avoid losing their 
job (Healy & Palepu 2001). In addition, since executive directors are employees of 
the company, they understand the business better than non-executive directors and so 
can make superior decisions (Donaldson & Davies 1994). 
In this research, it is expected that an in-house (inside) company secretary is better 
able to monitor and control management behaviour. He/she is also assumed to be 
able to provide management and directors with better access to appropriate advice 
and services as well as to offer inside information about the firm or industry-specific 
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information. An external (outside) company secretary may have limited resources 
and time. However he or she can offer disclosures of information based on 
experiences derived from personal knowledge about other companies. 
 
2.8 Gaps in literature 
This chapter has reviewed voluntary disclosure theories and literature relevant to this 
research. The main conceptual points that emanate from this review are that in spite 
of extensive available research examining voluntary disclosure and corporate 
governance quality, incentives for reporting on corporate governance information, 
especially in relation to capital market transactions and stock-based incentives, are 
still relatively unknown. More specifically, the association between corporate 
governance quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information in 
both developed and developing countries remain largely unexplained. Further, it 
appears that none of the prior literature in Malaysia has specifically applied Dye‟s 
(1985) voluntary disclosure theory to explain a firm‟s voluntary disclosure practices. 
Finally, the role of a company secretary as the guardian of corporate governance has 
not previously been examined. Similarly the review has not revealed any prior 
studies that investigated the effectiveness of in-house qualified company secretaries 
in influencing voluntary disclosure practices of publicly listed companies in 
Malaysia. To address these gaps, Chapter 3 explains the research design and the 
hypotheses development and draws on Dye‟s voluntary disclosure theory and agency 
theory.  
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3 Research Design  
3.1 Introduction 
This Chapter discusses the conceptual model of the study and its hypotheses 
development. The conceptual model is based on Dye‟s voluntary disclosure theory 
and agency theory. The discussion and applicability of these theories to explain 
voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information have been considered in 
Chapter 2. This Chapter is organised as follows: section 3.2 restates the main 
research question that was introduced in Chapter 1. Section 3.3 explains the 
conceptual model of the study. Section 3.4 develops the hypotheses that are tested 
and section 3.5 concludes the Chapter. 
 
3.2 Research question 
The main research question investigated in this study is: 
What are the incentive factors that influence the voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance information in annual reports of Malaysian listed companies?  
The following sub-questions are developed in order to answer the main question: 
1. Are companies with high quality corporate governance practices more likely 
to voluntarily disclose corporate governance information in their annual 
reports? 
(b) Does the presence of an in-house qualified company secretary in a 
company‟s corporate governance structure influence voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information in annual reports? (The 
presence of an in-house qualified company secretary is assumed to be 
an additional indicator of corporate governance quality). 
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2. Are companies more likely to voluntarily disclose corporate governance 
information in their annual reports prior to the issuance of new equity or 
debt? 
3. Do stock-based incentives motivate managers to voluntarily disclose 
corporate governance information in annual reports? 
 
3.3 Conceptual model 
From the main research question, this section presents a conceptual model of the 
study. A primary focus of this study is the relationship between corporate governance 
quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information. Dye‟s 
voluntary disclosure theory (1985) predicts that good quality companies are more 
likely to voluntarily disclose more information so as to distinguish themselves from 
poor quality companies. By applying the above voluntary disclosure theory this study 
predicts that companies with high quality of corporate governance are more 
forthcoming with voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information. 
According to Skinner (1994) good quality companies are more likely to disclose 
good news so as to differentiate themselves from bad quality companies. Here, 
corporate governance information is considered as „good news‟ and in principle 
companies are motivated to disclose good news (corporate governance information) 
to members of the public as a signal that the company is run and managed well. In 
addition, as one of the guardians of corporate governance, the company secretary is 
expected to influence a company‟s voluntary disclosure decisions. Therefore, a high 
quality company that employs an in-house qualified company secretary is expected 
to have a greater extent of disclosures than one that employs a less qualified 
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company secretary. Two possible incentives for voluntary disclosure that may 
explain why companies are likely to disclose additional information voluntarily are 
also investigated. First, companies have incentives to disclose more information to 
reduce the cost of capital when they intend to raise new shares or debt capital 
(Sengupta 1998; Seppanen 2000). Specifically, disclosing more information will 
reduce information asymmetry between companies and investors (Healy & Palepu 
2001). As such, the issuances of new shares or debt capital are possible moderators 
that strengthen the association between corporate governance quality and voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information. Second, managers are privy to 
information that investors demand and they are more likely to publicly disclose 
additional information when they are provided with appropriate incentives (Nagar et 
al. 2003). Stock-based incentives (stock-based compensation and CEO 
shareholdings) are suggested to be able to motivate managers to increase voluntary 
disclosure (Jensen & Murphy 1990; Nagar et al. 2003) and reduce agency costs. 
Hence, stock-based incentives are analysed as potential moderators of the 
association. Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the conceptual model of the research. 
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual Model 
 
3.4 Hypotheses development  
This section develops the hypotheses used to test the research question. This research 
aims to examine whether companies with higher quality corporate governance are 
more forthcoming with voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information in 
their annual reports. In addition to a broad measure that captures many aspects of 
corporate governance quality, the study includes the company secretary‟s role as a 
separate measure of corporate governance quality. This new variable is included in 
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order to determine the role of company secretaries in influencing companies‟ 
decisions to adopt voluntary disclosure practices. In addition, this study investigates 
the incentive factors related to capital market transactions (issuance of new shares or 
debt capital) and stock-based incentives (stock-based compensation and CEO 
shareholdings).  
3.4.1 Corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance information 
The contention of this research is that when companies‟ corporate governance quality 
is high, those companies are also more likely to voluntarily disclose corporate 
governance information in their annual reports. Dye (1985) argues that high quality 
companies will disclose more information to differentiate themselves from poor 
quality companies. By applying Dye‟s voluntary disclosure theory, this study 
predicts that companies with high corporate governance quality are more prepared to 
voluntarily disclose corporate governance information in their annual reports. 
Companies with high corporate governance quality in this study refer to companies 
that have a high level of conformity with the basic mandatory requirements of the 
Bursa Securities Listing Requirements (BSLR) and the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (MCCG). 
Signalling theory proposes that high quality companies will disclose more 
information voluntarily than poor quality companies to signal to investors that they 
are high quality companies (Dye 1985; Verrecchia 1983). Companies with high 
corporate governance quality due to their effective board governance structures have 
incentives to inform internal and external investors about their effective governance 
structures. High quality companies will signal their corporate governance quality by 
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voluntarily disclosing corporate governance information in annual reports. These 
kinds of disclosures are difficult to replicate by poor quality companies. By doing so, 
they will potentially increase firm value since knowledgeable investors will infer that 
companies with high corporate governance quality are less risky than companies with 
lower corporate governance quality. Thus, voluntary disclosure theory predicts a 
positive relationship between corporate governance quality and the voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information. 
Agency theory can also explain why managers voluntarily disclose information. The 
agency conflicts that occur between managers and shareholders are due to the 
separation of ownership and control. Managers have incentives to adopt better 
governance practices such as voluntarily disclosure to reduce agency conflicts, and 
the possibility of bonding and monitoring activities imposed by shareholders to 
control their behaviour. Dey‟s (2008) study provides evidence that supports the 
agency theory argument that the existence of corporate governance mechanisms in a 
firm is a function of the level of agency conflicts in the firm. This suggests that firms 
with high levels of agency conflicts are likely to adopt effective corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
As explained earlier, one of the characteristics of the Malaysian setting is highly 
concentrated ownership. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) show that more than 
half of Malaysian publicly listed companies were controlled by family and 
management-owned firms. This characteristic suggests that Malaysian companies not 
only have agency conflicts between managers and shareholders but also between the 
controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. Hence in this case, a Malaysian‟s 
company with high corporate governance quality is expected to use voluntary 
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disclosure to reduce agency conflicts that exist between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders. This study hypothesises that: 
H1: there is a positive relationship between corporate governance quality 
and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information. 
3.4.2 In-house qualified company secretary and voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance information 
As predicted an additional contributor to corporate governance quality, the presence 
of an in-house qualified company secretary is explored. In this research an in-house 
qualified company secretary is defined as a person employed on a full-time basis 
with a relevant professional qualification and/or being a member of a professional 
body. The alternative is an external company secretary holding a license to act as a 
company secretary. The academic background of an individual can be an important 
determinant of disclosure practices because with a better education, managers are 
more likely to adopt innovative activities and accept ambiguity (Hambrick & Mason 
1984). Grace, Ireland and Dunstan (1995) observe that the level of education should 
be examined as a basic measure for professional status. Wallace and Cooke (1990) 
posit that „an increase in the level of education in a country may increase political 
awareness and demand for corporate accountability‟. Therefore, if a company 
secretary is an individual with a professional academic background in accounting, 
business or law, he/she may choose to disclose more information to demonstrate 
accountability. Employing a person with a professional qualification can improve a 
company‟s image as well as offering credibility to a management team. The MCCG 
suggests that directors should appoint as company secretary someone who is capable 
of carrying out such duties in line with his/her qualification. 
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The status of a company secretary‟s appointment can also play an important role in 
influencing company decisions to disclose voluntarily. Having an in-house company 
secretary provides advantages to a board of directors because all directors would 
have access to the advice and services of a company secretary at all times. This study 
assumes that an in-house company secretary is in a better position to offer inside 
information and is also likely to have specialised firm or industry-specific 
information to add value, when compared to an external company secretary. When a 
company secretary is an external secretary, he or she can offer disclosure of 
information based on experiences derived from personal knowledge of other 
companies. However, an external company secretary may have limited resources and 
time available due to his or her commitment to other companies.  
In relation to Dye‟s voluntary disclosure theory this study expects that a good quality 
company (that usually employs an in-house qualified company secretary) is more 
likely to disclose good news (corporate governance information) to investors to 
differentiate itself from a poor quality company, and to signal its quality to investors. 
As such, the appointment of an in-house qualified company secretary provides a 
signal to investors that the company has a qualified person to provide expert advice 
to directors and management in relation to compliance and corporate governance 
issues. In line with agency theory, the presence of an in-house qualified company 
secretary is considered as a mechanism to control managers‟ behaviours as well as to 
influence them by providing advice to management to disclose information 
voluntarily. Thus, based on the above discussion, the study predicts that the presence 
of an in-house qualified company secretary will significantly influence voluntary 
disclosure practices. 
68 
 
Research conducted by Lee (2009) explores the importance of the company 
secretary‟s role in corporate governance in Malaysia. Her study documents that the 
respondents of her study are confident that the company secretary can enhance a 
company‟s corporate governance, and uphold the integrity of the company, by 
bringing to the board a wide range of knowledge and experience and by providing 
advice on governance issues more objectively. Accordingly the results of Lee‟s study 
indicate that the company secretary does influence the company‟s corporate 
governance quality which may suggest improved firm disclosures practices. Thus, 
this study predicts that there is a positive relationship between in-house qualified 
company secretaries and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information in 
annual reports. It is hypothesises that: 
H1- (a): there is a positive relationship between the employment of in-house 
qualified company secretaries and voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance information.  
This study combined both in-house and professional qualification in the hypothesis 
because both of these criteria are considered to be important in determining the 
effectiveness of company secretary‟s role in influencing voluntary disclosures. Thus 
considering them together is necessary to ensure that the study capture the relevant 
criteria that is considered to be an effective company secretary. 
3.4.3 The moderating role of issuance of new shares and debt capital 
According to the capital market transactions hypothesis, firms that are planning to 
make capital offerings (issuance of new shares or debt capital) have incentives to 
provide voluntary disclosure to reduce information asymmetry between managers 
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and investors. This study argues that when dealing with capital market transactions 
incentives which are expected to influence voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance, there are two important aspects to be considered. First, voluntary 
disclosure provides a signal to investors that firms are likely to have better corporate 
governance quality which implies that lower information asymmetry problems exist 
between managers and shareholders. Lower information asymmetry will reduce the 
risk for investors in forecasting future payoffs from their investment. As such 
issuance of new shares or debt capital can provide extra incentives to a firm to signal 
the high quality of its corporate governance via increased voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance information. De Nicolo, Laeven and Ueda (2008) find that 
companies with high corporate governance quality are in a better position to be able 
to attract outside financing. This finding is consistent with the above argument that 
high quality companies are likely to disclose more information to avoid a reduction 
of firm value. The more weight managers place on maximizing current firm value, 
the greater their incentives to disclose positive (corporate governance) information 
prior to issuance of new shares or debt capital. 
Second, firms with high corporate governance quality are likely to have better 
liquidity and lower cost of capital. This is because firms with high corporate 
governance quality are more likely to use voluntary disclosure as a mechanism to 
lower information asymmetry problems between investors and management which 
subsequently lowers the cost of capital (Healy & Palepu 2001). Thus, firms that 
intend to issue new share or debt capital in the future will have more incentives to 
improve their voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices in order to 
reduce the cost of raising external financing. Prior studies have found consistent 
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evidence for the view that, in general, voluntary disclosure facilitates a company‟s 
access to lower cost of external capital financing (Botosan 1997; Botosan & Plumlee 
2002). Lang and Lundholm (1993) found that disclosure scores were higher for 
companies that were issuing new securities. Seppanen (2000) suggests that managers 
do make disclosures to facilitate capital raising at a lower capital cost. A study by 
Collett and Hrasky (2005) also found consistent results that suggest that companies 
planning to issue new shares in the future have an incentive to make voluntary 
disclosures. Research on quality of disclosure and the cost of debt also shows that 
companies with high disclosure quality ratings from financial analysts enjoy a lower 
effective interest cost of issuing debt (Sengupta 1998).  
The cost of external financing can be reduced by using better voluntary disclosure 
practices which signal firm quality and the resultant effect of lower information 
asymmetry problems. In this respect, Malaysian firms that are planning to raise 
external financing have incentives to increase voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance information in order to signal the firm‟s quality. This signal can reduce 
information asymmetry, increase firm value and lower the cost of external financing. 
Accordingly, the study hypothesises that:  
H2 (a): the relationship between corporate governance quality and voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information is moderated by the 
intention to raise new share capital in the following year.  
H2 (b): the relationship between corporate governance quality and voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information is moderated by the 
intention to raise debt funds in the following year.  
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3.4.4 The moderating role of stock-based incentives 
Agency theory suggests that agency problems occur because of conflicting interests 
between managers and shareholders. This conflicting interest discourages managers 
to disclose their private information because such disclosure reduces their private 
benefits. One possible approach to overcome this agency conflict is to link managers‟ 
compensation directly to their disclosure activity. Stock-based incentives are 
suggested by agency theory to be able to reduce agency conflicts and improve 
managers‟ decision abilities from the shareholders‟ perspective (Fama & Jensen 
1983; Jensen & Murphy 1990). This form of compensation can serve as an alignment 
incentive as well as a monitoring device to ensure managers‟ interests are better 
aligned with shareholders‟ interests.  
This research considers two forms of stock-based incentives: stock-based 
compensation and CEO shareholdings. Stock-based compensation is viewed as an 
outcome-based incentive that is likely to influence the managers to act in the best 
interest of the shareholders as opposed to cash form incentives (goals-based). Smith 
and Watts (1992) argue that the use of stock-based compensation lowers monitoring 
costs of shareholders by providing managers with incentives to maximize 
shareholders‟ value. This suggests that stock-based compensation increases the level 
of alignment between managers‟ and shareholders‟ interests which then lowers the 
agency costs. Prior studies have examined a link between stock-based compensation 
and voluntary disclosures. Neo (1999) found that managers will take advantage of 
voluntary disclosures to ward off the appearance of impropriety when dealing with 
insider transactions. Furthermore, it was also found that CEOs may make 
opportunistic voluntary disclosure decisions that maximise their stock option 
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compensation which in turn will also maximise shareholders‟ wealth (Aboody & 
Kasznik 2000). Therefore managers‟ disclosure activities are related to their stock-
based compensation which acts as a motivator as well as a monitoring mechanism 
that can reduce agency costs. 
CEO shareholdings can also help alleviate agency conflicts because managers‟ 
interests are closely aligned with shareholders‟ interests. This is because managers 
who own a large portion of shares in a company will bear the same consequences of 
losses as shareholders if they make poor business judgments that destroy company 
value (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) have examined 
the association between managers‟ disclosure practices and CEO shareholdings 
which is based on stock price. They found that the value of shares owned by the 
CEOs improve firms‟ disclosure practices. This result suggests that CEO 
shareholdings can mitigate agency conflicts between managers and shareholders.  
In contrast, most of the studies in Asian countries, such as those undertaken in 
Singapore (Eng & Mak 2003), Hong Kong (Chau & Gray 2002) and Malaysia 
(Ghazali & Weetman 2006), have found that CEO shareholdings are associated with 
less voluntary disclosures. They argue that when CEOs hold a higher proportion of 
company issued share capital, the traditional conflicts of interest between managers 
and shareholders become conflicts between larger shareholders and smaller 
shareholders. CEOs who are also large controlling shareholders will make decisions 
that benefit them rather than working in the best interests of the firm. This agency 
conflict becomes more apparent especially in Asian countries where weak legal 
institutions and high concentration of ownership structures are common (Claessens et 
al. 2000).  
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Stock-based incentives can also provide signals about firms‟ quality. Companies that 
use stock-based incentives to compensate their CEO will be viewed to have a high 
quality governance structure. These high quality firms are expected to employ 
effective compensation packages that can motivate as well as monitor managers‟ 
behaviours. For this reason, a company with high corporate governance quality is 
likely to increase disclosure of corporate governance information voluntarily when 
managers are compensated with stock-based incentives.  
Overall, the study postulates that a company with high corporate governance quality, 
stock-based incentives encourages management to disclose more information 
voluntarily. However this is more likely to be the case for stock-based compensation 
than CEO shareholdings, particularly in the Malaysia setting. Thus the next 
hypotheses are that: 
H3 (a): the relationship between corporate governance quality and voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information is moderated by stock-
based compensation.  
H3 (b): the relationship between corporate governance quality and voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information is moderated by CEO 
share ownership. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The research question and conceptual model of this study are presented in this 
Chapter. Dye‟s voluntary disclosure theory and agency theory are used to explain the 
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incentives that motivate firms‟ managers to disclose corporate governance 
information voluntarily. The model includes variables that are usually found to have 
a significant relationship to voluntary disclosure in general and specifically to 
corporate governance practices. Third, based on the conceptual model, three 
hypotheses are stated. The sample and research methodology used to test these 
hypotheses are described in the next chapter. 
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4 Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this Chapter is to explain the method used to test the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 3. This chapter is organised as follows: section 4.2 explains 
how the dependent, independent, moderating and control variables are measured. 
Justification for and discussion about the chosen methods are also provided. Section 
4.3 explains the population, sample selection and identifies the data sources used. 
Section 4.4 describes the data analysis techniques that are applied in this study and 
section 4.5 concludes the Chapter. 
 
4.2 Measures of variables 
4.2.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information 
(VDCGI). A number of alternative approaches could be used to measure voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance. First, a self constructed disclosure index could 
be used to measure the voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information in 
annual reports. This method is adopted by most voluntary disclosure studies on 
corporate governance information (Bujaki & McConomy 2002; Collett & Hrasky 
2005). For example, Bujaki and McConomy (2002) have developed a scoring system 
that measures the extent of disclosure in annual reports based on the 25 variables 
from the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) compulsory guidelines on corporate 
governance. Each variable is coded as „1‟ if the company disclosed according to the 
guideline and „0‟ if otherwise. A similar dichotomous scoring system is used in 
Collett and Hrasky‟s (2005) Australian study. The year 1994 is used as a base year 
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because after that year the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) made it compulsory for 
all listed companies to include in their annual reports a statement about their 
corporate governance practices. Collett and Hrasky‟s study identified the following 
corporate governance information in the annual reports of 29 Australian companies: 
the presence of particular board committees, the structure of the board of directors, 
the functions of the board of directors and board committees, the internal control 
policies, and directors‟ share dealings. However, this technique of measuring 
voluntary disclosure has been criticised as involving a lot of judgment from the 
researcher and hence the findings may be difficult to replicate (Healy & Palepu 
2001).  
The second approach is a disclosure index developed by another organisation, such 
as a rating agency or professional association. Only a few studies have used a 
disclosure index that has been developed by one of these organisations to measure 
voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices. For example, Labelle (2002) 
used the governance disclosure index developed by the Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (CICA) as a benchmark for firms‟ corporate governance 
disclosure quality in annual reports. This governance disclosure index is based on the 
criteria of the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) listing requirements. Firms are 
awarded a value of „1‟ if they provide a good or very good level of corporate 
governance disclosure according to the CICA panel of experts and „0‟ otherwise. 
Healy and Palepu (2001) identify several benefits of using a voluntary disclosure 
index published by an organisation such as the Association for Investment 
Management and Research (AIMR). This AIMR report provides a comprehensive 
measure of voluntary disclosure practices for a large number of listed companies 
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relative to their industry peers. The panels that are involved in the ranking process 
comprise leading analysts for each industry and are likely to be well qualified or 
experts in judging firms‟ voluntary disclosures. 
A disclosure index developed by a rating agency or professional organisation is 
adopted for measuring voluntary disclosure in this research. This disclosure index 
was developed by the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) in Malaysia. 
The MSWG is an independent association that has published a Corporate 
Governance Survey Report of Malaysian listed companies since 2005. The report 
shows the overall ranking of corporate governance scores of large listed companies 
based on their level of compliance with the basic corporate governance requirements 
and best practices. The total corporate governance score is the sum of two main 
components: the Basic Compliance Score (BCS) and International Best Practices 
(IBP). In this study the BCS component is the independent variable which represents 
a firm‟s corporate governance quality. The IBP component represents voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance practices of a company and is the dependent 
variable of the study. Table 4.1 contains details of the Corporate Governance 
Scorecard. 
There are four main reasons for choosing this method for measuring the dependent 
variable in this study. First, the voluntary disclosure index in this study was 
developed by an independent agency. Second, the population of interest for this 
research consists of Malaysian listed companies, which is also the focus of the 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) corporate governance survey 
report. Third, the International Best Practices (IBP) component in the MSWG report 
consists of principles and best practices that are highly recommended by other 
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international bodies and jurisdictions, but which are purely voluntary in Malaysia. 
Thus this means that companies are free to choose whether to conform to the 
international best practice recommendation relating to reporting on corporate 
governance information. Fourth, data that relates to voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance practices is available and accessible. This index is preferred over a self-
constructed one because the information provided is standardised and can be used for 
benchmarking, ranking and cross-comparisons among Malaysian companies.  
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Table 4.1: Composition of Corporate Governance Scorecard 
Categories Attributes Basic 
Compliance 
Score 
(BCS) 
International 
and Best 
Practices 
(IBP) 
Actual 
score/Max 
score 
Actual 
Score 
(%) 
 The Board’s principal 
responsibilities   
    
 Board balance     
 Supply of information     
 Re-election     
 Appointment to the Board     
Board of Directors’ training     
Directors Board structure and 
procedures 
    
 Chairman and CEO     
 Nomination committee     
 Audit committee     
 Remuneration committee     
 Other committee     
 Sub Total 21 8 29 38 
 The level and make-up of 
remuneration 
    
Directors’  Procedure on 
remuneration 
    
remuneration Disclosure on 
remuneration 
    
 Sub Total 8 6 14 19 
 Dialogue between 
companies and investors 
    
Shareholders The AGM     
 Sub Total 2 9 11 15 
 Internal control     
Accountability  Relationship with auditors     
and Audit Financial reporting     
 Internal Audit     
 Sub Total 9 12 21 28 
 Total 40 35 75 100% 
Source: Corporate Governance Survey Report 2007 – a joint survey by MSWG and the University of Nottingham, 
Malaysia Campus 
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The dependent variable for this research is measured as the score obtained by a 
company for the IBP component of the Corporate Governance Scorecard used by the 
MSWG. The IBP comprises 35 items capturing selected international best practices 
that are drawn from other influential principles, guidelines or codes of corporate 
disclosure and governance. These include those of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Principles and the California Public Employees‟ Retirement System 
(CalPERs) Guidelines on corporate governance (MSWG & UNMC 2007).  
The IBP component of the corporate governance scorecard includes voluntary 
disclosure information in relation to four main categories: board of directors; 
directors‟ remuneration; additional shareholder information; and accountability and 
audit. These four categories are measured by 35 key voluntary disclosure items. 
Managers of companies are free to choose whether to conform to this IBP 
recommendations relating to reporting on corporate governance information in their 
annual reports. Table 4.2 provides details of the 35 key voluntary disclosure items of 
the IBP component of the corporate governance scorecard.  
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Table 4.2: List of 35 key voluntary disclosure items using IBP component 
Section A - Board of Directors 
Principal responsibilities of the board 
1. Disclose the existence of code of conduct or ethics. 
2. Disclose details about the implementation of the code of conduct/ethics. 
Chairman and CEO 
3. Does statement discloses current chairman was not a previous CEO. 
Board Balance 
4. Half of the board members are independent non-executive directors (INED). 
5. More than half of the board members are independent non-executive directors. 
Appointment to the Board (Ensuring Board’s continuous effective) 
6. Discloses the terms of reference of NC (including activities, responsibilities, reporting 
frequency, meeting frequency and individual attendance) 
7. Disclose whether non-executive directors in the NC are also independent directors 
Board structures and procedures 
8. Disclose the type of transaction that requires board approval. 
Section B - Directors’ Remuneration 
The level and make-up of remuneration 
1. Disclose the term of reference of RC (including activities, responsibilities, reporting frequency, 
meeting frequency and individual attendance) 
2. Discloses details of the remuneration policy regarding how senior executives and directors’ 
pay is determined. (Company must disclose key performance benchmarks in the process of 
determining individual pay). 
3. Disclose whether the company uses significant (more than 50 percent of total remuneration) 
performance based remuneration for executive directors. 
4. Disclose whether the company uses long-term incentives (shares based payments) to reward 
executive director. 
Disclosure of Remuneration 
5. Discloses information in relation to remuneration of each director received from company and 
from subsidiaries. 
6. Discloses information in relation to separate fees for additional contribution by non-executive 
directors, like attendance fee etc. 
Section C – Shareholders 
Dialogue between Companies and Investors 
1. Does the company has an active website? 
2. Does the website has an Investor Relations section? 
3. Does the website contain information or instructions as to how investors can direct queries to 
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the company? 
4. Disclose details of officer managing investor relations (e.g. name, title, age, qualification, 
experience etc). 
5. Disclose details of investor relations policy and disclosure processes toward investors (e.g. 
does the company have a regular investors’ relation meetings, are they using electronic 
communication and the media to carry their message to shareholders, etc). 
6. Discloses clear and consistent corporate governance strategy. 
7. Discloses comparative key performance indicator (KPI) to industry benchmarks. 
8. Disclose identified specific and measurable performance target for future year. 
9. Disclose the company’s dividend policy. 
Section D – Accountability and Audit 
The audit committee 
1. If the audit committee (AC) is made up of entirely INED. 
2. Disclose whether or not non-executive director and independent members of AC meet 
separately (at least once a year) without the presence of executive officers of the company). 
Internal controls 
3. Disclose informative, straight-forward and updated explanation of risk factors related to 
company different products and industries. 
4. Disclose biographical details of the officer responsible managing internal controls at the 
company. 
5. Disclose biographical details of the officer responsible for legal and regulatory compliance at 
the company. 
Related party transactions 
6. Discloses details of related party transactions in Corporate Governance statement. 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
7. Any reporting statement on human resources. 
8. Any reporting statement on environmental issues. 
9. Any reporting statement on community issues. 
Auditors 
10. Is the external auditors independent (yes, if they only provide statutory audit function). 
Provides explanation for the use of the same external audit firm for non-statutory audit and 
other services. 
Timely reporting 
11. Is the audit report released to the public after 120 days (4 months) of the balance sheet date 
(BSLR rules – account have to be filed 6 months after the company’s balance sheet date)? 
Board approval 
12. Disclose in the statement of corporate governance that the Board had approved the 
statement. 
Source: Corporate Governance Survey Report 2007 – a joint survey by MSWG and the University of Nottingham, 
Malaysia Campus 
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4.2.2 Independent variables 
This section describes in detail the technique used to measure the independent 
variables. Justification of the chosen technique is also provided. 
Corporate governance quality 
The first independent variable in the study is corporate governance quality (CGQ) 
which is represented by the total score obtained by a company in the Basic 
Compliance Score (BCS) component of the MSWG‟s Corporate Governance 
Scorecard. The BCS and IBP are the main components of Corporate Governance 
Scorecard: The BCS comprises the company‟s compliance with 40 key items based 
on the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and the Bursa Securities Listing 
Requirement (MSWG & UNMC 2007). Therefore the total score of BCS component 
will be used to represent sample companies‟ corporate governance quality. The 
higher the score the better is a company‟s corporate governance quality (Table 4.3).  
This research project uses a similar approach to measuring corporate governance 
quality as has been applied in Beekes and Brown‟s (2006) study, except that the 
Horwath Report 2002 is used by Beekes and Brown (2006) as the basis to measure 
corporate governance quality of Australian listed companies. The 2002 Horwarth 
report contains the ranking of corporate governance for Australian‟s top 250 
companies by market capitalisation as at 30 June, 2001. The criteria used to rank 
companies are based on information related to the Board and its principal committees 
as reported and disclosed by companies in their 2001 Annual Reports and related 
party disclosures. The companies are ranked according to a five-star system. A five-
star rating indicates that a company‟s corporate governance structure is excellent and 
a one-star rating indicates that a company‟s corporate governance structure is poor. 
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For the purpose of their research, Beekes and Brown transformed Horwath‟s raw 
rating scores to range from 1 to 100, where good corporate governance is reflected in 
a higher score. 
There are three main reasons for using this measure for corporate governance quality. 
First, recent studies on corporate governance have developed a broader set of 
corporate governance indices. This particular index is seen as an appropriate measure 
of corporate governance quality as no single corporate governance variable is 
sufficient to evaluate the quality of corporate governance structures of a company 
(Beekes & Brown 2006; Brown & Caylor 2006; Larcker et al. 2007). Second, an 
individual or combination of several corporate governance variables (for example 
directors, auditors and audit committee) approach can create measurement errors 
(Larcker et al. 2007). Furthermore, these variables are likely to be interrelated and 
ignoring such correlations can lead to spurious inference (Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; 
Bowen et al. 2005). Third, the corporate governance quality index that is represented 
by the BCS component of the Corporate Governance Scorecard is customised to the 
local business environment and addresses the governance issues that are relevant to 
the Malaysian context. Therefore, in this research the total score of the BCS 
component will measure the corporate governance quality of a company. 
One of the major issues of adopting this technique is possibility that the above 
measure captures „box-ticking rather than corporate governance quality. To assess 
this possibility, the study conducts some analysis on annual reports of the highest and 
lowest scoring firms in the sample. It shows that there are significant differences 
between low and high corporate governance quality firm in relation to the contents of 
their corporate governance statement in annual report. The high scoring companies 
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have more detailed and longer corporate governance statements compared to 
companies with low corporate governance quality. In addition, some companies with 
low corporate governance quality fail to comply fully with MCCG and BSLR. 
Overall these findings appears to indicate that the measure is capturing more than 
just box-ticking. 
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Table 4.3: List of 40 key corporate governance items using BCS component 
Section A - Board of Directors 
Principal responsibilities of the board 
1. Disclose the statement on the issue of leads control in company 
Chairman & CEO 
2. Have clear division of responsibility 
3. Have independent Chairman (separation of two roles). 
Board balance. 
4. 1/3 of the board members are independent non-executive directors. 
5. Disclose non-executive director’s calibre, credibility, skill and experience. 
Significant shareholder 
6. Board have minority shareholder representation. 
Appointment to the Board (Ensuring Board’s Continuous Effective) 
7. Have nominating committee (NC). 
8. NC composed exclusively of non-executive directors. 
9. NC proposes new nominees for the board consideration and approval. 
10. Disclose the annual review on the board in respect of the skills and experience and other mix 
(Board appraisal is conducted). 
11. Disclose assessment on individual director (Individual director appraisal is conducted). 
Size of Board 
12. Disclose that the company had reviewed the size of the board and feels that it is appropriate. 
Directors’ training 
13. Orientation and education program for new recruits to the board. 
14. Ongoing education and training for directors. 
Board structures and procedures 
15. Disclose the number of board meeting in a year. 
16. Disclose detail of attendance of each individual director in respect of meetings held. 
Relationship of the board to management 
17. Does board define limits of management’s responsibilities? 
Quality of information 
18. Management obliged to supply to the Board with all necessary information including customer 
satisfaction and services quality, market share, market reaction and so on. 
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Access to information 
19. Do directors have separate and independent access to company secretary services? 
Access to advise 
20. Have agreed procedure for director to take independent professional advice.  
Used of Board committees 
21. Have defined authority of any committee form. 
Section B - Directors’ Remuneration 
The level and make-up of remuneration 
1. Have a remuneration committee (RC) 
2. RC consists wholly of non-executive directors. 
3. RC to recommend to the Board the remuneration of the executive directors. 
4. Disclose of membership of the RC in directors’ report. 
5. Take into account of pay and employment conditions within the industry. 
6. Link executive directors’ package to corporate and individual performance. 
7. Relate non-executive directors’ remuneration to contribution and responsibilities. 
Disclosure of Remuneration 
8. Disclose details of remuneration of each director. 
Section C – Shareholders 
AGM 
1. Special business included in the AGM notice must be accompanied by full explanation of the 
effects of a proposed resolution. 
2. Re-election of directors, notice of meetings state which directors are standing for election with 
a brief description of them. 
Section D – Accountability and Audit 
The audit committee (AC) 
1. Audit committee comprised at least three directors. 
2. If more than 50% of them are independent. 
3. Have written terms of reference. 
4. The chairman of the audit committee is an independent non-executive director. 
5.  Disclose details of the activities of audit committee. 
6. Disclose details of the number of audit meeting in a year. 
7. Discloses details of attendance of each individual director in respect of meetings. 
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Internal controls (IC) 
8. Disclose detail of the internal control process (e.g. what financial and non-financial measures 
are in place, when are they tested, when reports on IC are done and who are the reports 
submitted to?). 
9. Disclose risk management statement 
Source: Corporate Governance Survey Report 2007 – a joint survey by MSWG and the University of Nottingham, 
Malaysia Campus 
 
Company secretary  
The company secretary (CSEC) is the second independent variable of this research. 
In order to measure whether the company secretary is an in-house qualified company 
secretary, the definition of an in-house qualified company secretary needs to be 
ascertained properly. This research defines in-house qualified company secretary as 
someone who is employed on a full-time basis by the company and possesses a 
professional qualification or is a member of a professional body. If the company 
secretary is an in-house company secretary „1‟ point will be assigned and „0‟ if the 
company secretary is an external company secretary. Another „1‟ point will assigned 
to a company that has employed someone with a professional qualification and/or is 
a member of professional body, and „0‟ point if otherwise. These scores will be 
summed up together. A full score of 2 points is considered to be an in-house 
qualified company secretary and a score less than 2 is classified as not in-house 
qualified.  
To ascertain whether a particular secretary is a qualified person a reference is made 
to the requirement of the Act. According to section 139A „no person may act as 
company secretary unless he is a member of a professional body which has been 
prescribed by the Minister of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs or he is licensed 
by the Registrar of Companies to act as company secretary‟ (Malaysian Companies 
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Act 1965). In this study it is predicted that a person who is a member of a 
professional body has professional qualification either in accounting, law or 
business. A license holder has less academic qualifications since the minimum 
qualification to apply for the licence is Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia, which is equivalent 
to O‟Level (Section 139B Malaysian Companies Act 1965).  
In checking for this information, the study searches the annual report for the 
professional membership number or the licence registration number issued to the 
company secretary. It is the requirement of the Act that whenever the secretary is to 
sign any statutory forms or documents, the registration number shall be legibly 
written after or printed under his or her name (Companies Regulations 1966, Reg. 
18(3) Malaysian Companies Act 1965). For example if a person has a professional 
qualification and/or is a member of a professional body, the registration number will 
appear as „MAICSA 7018176‟ or „MIA 1112‟ and for a licence holder the number 
will appear as „Licence no. 0005687‟. Based on this information, the secretary will 
be classified as either (a) someone with a professional qualification and/or a member 
of a professional body or (b) a licensed secretary. 
To determine whether a company secretary is an in-house or external, annual report 
information in relation to the registered office address of the company and the 
company‟s business or principal address is checked. If these addresses appear the 
same then the company secretary is categorised as in-house (full-time) but if not then 
he or she is seen as an external company secretary. In addition, the study checks 
whether the company secretary‟s name appears in the list of the management team 
members since an in-house company secretary is also considered to be a member of 
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the company‟s management team and sometimes holds other senior positions in the 
company. 
In case of a company that employs more than one company secretary and either both 
of them are in-house or one is an in-house and the other is an external, a decision to 
determine whether they are in-house qualified or not is given to the company 
secretary that possesses better professional qualifications. The reason for this is 
because the descriptive statistics of company secretary (Table 5.10) shows that most 
companies that employed more than one company secretary tend to engage an 
external secretary with better qualifications than the existing in-house company 
secretary. 
4.2.3 Moderating variables 
This section explains in detail the techniques used to measure the moderating 
variables that are expected to moderate the relationship between corporate 
governance quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information.  
Issuance of new shares 
Collett and Hrasky (2005), and Bujaki and McConomy (2002) consider an increase 
of a certain percentage of the existing share capital level from the preceding year in 
their measurement of an issuance of new shares (S-ISS). Five percent and 20 percent 
have been used in Collett and Hrasky (2005) and Bujaki and McConomy (2002) 
respectively to measure an issuance of new shares for firms. A value of „1‟ is 
assigned if the company‟s issued share capital increases by the certain fixed 
percentage or more from the preceding year and a „0‟ otherwise. In contrast Labelle 
(2002) measures issuance of new shares by examining whether the firm appeared to 
have raised funds in T+1 in the Financial Post Record of New Issues. If the firm‟s 
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name appeared in the Financial Post Record of New Issues, the same dichotomous 
scoring system used in the above studies is adopted to measure the variable. For the 
purpose of this research project, the scale used in the study of Collett and Hrasky 
(2005) is adopted. That is a five percent increase of share capital will be considered 
as an issuance of new share capital. 
Issuance of new debt 
A similar scale to the one used by Collett and Hrasky (2005) is also adopted to 
measure the issuance of new debt capital (D-ISS). This variable takes a value of „1‟ 
if the company‟s existing debt issuance increases by five percent or more compared 
to the previous year‟s debt level. Lang and Lundholm (1993) use an index variable to 
identify firm-years with a debt offering in the current or following two years. New 
debt issue data are collected from the Investment Dealer‟s Digest which provides a 
complete listing of the SEC registration statement for filings. Issuance of new debt is 
a dummy variable equal to one if the firm files a debt equity registration statement in 
the current year or in the next two years, and 0 otherwise. Lang and Lundholm 
(1993) include financing activity which takes place in the future years to reflect 
increased disclosure in anticipation of future securities issues. This form of data is 
not available in Malaysia. Hence, a five percent increase of debt capital from the 
previous year will be used to measure an issue of new debt. 
Stock based compensation 
To measure this variable, the study will use Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki‟s (2003) 
scale to determine stock-based compensation (SC-OPTIONS). That is the sum of 
total value of stock option grants plus the value of restricted stock grants divided by 
the total value of direct compensation. The main reason for using this measurement 
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is the availability of data in relation to directors‟ components of remuneration 
packages and stock options. These data are easily assessable and can be found in 
annual reports. Thus measuring stock-based compensation using this technique is 
possible.  
The CEO shareholdings 
CEO shareholdings (SH-OWN) are measured as the market value of the total CEO 
ownership over the total market value of issued share capital of a company. Deumes 
and Knechel (2008) use top managers‟ equity ownership to measure the association 
between management ownership and voluntary reporting of internal control. They 
measure managerial ownership by summing up the percentage of shares held by 
members of the management board. On the other hand Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki 
(2003) use the average value of CEO shareholdings in the firm over the sample 
period to measure the stock price-based incentives. In this research project, a similar 
approach is employed to measure CEO shareholdings (the market value of shares 
held by CEO) except that the market value of CEO shareholdings is not averaged by 
year (sample period) but divided by the total market value of issued share capital.  
4.2.4 Control variables 
In order to test the relationship between corporate governance quality and the 
voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information, it is important to include 
control variables that could be associated with voluntary disclosures. The control 
variables that are included in the model to test all the hypotheses in this research are 
company size, type of industry, listing status, leverage, family member on the board, 
race and profitability. These control variables are drawn from prior research (Collett 
& Hrasky 2005; Deumes & Knechel 2008; Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Haniffa & 
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Cooke 2002; Ho & Wong 2001; Hossain et al. 1995; Meek et al. 1995; Watson et al. 
2002).  
Company size (SIZE) has consistently been associated with increases in voluntary 
disclosure in general. Larger firms are suggested not to have difficulty in general to 
comply with governance issues as well as to provide corporate governance 
information in annual reports compared to smaller firms (Bujaki & McConomy 
2002). Larger firms are also likely to be more complex and have a wider ownership 
base than smaller firms. Thus, agency theory suggests that larger firms will have 
higher agency costs compared to smaller firms which requires them to voluntarily 
disclose more information to mitigate this agency problem (Jensen & Meckling 
1976). There are a number of methods used to measure firm size: total revenue 
(Meek et al. 1995); the sum of market value of equity or market capitalisation 
(Beekes & Brown 2006; Collett & Hrasky 2005); and total assets (Labelle 2002). 
There are two main reasons why the study uses total assets to measure a company‟s 
size instead of market capitalisation. First, total assets are a better measure than 
market capitalisation since it is not impacted by stock market conditions. Second, it 
is also not related to how the company is financed. That is how much debt versus 
equity is included in its capital structure. 
Type of industry or industry classification according to which firms are grouped 
together is another determining factor that is commonly used in previous studies to 
explain the level of voluntary disclosure. Most prior studies that examine the 
association between type of industry and voluntary disclosure have found a 
significant association between the type of industry and voluntary disclosure 
practices (Collett & Hrasky 2005; Deumes & Knechel 2008; Meek et al. 1995). This 
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study uses the indicators of „1‟ if a company operates in trading/services sector and 
„0‟ otherwise. Prior studies on voluntary disclosure in Malaysia have also used 
trading/services (TRA) sector classification as well as other sectors such as 
industrial, consumer, construction and plantation (Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Haniffa 
& Cooke 2002). Trading/services sector is chosen because they represent the 
majority sample of companies in the study. 
Listing (LIS) status refers to firms whose shares are listed on both international and 
domestic stock exchanges. Firms whose shares are listed on an international stock 
exchange face additional listing requirements in relation to corporate governance 
disclosure in their annual reports (Gray et al. 1995). To measure listing status a 
dummy variable is used, whereby a company that is listed on both the domestic and 
the international stock exchange is assigned a value of „1‟ and a value of „0‟ 
otherwise. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that a firm with a high gearing ratio (LEV) 
will have more agency problems because the potential for wealth transfers from debt 
holders to shareholders increases. Thus, voluntary disclosure is expected to increase 
as the gearing ratio increases. Deumes and Knechel (2008) hypothesise and have 
found a positive association between leverage and voluntary reporting on internal 
control within a two year period (1998 and 1999) but an insignificant association in 
1997. Gray, Meek and Roberts‟ (1995) study also found a significant association 
between leverage and voluntary disclosure but in the inverse direction. Some studies 
use total liabilities divided by total assets of a firm to represent leverage (Bujaki & 
McConomy 2002; Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Meek et al. 1995) while another group of 
studies measures leverage by the ratio of the book value of debt to the sum of the 
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market value of equity and the book value of debt or long term loans to shareholders‟ 
funds (Deumes & Knechel 2008; Ghazali & Weetman 2006). In this study the first 
method of measurement of leverage is used. This method of measuring leverage is 
preferred because shareholders‟ equity has been used to measure return on equity 
(ROE) variable. Thus this can reduce the possibility of multicollinearity problem. 
The presence of a family member on board (FMB) is measured by the proportion of 
family members on the board (Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Haniffa & Cooke 2002; 
Ho & Wong 2001). The presence of family members on the board is considered to be 
the main factor that hinders voluntary disclosure especially for firms that operate in 
Asian countries. Ho and Wong (2001) argue that in Hong Kong, the majority of 
listed firms are family-owned and this is considered as highly concentrated 
ownership. These types of family-owned firms are controlled and managed by family 
members who own a substantial amount of the firms‟ issued share capital. As such 
decisions made by a board of directors that is dominated by family members are 
more likely to approve the desires or needs of the family. They find evidence to 
support their prediction that companies with a high proportion of family members on 
the board are less likely to disclose information voluntarily. Similar results are also 
found in studies that examined the level of voluntary disclosure in the Malaysian 
setting (Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Haniffa & Cooke 2002). 
Another factor that is considered to be a contributor to decisions to disclose 
voluntarily is race. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) used cultural factors (race and 
education background) as one of the determining factors that influence voluntary 
disclosure by Malaysian corporations. They measure race as a firm having a Malay 
managing director, a Malay finance director, a Malay Chairman, the proportion of 
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Malay directors on the board and the proportion of Malay shareholdings. They 
proposed a negative relationship for all of the above variables with the level of 
voluntary disclosure. The results of their study show that race significantly 
influences the level of voluntary disclosure and in an opposite direction. This 
suggests that in examining voluntary disclosure in Malaysia, cultural factors such as 
race should be considered. Therefore the proportion of Malay directors (BOARD-M) 
on the board will be used to measure cultural factors in this research. 
Companies reporting high profitability are expected to have more incentive to 
disclose voluntarily as good performance (profit) is considered to be good news. In 
contrast Collett and Hrasky (2005) predict that companies with poor performance 
(loss) may have more incentive to disclose corporate governance information 
voluntarily. They used return on assets (ROA) to measure firm performance. Since 
total assets have been used to measure firm size, return on equity (ROE) is adopted 
as a measure of firm performance, to reduce the possibility of multicollinearity 
problems. ROE is a continuous variable measured as profits before tax divided by 
shareholders' equity. This measure of profitability has been used in prior studies in 
Malaysia (Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Haniffa & Cooke 2002).  
 
4.3 Population and sample selection 
4.3.1 Population  
The population of this study consists of the 987 companies listed on the Bursa 
Securities Malaysia Berhad (BSMB) in 2007. However since one of the major 
criteria for inclusion in the sample of the study is corporate governance quality, the 
sample frame is reduced to the 350 companies that have data on corporate 
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governance quality available. This sample frame is based on the 350 top listed 
companies published in the MSWG 2007 corporate governance survey report. The 
MSWG assessed annual report disclosures using the corporate governance scorecard 
and then used this assessment to rank companies according to the quality of their 
corporate governance structures. Identifying companies with corporate governance 
quality data is necessary because empirical tests in this research project analyse the 
association between corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance information.  
4.3.2 Sample selection 
From the sample frame of 350 top listed companies in Malaysia, 40 companies are 
excluded either because their shares have been suspended, deleted, delisted, acquired 
or become privatised during the period. Another 35 companies in the Finance sector 
are also excluded because these companies are required to comply not only with the 
Bursa Securities Listing Requirements but also with stricter rules such as the 
Banking and Financial Act and the Bank Negara rules. This leaves a final sample of 
275 companies. Table 4.4 shows the total number of companies listed on the BSMB 
and how the final sample is derived. 
Table 4.4: Sample companies used for empirical tests  
  Total population  987 
less: Companies without data on corporate governance quality 637 
Top 350 companies with corporate governance quality 350 
less: Companies whose shares were deleted, suspended, delisted, 
acquired or privatised 40 
   310 
Less: Companies in Finance sector 35 
 Final Sample 275 
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4.3.3 Data collection and data sources 
Secondary data is used in the form of company annual reports. There are a few 
reasons for using annual reports as the main data source. First, the corporate 
governance quality (CGQ) and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
information (VDCGI) variables are proxied through the use of the MSWG 
measurement of the IBP and BCS components of the corporate governance 
scorecard. The MSWG collects data in relation to corporate governance quality and 
voluntary disclosure information from companies‟ annual reports. 
Second, most of the relevant data such as company secretary, issuance of new share 
and debt capital, stock-based incentives as well as data on control variables can be 
obtained from the annual reports. Annual reports of listed companies are easily 
assessable through company websites, the Bursa Securities Malaysia Berhad 
(BSMB) websites and the OSIRIS database.  
Third, most of the prior studies of voluntary disclosure have used annual reports to 
analyse the extent of corporate governance disclosures (Bujaki & McConomy 2002; 
Collett & Hrasky 2005). According to Catasus (2000) there are two main reasons for 
researchers to use annual reports for corporate governance studies. The first reason is 
that annual reports are commonly viewed as representing the domain of corporate 
concerns. Hence annual reports are one of the most important media to communicate 
these concerns to stakeholders. Second, an annual report is issued regularly and is 
easily assessable for inspection by members of the public. Thus, using an annual 
report as the main source of data collection for this research is justifiable. 
The study uses 2007 annual reports for three main reasons. First, there is no 
corporate governance quality data available for a large population before 2006. 
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Second, the study uses 2007 annual reports because the data collected in the MSWG 
corporate governance survey report 2008 was based on 2007 annual reports. Third, 
2007 was chosen because it was the most recent year for which full financial data 
was available for the sample companies, and to avoid the effect of the global 
economic downturn which happened at the end of 2008.  
The BSMB website‟s link to companies‟ websites as well as the OSIRIS database are 
used as sources for companies‟ annual reports to collect company secretary data, 
moderating data (issuance of new share and debt capital, and stock-based incentives), 
and control variables data. Both the corporate governance quality and voluntary 
disclosure data are obtained from the MSWG. The governance data refer to the 
position at the end of the 2007 financial year as reported in the annual reports. All 
data in relation to issuance of new shares and debt capital refer to the end of the year 
2008 and 2009 financial years as reported in the companies‟ annual reports. This 
approach is chosen because it identifies the voluntary disclosure practices that are in 
place at the beginning of the relevant financial year and which are therefore relevant 
for financing activity in the following year. Prior studies have found evidence that 
shows companies increase disclosure in their annual reports prior to financing 
activities (Bujaki & McConomy 2002; Collett & Hrasky 2005; Lang & Lundholm 
2000). The study expects that issuances of new share or debt capital will be made in 
the next two years (2008 and 2009) from the base year 2007. Therefore this study 
assumes that the current firms‟ disclosure decisions are related to firm anticipation of 
future financing needs. Finally, data on stock-based incentives and company 
secretaries are based on companies‟ 2007 annual reports. 
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4.4 Data analysis techniques 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
As a first step before testing the hypotheses, general observations are made on 
various data obtained for the year 2007. Descriptive statistics are a useful tool for 
making some general observations about the data collected, for example the 
characteristics of the companies involved in the study, the size range and average 
mean size or the industry classification and listing status of the companies. All data 
are tabulated, either through simple tabulation or cross-tabulation. This technique is 
useful for arranging data in a more informative format. The data are described by 
measures of central tendency such as mean, median or mode. In addition, graphs are 
used to help simplify and clarify research data (Zikmund 2003). Other statistics such 
as standard deviation and variance also provide information about the distribution of 
each variable (Hair et al. 2006). 
4.4.2 Interpretive analysis 
Correlation analysis: measures of association between variables 
Pearson‟s and Spearman‟s rho product-moment correlation tests are run to measure 
the relationship of one variable to another. These tests also look at whether there is 
significant correlation among independent variables, the dependent variable, the 
moderating variables and the control variables. It is important to keep in mind that 
correlation does not mean causation. Hence, no matter how high the correlation 
between the two variables, this correlation does not indicate that the independent 
variable causes the dependent variable (Zikmund 2003). In addition correlations 
between independent, moderating and control variables help to discover if 
multicollinearity will be a problem in the regression analysis. 
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Regression model and analysis 
Regression analysis is the main technique used for measuring the linear association 
between dependent, independent and moderator variables. The type of regression 
analysis to test all the hypotheses is a linear simultaneous multiple regression 
technique which is also referred to as forced entry regression or standardised 
multiple regression. In this type of regression technique all variables are forced to 
enter the equation at the same time. The simultaneous regression technique is 
appropriate because the main purpose of this research is to determine the extent of 
the influence of incentive factors on voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
information. The simultaneous multiple regression technique enables the study to 
estimate the direct effects of each variable on the dependent variable. In addition, this 
research is also interested to know whether Dye‟s voluntary disclosure theory holds 
in developing countries as well as to different type of voluntary disclosure. This 
technique is believed by some researchers to be the only appropriate method for 
theory testing (Studenmund & Cassidy 1987). The following multiple regression 
equation model is used for hypotheses testing:   
VDECGI = β0 + β1CGQ + β2CSEC + β3S-ISS + β4CGQ*S-ISS + β5D-ISS +  
 β6CGQ*D-ISS + β7SC-OPTIONS + β8CGQ* SC-OPTIONS +  
 β9 SH-OWN + β10CGQ *SH-OWN + β11SIZE + β12IND + β13LIST 
+ β14LEV + ß15 FMB + ß16 BOARD-M + ß17 ROE + εi 
where VDECGI represents Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Governance 
Information. Table 4.5 provides a summary of the regression equation components. 
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Label Explanation 
CGQ*S-ISS interaction term of CGQ and S-ISS 
CGQ*D-ISS interaction term of CGQ and D-ISS 
CGQ*SC-OPTIONS interaction term of CGQ and SC-OPTIONS 
CGQ*SH-OWN interaction term of CGQ and SH-OWN 
 
This multiple regression model also includes interaction effects between corporate 
governance quality and each moderator. In order to test all hypotheses in this study it 
is necessary to consider the simultaneous effects of the independent and moderating 
variables on voluntary disclosure outcomes (Chen & Jaggi 2000; Labelle 2002). 
Since incentive factors (capital market transactions and stock-based incentives) are 
expected to moderate the relationship between corporate governance quality and 
voluntary disclosure, it is necessary to test the interaction terms related to each of the 
incentive factors in order to rule out the possibility that the unobserved interaction of 
corporate governance quality and the incentive factors drives the primary results of 
this study. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter explains the research methodology used to test the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 3. First, the measures used for each of dependent, independent, 
moderating and control variables are explained and justification for adopting the 
approach is provided. Second, the population from which the sample was selected is 
discussed and the main sources of data used have been described. Finally, the data 
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analysis techniques undertaken in this research are outlined. Chapter 5 presents an 
analysis of the results obtained by using these tests. 
  
104 
 
Table 4.5: Summary of regression equation components 
Dependent variable Operational Source of information 
VDCGI = Voluntary 
disclosure of  corporate 
governance information 
Total number of points awarded for voluntary 
corporate governance information 
The proportion of IBP 
scores obtained from the 
MSWG 
Independent variables Operational Source of information 
CGQ = Corporate 
governance quality 
Total number of points awarded for corporate 
governance quality 
The proportion of BCS 
scores obtained from the 
MSWG 
CSEC = Company 
secretary 
In-house qualified company secretary: 
Member of professional body = 1, otherwise 0. 
In-house = 1, external = 0. 
The above score will then be added together. Full-
time qualified company secretary should obtain a 
score of 2 points. A score below 2 points is 
considered as ‘Not in-house qualified’  
Company annual report 
Moderating variables Operational Source of information 
S-ISS = Share issue 5% or more of existing share issued. Company annual report 
D-ISS = Debt issue Non-current liabilities increase by 5% or more. Company annual report 
SC-OPTIONS = Ratio of 
stock based 
compensation to total  
compensation 
The sum of total value of stock option grants plus the 
value of the restricted stock grants divided by the total 
value of direct  compensation  
Company annual report 
SH-OWN = value of 
shares held by CEO 
Ratio of market value of the CEO’s shareholdings to 
total market value of issued share capital. 
Company annual report 
Control variables Operational Source of information 
SIZE = Size Total assets Company annual report 
TRA = Trading/ services 
sector  
1 if the company is in the trading/services sector  and 
0 if otherwise 
Company annual report 
 
LIS = Cross Listing  1 if the company has multiple listings, 0 if otherwise Company annual report 
LEV = Leverage Total liabilities divided by total assets  Company annual report 
FMB = Family members 
on the board 
Proportion of family members on the board to the total 
number of directors 
Company annual report 
BOARD-M = Malay 
directors on board 
Proportion of Malay directors to total number of 
directors on the board 
Company annual report 
ROE = Return on equity Profits before tax divided by shareholders' equity Company annual report 
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5 Analysis and Results 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the results from the descriptive statistics, correlations and 
regression analyses. It does not draw conclusion from the results nor suggest 
implications for theory, policy or practice. This is left to Chapter 6. The current 
Chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 discusses the descriptive statistics of the 
sample. Section 5.3 explains the results obtained from the correlation analysis. 
Section 5.4 details the results of testing the interaction term effects. Section 5.5 
presents the results of the regression analysis. Section 5.6 outlines the results of 
additional tests and section 5.7 concludes the Chapter by summarising its main 
outcomes. 
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
The number of sample firms and the population from each industry sector are shown 
in Table 5.1. The majority (49.1%) of sampled companies are from the 
trading/services and industrial sectors. The property sector accounts for 15.3%, 
followed by consumer product (11.6%) and plantation (10.9%). The construction, 
infrastructure, technology, hotel and closed-end fund sectors represent 6.5%, 2.9%, 
2.5%, 0.7% and 0.4% respectively from the sample. As can be seen in Table 5.1, the 
275 companies are a reasonably representative sample based on industry sector. 
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Table 5.1: Sample companies by industry sector 
   
      
Industry sector   
Number in 
sample % in Sample 
Number in 
Population 
% in 
Population 
Trading/Services 
 
72 26.2 182 21.5 
Industrial Product 
 
63 22.9 269 31.8 
Property 
 
42 15.3 87 10.3 
Consumer Product 32 11.6 133 15.7 
Plantation 
 
30 10.9 43 5.1 
Construction 
 
18 6.5 50 5.9 
Infrastructure 
 
8 2.9 12 1.4 
Technology 
 
7 2.5 25 3.0 
Hotel 
 
2 0.7 4 0.5 
Closed-end fund 
 
1 0.4 2 0.2 
Mining 
 
0 0.0 1 0.1 
Finance 
 
0 0.0 39 4.6 
Total no. of 
Companies 275 100 847* 100 
      * This number excludes 124 companies from the MESDAQ market and 16 companies under PN17 
+ GN3. PN17 companies are those that triggered any of the criteria pursuant to Amended Practice 
Note 17 of the Listing Requirements of Bursa Securities Malaysia Berhad. GN3 companies are 
those that triggered any of the criteria pursuant to Guidance Note 3 of MESDAQ market Listing 
Requirements of Bursa Securities Malaysia Berhad. 
Source: Bursa Malaysia Berhad 
 
Table 5.2 summarises the descriptive statistics for the corporate governance quality 
(CGQ) and its sub-categories that make-up the Basic Compliance Score (BCS) 
component of Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) scorecard. The 
distribution of CGQ score and its sub-categories is presented in Table 5.3. The sub-
categories include board of directors, directors‟ remuneration, shareholders, and 
accountability and audit. The highest total CGQ score achieved by a company is 39 
out of 40 points and the lowest score is 18 points. The mean and median values are 
29.67 and 30 respectively. This suggests that companies‟ CGQ scores in the sample 
107 
 
are at relatively high levels. A close review of Tables 5.2 and 5.3 reveals that the 
averages mean score under the board of directors category was 14.98, with the 
minimum and maximum score of nine and 20 respectively. Directors‟ remuneration 
was the category with the poorest governance quality. This is indicated by a median 
score of 4 points, with less than 21 per cent of the 275 companies obtaining a score 
above 6 points. On the other hand, the majority of companies (84%) attained a 
maximum score of 2 points in the shareholders category with a mean of 1.84. 
Similarly, more than 80 percent of companies score a maximum 9 points for the 
accountability and audit category. The above analysis indicates that more than one-
half (51.6%) of the companies in the sample obtained a CGQ score of 30 and above 
points.  
 
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for Corporate Governance Quality (CGQ) and its sub-
categories (N = 275) 
 
  
Categories Mean Median Minimum Maximum  
Part A - Board of Directors (0 to 21)* 14.98 15.00 9.00 20.00  
Part B - Directors' remuneration (0 to 8)* 3.98 4.00 0.00 8.00  
Part C - Shareholders (0 to 2)* 1.84 2.00 0.00 2.00  
Part D - Accountability and Audit(0 to 9)* 8.87 9.00 7.00 9.00  
Total possible CGQ score (0-40)* 29.67 30.00 18.00 39.00  
 
*Numbers in bracket are minimum and maximum possible scores. 
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Table 5.3: Distribution of Corporate Governance Quality (CGQ) score and its sub-
categories (N=275) 
Board of directors (0-21)* 
 
Directors' Remuneration (0-8)* 
Score 
No of 
companies Percentage 
 
Score  
No of 
companies Percentage 
9 to 12  42 15.3 
 
0 to 2 58 21.1 
13 to 16 166 60.3 
 
3 to 5 160 58.2 
17 to 20 67 24.4 
 
6 and above 57 20.7 
Total 275 100.0 
 
Total 275 100.0 
   
 
   
   
 
   
Shareholders (0 - 2)* 
 
Accountability and Audit (0-9)* 
Score 
No of 
companies Percentage 
 
Score 
No of 
companies Percentage 
0 3 1.1 
 
7 2 0.7 
1 39 14.2 
 
8 32 11.7 
2 233 84.7 
 
9 241 87.6 
Total 275 100.0 
 
Total 275 100.0 
   
    
       Total CGQ Score (0-40)* 
   
Score 
No of 
companies Percentage 
    18 to 24 30 10.9 
    25 to 29 91 33.1 
    30 to 34 129 46.9 
    35 to 39 25 4.7 
    Total 275 100.0 
    
       *Numbers in bracket are minimum and maximum possible scores. 
 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 summarise the descriptive statistics and distribution score in 
relation to voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information (VDCGI) and 
its sub-categories which represent the International Best Practices (IBP) score 
component of MSWG scorecard. Possible VDCGI scores range from a minimum of 
zero point to a maximum of 35 points. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 reveal that there is a wide 
range in observed VDCGI scores, from 1 to 25, with a mean of 9.18. This suggests 
that most companies scored at the lower end of the possible range. The mean score 
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for the board of directors‟ category is low at 1.36 with a majority of companies 
(60%) obtaining a score of zero to one point and about 40 per cent of companies 
obtaining a score over two points. The average mean score for the directors‟ 
remuneration category is also low at 0.78. More than 80 per cent of sample 
companies received a score of less than two points compared with about 50 (18%) of 
companies receiving two or above points for the directors‟ remuneration category. 
The minimum and maximum possible scores for the shareholders category are zero 
and nine points respectively. The observed mean and median for this sub-category 
are 3.43 and 4.00. The mean score for accountability and audit category is 3.61 while 
the median is 4.00. The overall analysis of the VDCGI score indicates that less than 
10 per cent of the 275 sample companies received a disclosure score of more than 14 
out of the maximum possible score of 35.  
 
Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics for Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Governance  
                 Information (VDCGI) and its sub-categories (N = 275) 
     
Categories Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Part A - Board of Directors (0 to 8)* 1.36 1.00 0.00 7.00 
Part B - Directors' remuneration (0 to 6)* 0.78 1.00 0.00 4.00 
Part C - Shareholders (0 to 9)* 3.43 4.00 0.00 8.00 
Part D - Accountability and Audit(0 to 12)* 3.61 4.00 0.00 9.00 
Total VDCGI Score (0-35)* 9.18 9.00 1.00 25.00 
 
*Numbers in bracket are minimum and maximum possible scores. 
  
110 
 
Table 5.5: Distribution of Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Governance Information (VDCGI) 
                 score and its sub-categories (N=275) 
Board of Directors (0-8)* 
 
Directors' Remuneration (0-6)* 
 
 
Score 
No of 
companies Percentage 
 
Score 
No of 
companies Percentage 
  1 and 
below 166 
60.4 
 
1 and 
below 225 
81.8 
  2 to 4 106 38.5 
 
2 to 3 49 17.8 
  5 to 7 3 1.1 
 
4 1 0.4 
  Total 275 100.0 
 
Total 275 100.0 
     
 
   
 
 
   
     
 
Shareholders (0-9)* 
 
Accountability and Audit (0-12)* 
 
 
Score 
No of 
companies Percentage 
 
Score 
No of 
companies Percentage 
 
 
0 to 2 64 23.3 
 
0 to 3 123 44.7 
 
 
3 to 5 184 66.9 
 
4 to 6 129 46.9 
 
 
6 to 8 27 9.8 
 
7 to 9 23 8.4 
 
 
Total 275 100.0 
 
Total 275 100.0 
 
 
        
 
        
 
Total VDCGI score (0-35)* 
 
 
 
 
Score 
No of 
companies Percentage 
 
 
   
 
1 to 7 95 34.6 
 
 
  
 
8 to 14 156 56.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 to 25 24 8.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 275 100.0 
 
  
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
*Numbers in bracket are minimum and maximum possible scores. 
 
Table 5.6 shows the descriptive statistics for other continuous variables. The 
proportion of stock-based compensation offered to CEOs as part of their total 
compensation packages ranged from 0.00 to 0.95. There are 198 companies that did 
not offer stock-based compensation (SC-OPTIONS) as part of the total compensation 
packages for the CEO compared to only 77 companies that offered this form of 
compensation (Table 5.7). The mean proportion of stock-based compensation is 0.15 
as shown in Table 5.6. CEOs on the whole owned on average 0.17 of the total issued 
shares, although the highest proportion of shares owned by CEOs (SH-OWN) in the 
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sample reached 0.75. Based on Table 5.7, there are around 45% of CEOs who owned 
shares in companies and the remaining 55% of them did not own shares. 
 
Table 5.6: Summary statistics for other continuous variables 
   
       
 
Continuous Variables Label Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum  
% of Stock-based 
Compensation 
SC-
OPTIONS 0.15 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.95  
% of CEO shares own SH-OWN 0.17 0.01 0.21 0.00 0.75  
Total Assets LSIZE 13.99 13.8 1.19 11.53 18.03  
Total Assets/Total Debt LEV 0.43 0.42 0.23 0.00 1.95  
Returns on equity ROE 0.18 0.16 0.23 -0.78 2.90  
% of Family members 
on board FMB 0.18 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.83  
% of Malay directors on 
board BOARD-M 0.43 0.38 0.28 0.00 1.00  
 
 
The distribution of the total assets (LSIZE) was normalised using a log 
transformation (Table 5.7). Mean value of total assets before transformation is 
Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) 2.9 billion. More than one-half of companies are smaller 
than MYR 1.0 billion total assets. The range of total assets indicates that sampled 
companies are widely distributed (Table 5.8). Leverage (LEV) levels of companies 
are quite high with a mean of 0.43. The lowest gearing level is 0.00 with highest at 
1.95. Return on equity ratio (ROE) is used to measure profitability of a company. 
Statistics on ROE indicate that a small number of companies exhibit negative ROE. 
The maximum ROE is 2.90 and the mean is 0.18 (Table 5.6). 
  
112 
 
Table 5.7: Summary of companies with and without stock-based compensation, CEO  
                  shareholdings, family members and Malay directors 
  
No of 
companies %     
No of 
companies % 
Stock-based compensation (SC-
OPTIONS) 77 28 
 
Do not offer Stock-based 
compensation 198 72 
CEO Shareholdings (SH-OWN) 150 55 
 
No CEO shareholdings 125 45 
Family members on boards 
(FMB) 123 45 
 
No family member on 
boards 152 55 
Malay directors on boards 
(BOARD-M) 256 93 
 
No Malay directors on 
boards 19 7 
 
The proportion of family members on boards of directors (FMB) ranges from 0.00 to 
0.83. As shown in Table 5.7, there are more than half (152) of companies in the 
sample did not have directors with family connections. The mean and median for the 
proportion of Malay directors on boards (BOARD-M) are 0.43 and 0.38 of which the 
minimum and maximum proportion of Malay directors on board range from zero and 
1.00 respectively. In addition, Table 5.7 also shows that there are about 19 (7%) 
companies that have no Malay directors, indicating that majority of companies would 
have at least one Malay director as a member of their board. 
 
Table 5.8: Total assets of sample companies 
   
      
Statistics 
 
Total assets 
No. of 
companies Percentage 
SIZE (MYR'000) 
 
less than 1 billion 141 51.3 
Mean 2,948,926 
 
Between 1 billion to 3.5 billion 87 31.6 
Median 986,600 
 
Between 3.5 billion to 7.0 billion 25 9.1 
Minimum 101,973 
 
Between 7.0 billion to 10.5 billion 9 3.3 
Maximum 67,724,600 
 
Above 10.5 billion 13 4.7 
 
Descriptive statistics for dichotomous variables are presented in Table 5.9. Nearly 
half (48%) of the sample companies employed in-house qualified company 
secretaries (CSEC). More than 70% of them have professional qualifications (ProQ) 
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and about two third (68%) of them are also in-house (InH) company secretaries. 
Table 5.10 presents more detailed descriptive statistics for company secretaries. It 
shows that 55% (150) of sample companies have more than one company secretary. 
The remaining 45% (125) employed only one company secretary. Eighty-four (56%) 
of these company secretaries are in-house qualified compared to only 49 (39%) 
companies with one company secretary that are in-house qualified. In fact, 26 (17%) 
of companies with more than one company secretary have both professional by 
qualified and license holder as well as in-house and external. This shows that 
companies value academic qualifications of company secretaries on par with the in-
house category. Some companies that employed an in-house company secretary of 
lower academic qualification (license holder) are likely to engage an external 
company secretary with higher qualifications (professional qualification). In 
addition, 58 (21%) of the in-house company secretaries also hold various posts in 
companies other than as a company secretary alone. 
Table 5.9: Summary for dichotomous or dummy variables 
      
Dichotomous or Dummy 
Variable Label 
Number of 
companies 
where 
Dummy 
Variable = 1 % 
Number of 
companies 
where 
Dummy 
Variable= 0 % 
              
In-house qualified 
company secretary 
 
CSEC 133 48 142 52 
 
*Professional 
Qualification ProQ 202 73 73 27 
 
*In-house InH 191 69 84 31 
Issued new shares S-ISS 44 16 231 84 
 
*ESOS Esos 27 10 248 90 
 
*Rights Rights 17 6 258 94 
Issued new debt funds D-ISS 43 16 232 84 
Cross listing 
 
LIS 10 4 265 90 
Trading/ services sector TRA 72 26 203 74 
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There are 44 companies that issued new shares (S-ISS), while the remaining 231 
companies did not issue any new shares. Out of the 44 companies that issued new 
shares, 27 of the new issuances are Employee Share Options Scheme (ESOS) and 17 
are in the form of a rights issue (Rights). There are 43 companies that issued new 
debt capital (D-ISS). This indicates that there are only a small number of companies 
in the sample that issued new shares and debt capital during the period of 2008 to 
2009.   
Ten listed companies have shares that are cross listed (LIS) on other stock exchanges 
(Table 5.9). The sub-sample of companies that belong to the trading/services sector 
(TRA) is 72 which represent 26% of the overall sample. 
Company size, as measured by total assets initially has very high values for skewness 
and kurtosis. Therefore, as is common in the literature, this variable was transformed 
using a natural log transformation. This transformation reduced the skewness and 
kurtosis statistics to 0.754 and 0.498 respectively. The stock-based compensation 
variable also had reasonably high statistics for skewness and kurtosis. This was dealt 
with by transforming the variable using a square root transformation. This 
transformation reduced the skewness to 1.272 and kurtosis to -0.179. The remaining 
variables have lower values of skewness and kurtosis and are normally distributed.  
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Table 5.10: Descriptive statistics of company secretary data 
       
 
No of 
companies percentage 
     
One company secretary 125 45 
     
More than one 150 55 
     
total 275 100 
     
        
 
One company 
secretary percentage 
 
More than 
one percentage Total percentage 
In-house qualified 
(CSEC) 49 39 
 
84 56 133 48 
Not in-house qualified 76 61 
 
66 44 142 52 
 
125 
  
150 
 
275 100 
        Professional qualified 
(ProQ) 84 67 
 
118 79 202 73 
License holder 41 33 
 
32 21 73 27 
 
125 
  
150 
 
275 100 
        
In-house (InH) 96 77 
 
95 63 191 69 
External 29 23 
 
55 37 84 31 
 
125 
  
150 
 
275 100 
        
Holding other post 24 19 
 
34 23 58 21 
Not holding other post 101 81 
 
116 77 217 79 
 
125 
  
150 
 
275 100 
        
Both in-house and external 0 
  
91 61 
  Have license as well as 
professional qualified 0 
  
33 22 
  Have both of the above 
category 0 
  
26 17 
  
    
150 
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5.3 Correlation results 
5.3.1 Correlations between dependent variable and predictor variables 
The bivariate relationships among variables in the regression model are explored in 
Tables 5.11 and 5.12. The Pearson correlation coefficients between dependent, 
independent, moderating and control variables are reported in Table 5.11. As 
expected, there is a significant correlation between corporate governance quality 
(CGQ) and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information (VDCGI), r = 
0.49, p (one-tailed) < 0.01. In addition, issuance of new shares (S-ISS) and debt 
funds (D-ISS), stock-based compensation (SC-OPTIONS), natural log for total assets 
(LSIZE), leverage (LEV), proportion of Malay directors (BOARD-M), return on 
equity (ROE), cross-listing (LIS) and trading/services sector (TRA) are all positively 
and significantly correlated with voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
information. The proportion of family members on boards (FMB) is negatively 
correlated with voluntary disclosure as expected, r = -0.35, p (one-tailed) < 0.01. As 
predicted, CEO shareholding (SH-OWN) is also negatively and significantly 
correlated with voluntary disclosure. An in-house qualified company secretary is the 
only variable that is not significantly correlated to voluntary disclosure. Overall, 
these correlation results provide initial support for the majority of the hypotheses. 
They also confirm the importance of the control variables. 
Non-parametric Spearman‟s rho correlations are also calculated and presented in 
Table 5.12. As with Pearson correlations in Table 5.11, CGQ is significantly 
positively correlated with VDECGI. VDECGI is also positively correlates with S-
ISS, D-ISS, SC-OPTIONS, LSIZE, LEV, BOARD-M, ROE, LIS and TRA. FMB 
and SH-OWN are negatively correlated with VDCGI. These correlations suggest that 
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issuance of new shares, issuance of new debt capital, stock-based compensation, firm 
size, leverage, proportion of Malay directors on board, cross listing, trading/services 
sector, proportion of family members on boards, and CEO shareholdings are 
associated with voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information. As before, 
the in-house company secretary is not associated with voluntary disclosure. 
The correlation analysis was run again. This time the company secretary variable is 
divided into professional qualified versus licence holder (ProQ) and in-house versus 
external company secretary (InH). The issuance of new shares variable is also 
divided into two categories: Employee Share Options Scheme (ESOS) and rights 
issues (Rights). The reason for this is to test whether voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance information is influenced by types of company secretary or 
types of issuance of new shares. As can be seen from Table 5.13, in-house company 
secretary is significantly related to voluntary disclosure, r = 0.20, p < 0.01 as 
predicted by hypothesis H1(a). However the relationship between professional 
qualified company secretary and voluntary disclosure is in an inverse direction, r = -
0.11, p < 0.05. Professional qualified company secretary is negatively related with 
in-house company secretary, r = -0.130, p < 0.05. The negative correlation between 
professional qualified and in-house suggests that most in-house company secretaries 
in the sample have lower qualifications. This suggests that professional qualification 
(ProQ) is influencing the insignificant correlation between company secretary and 
voluntary disclosure. In the case of issuance of new shares, ESOS is significantly 
related to voluntary disclosure, r = 0.24, p < 0.01, while rights issue is not. This 
suggests that ESOS are driving the significant correlation between issuance of new 
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shares and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information. Similar results 
are also reported by Spearman‟s rho correlations (Table 5.14). 
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Table 5.11: Pearson Correlations between all variables in the voluntary disclosure model 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 
VDCGI                
2 
CGQ  **0.494              
3 
CSEC D 0.089 *0.121             
4 
S-ISS D **0.215 0.087 *0.114            
5 
D-ISS D **0.244 0.077 0.064 **0.222           
6 
SC-OPTIONS  **0.265 0.064 0.039 **0.475 **0.222          
7 
SH-OWN  **-0.293 **-0.199 0.001 0.058 -*0.138 0.035         
8 
LSIZE **0.403 *0.136 -0.014 0.090 **0.335 *0.132 **-0.224        
9 
LEV  **0.173 0.084 0.063 **0.186 **0.310 0.096 -0.041 **0.393       
10 
FMB  **-0.349 **-0.259 0.019 -0.024 -0.045 *0.118 **0.358 *-0.137 0.002      
11 
BOARD-M  **0.306 **0.205 0.053 -0.014 0.083 -0.001 **-0.267 **0.239 **0.152 **-0.422     
12 
ROE **0.250 0.066 -0.006 0.036 **0.158 0.031 -0.083 0.044 **0.145 -0.019 -0.067    
13 
LIS D **0.154 0.038 0.006 -0.085 **0.184 0.046 -0.065 **0.318 0.065 -0.063 0.092 -0.018   
14 
TRA D **0.234 0.098 0.036 -0.012 **0.176 0.020 *-0.113 **0.175 *0.121 **-0.272 **0.349 0.018 *0.105 
 
Notes: 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
       
  
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed)       
   N = 275 
VDCGI is the total score of IBP component that represent voluntary disclosure score; CGQ is the total score of BCS component that represent corporate governance quality of a company; 
CSEC equals to 1 if the company secretary hold a professional qualification and employed in-house and zero otherwise; S-ISS equals to 1 if the company issue new shares with 5% and above 
and zero otherwise; D-ISS equals to 1 if the company issue new debt capital with 5% and above and zero otherwise; SC-OPTIONS is the proportion of stock-based compensation over the total 
compensation; SH-OWN is the proportion of total CEO’s shareholdings; LSIZE is the company size as measured by the natural log of its total assets; LEV is a percentage of total debts to total 
assets; FMB is the percentage of total family members on boards; BOARD-M is the percentage of Malay directors on boards; ROE is the total shareholders’ returns on total equity; LIS equals 
to 1 if the company shares is cross listed in more than one stock exchanges and zero otherwise; and TRA equals to 1 if the company is a trading/services sector and zero otherwise. 
‘D’ stands for dummy variable. 
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Table 5.12: Spearman's rho Correlations between all variables in the voluntary disclosure model 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 VDCGI                
2 CGQ 0.454**              
3 CSEC D 0.067 0.105*             
4 S-ISS D 0.247** 0.086 0.114*            
5 D-ISS D 0.239** 0.092 0.064 0.222**           
6 SC-OPTIONS  0.268** 0.014 0.036 0.494** 0.202**          
7 SH-OWN  -0.305** -0.263** -0.005 0.103* -0.144** 0.096         
8 LSIZE 0.392** 0.170** 0.015 0.112* 0.318** 0.103* -0.300**        
9 LEV  0.215** 0.084 0.084 0.222** 0.356** 0.103* -0.045 0.450**       
10 FMB  -0.347** -0.275** 0.014 -0.020* -0.064 0.105* 0.414** -0.120* -0.019      
11 BOARD-M  0.279** 0.190** 0.051 -0.034* 0.073 0.014 -0.326** 0.235** 0.186** -0.415**     
12 ROE 0.118* -0.045 0.028 0.111* 0.147** 0.128* -0.004 0.073 0.222** 0.016 -0.002    
13 LIS D 0.128* 0.012 0.006 -0.085 0.184** 0.052 -0.081 0.229** 0.069 -0.066 0.085 -0.001   
14 TRA D 0.210** 0.083 0.036 -0.012 0.176** 0.018 -0.160** 0.135* 0.150** -0.279** 0.343** 0.034 0.105* 
 
Note:       
       
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed)    
       
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed)    
        N = 275 
VDCGI is the total score of IBP component that represent voluntary disclosure score; CGQ is the total score of BCS component that represent corporate governance quality of a company; 
CSEC equals to 1 if the company secretary hold a professional qualification and employed in-house and zero otherwise; S-ISS equals to 1 if the company issue new shares with 5% and above 
and zero otherwise; D-ISS equals to 1 if the company issue new debt capital with 5% and above and zero otherwise; SC-OPTIONS is the proportion of stock-based compensation over the total 
compensation; SH-OWN is the proportion of total CEO’s shareholdings; LSIZE is the company size as measured by the natural log of its total assets; LEV is a percentage of total debts to total 
assets; FMB is the percentage of total family members on boards; BOARD-M is the percentage of Malay directors on boards; ROE is the total shareholders’ returns on total equity; LIS equals 
to 1 if the company shares is cross listed in more than one stock exchanges and zero otherwise; and TRA equals to 1 if the company is a trading/services sector and zero otherwise. 
‘D’ stands for dummy variable 
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Table 5.13: Pearson Correlations between the different types of company secretary and  
                    issuance of new share variables with voluntary disclosure 
   
  Variable  1 2 3 4 
   
1 VDCGI          
2 ProQ *-0.109        
3 InH **0.200 *-0.130       
4 ESOS **0.236 *0.136 0.037      
5 Rights 0.057 0.026 0.048 **0.231    
 
Notes: 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
   
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed)    
N = 275 
VDCGI is the total score of IBP component that represent voluntary disclosure score; ProQ equals to 1 if the 
company secretary holds professional qualification and zero otherwise; InH equals to 1 if the company 
secretary is employed in-house rather than external; ESOS equals to 1 if the company issue new shares in 
the form of Employee Share Options Scheme and zero otherwise; and Rights equals to 1 if the company 
issues a rights issue and zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
Table 5.14: Spearman's rho Correlations between the different types of company secretary  
                    and issuance of new share variables with voluntary disclosure 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1 VDCGI    
   
2 ProQ -0.121*   
  
3 InH 0.189** -0.130*   
 
4 ESOS 0.259** 0.136* 0.037   
5 Rights 0.088 0.026 0.048 0.231** 
 
Note:    
 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
 N = 275 
VDCGI is the total score of IBP component that represent voluntary disclosure score; ProQ equals to 1 if the 
company secretary holds professional qualification and zero otherwise; InH equals to 1 if the company 
secretary is employed in-house rather than external; ESOS equals to 1 if the company issue new shares in 
the form of Employee Share Options Scheme and zero otherwise; and Rights equal to 1 if the company issue 
a rights issue and zero otherwise. 
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5.3.2 Correlation between predictor variables 
In-house qualified company secretaries, size of companies and Malay directors on 
boards are positively and significantly related to corporate governance quality. This 
suggests that good quality companies are likely to employ an in-house qualified 
company secretary, are bigger and have Malay directors on their boards. In contrast, 
CEO shareholdings and family members on boards have a significant inverse 
relationship with corporate governance quality. This may infer that corporate 
governance quality would be lower in companies that have family members on board 
and with higher CEO‟s shareholdings. Issuance of new debt, stock-based 
compensation and highly leveraged companies are all positively correlated with 
issuance of new share capital. Similarly, issuance of new debt capital is also highly 
correlated with stock-based compensation, highly leveraged as well as bigger 
companies. In addition, issuance of new debt capital is significantly and moderately 
correlated with return on equity, cross-listing and trading/services sector but is 
negatively correlated with CEO shareholdings.  
Stock-based compensation is moderately positively correlated with companies of 
larger size and family connections on boards. There is a significant positive 
relationship between proportion of family members on boards and CEO 
shareholdings. In contrast, CEO shareholdings are negatively correlated with size of 
companies, Malay directors and membership of the trading/services sector. Size of 
companies, as a natural log of total assets, is positively correlated with having higher 
leverage, Malay directors on boards and shares cross-listed on more than one stock 
exchange. Bigger companies are also moderately positively correlated with 
companies in trading/services sector and negatively correlated with presence of 
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family members on boards. Gearing level is moderately positively correlated with 
Malay directors and returns on equity. Gearing levels in trading/services sector is 
also moderately positively correlated. Furthermore, trading/services sector also has a 
higher Malay directors‟ proportion on boards as well as number of cross listing 
companies. The presence of Malay directors on boards and companies in 
trading/services sector are negatively related with family member connections.  
There are a few techniques that can be applied to identify multicollinearity problems 
in the sample. One way of identifying multicollinearity is to scan a correlation matrix 
of all of the predictor variables and see if any correlate very highly (above 0.80). 
None of the predictor variables are very highly correlated. This is a good way to 
check multicollinearity problems but it can miss more delicate forms of 
multicollinearity (Field 2009). Another way of checking for collinearity problems is 
examining the SPSS output from the regression analysis by requesting collinearity 
diagnostic statistics. The collinearity diagnostic statistic from the regression analysis 
output produces a variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance statistics. A VIF that 
is greater than 10 indicates a strong linear relationship between predictors 
(Bowerman & O' Connel 1990; Hair et al. 2006; Myers 1990). A value of tolerance 
which is below 0.2 indicates a potential problem with collinearity (Menard 1995). 
The SPSS output (Appendix 1) shows that variables in the regression model lack 
collinearity as no predictor has a VIF exceeding 10 or has a tolerance value below 
0.2.  
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5.4 Testing interaction in multiple regression model 
Four interaction terms were identified in Chapter 4 along with reasons for including 
these interaction effects between moderating variables and voluntary disclosure. 
However no information was provided for deciding which interaction term should be 
included in the final regression model. A test is run to find out which of these 
interaction terms are statistically significant when added to the regression model. To 
facilitate this test, cross-product variables are created by multiplying the two 
variables of interest (Cohen 1978).  
In this research project, there are four cross-product terms: corporate governance 
quality (CGQ) and issuance of new shares (CGQ*S-ISS), CGQ and issuance of new 
debt (CGQ*D-ISS), CGQ and stock-based compensation (CGQ*SC-OPTIONS), and 
CGQ and CEO shareholdings (CGQ*SH-OWN). The study has to first centre the 
continuous variables (prior to multiplication) by subtracting the mean for each 
continuous variable. The main advantage of doing this is that it can improve 
statistical validity and interpretation of regression results by reducing 
multicollinearity problems between the product of two variables that are multiplied 
(Keith 2006).  
To test the statistical significance of the interaction for the CGQ*S-ISS term, 
voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information (VDCGI) was first 
regressed on S-ISS and CGQ (centred). These variables are entered using 
simultaneous multiple regression. As shown in column 1 of Table 5.15, these 
variables account for 27.3% of the variance in VDCGI. The second step in this 
sequential regression, is to add the interaction term (CGQ*I-ISS) to the model. As 
shown in column 2 of Table 5.15, the addition of the interaction term does not lead to 
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a statistically significant increase in R² (ΔR² = 0.003, F [1, 271] = 1.020, p = 0.313). 
The regression coefficients analysis as presented in Model 1 and 2, shows that CGQ 
has a large effect (0.479 and 0.458) on VDCGI and S-ISS has a moderate effect 
(0.173 and 0.163). The regression coefficient of CGQ and S-ISS in Model 2 also has 
a large (0.458) and moderate (0.163) effect on VDCGI. However, the inclusion of 
CGQ*S-ISS in the model is found to be insignificant. The interaction term in this 
case does not help explain voluntary disclosure beyond the explanation provided by 
S-ISS and CGQ. This result suggests that CGQ has the same effect on VDCGI for 
companies that issue and do not issue new shares.  
Table 5.15: Regression results testing for interaction term CGQ*S-ISS on VDCGI 
 
       
  
Model 1 Model 2 
   Intercept (Constant) 
 
8.878 8.874 
   S-ISS D 
 
0.173 0.163 
   
  
(3.328)** (3.098)** 
   CGQ_Cent 
 
0.479 0.458 
   
  
(9.222)*** (8.204)*** 
   CGQ*S-ISS 
  
0.057 
  
   
(1.010) 
   Adjusted R2 
 
0.268 0.268 
   F statistic 
 
51.134 34.432 
   R Square   0.273 0.276 
   R Square Change 
 
0.273 0.003 
   F Change 
 
51.134 1.020 
   Sig. F Change   0.000 0.313 
  The table shows standardised coefficient and t statistics (in parentheses) for the 
respective independent variable in the model. 
** Significant at 0.01 
      *** Significant at 0.001 
       
A similar test was repeated for CGQ*D-ISS, the results are presented in Table 5.16. 
D-ISS and CGQ (centred) together account for 28.6% of the variance in VDCGI (F 
[2, 272] = 54.596, p < 0.001). However, the addition of the interaction term of 
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CGQ*D-ISS into Model 2 was not statistically significant, (ΔR² = 0.001, F [1, 271] = 
.465, p = 0.496), suggesting that CGQ has the same effect on VDCGI of both issued 
and non-issuing companies in the case of debt capital.  
Table 5.16: Regression results testing for interaction term CGQ*D-ISS on VDCGI  
 
       
  
Model 1 Model 2 
   Intercept (Constant) 
 
8.821 8.818 
   D-ISS D 
 
0.207 0.203 
   
  
(4.039)*** (3.928)*** 
   CGQ_Cent 
 
0.478 0.459 
   
  
(9.300)*** (7.925)*** 
   CGQ*D-ISS 
  
0.040 
  
   
(0.682) 
   Adjusted R2 
 
0.281 0.280 
  F statistic 
 
54.596 36.481 
   R Square   0.286 0.288 
   R Square Change 
 
0.286 0.001 
   F Change 
 
54.596 0.465 
   Sig. F Change   0.000 0.496 
  The table shows standardised coefficient and t statistics (in parentheses) for the 
respective independent variable in the model. 
** Significant at 0.01 
      *** Significant at 0.001 
       
For the interaction of CGQ*SC-OPTIONS and CGQ*SH-OWN, the same test was 
carried out. Since both stock-based compensation (SC-OPTIONS) and CEO 
shareholdings (SH-OWN) are continuous variables, these two variables need to be 
centred and then centred variables are multiplied to create a cross-product term. Also 
included is firm size (LSIZE). This time LSIZE is included because both SC-
OPTIONS and SH-OWN variables can no longer be used to test the interaction term 
in the model since both of these variables have been centred in order to get the cross-
product terms (CGQ*SC-OPTIONS and CGQ*SH-OWN). Table 5.17 presents the 
test result of the interaction between SC-OPTIONS (centred) and CGQ (centred) in 
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their effects on VDCGI. As shown in column 1 of Table 5.17, the initial three 
independent variables account for 39.6% of the variance in VDCGI (F [3, 271], = 
59.268, p < 0.001. The addition of CGQ*SC-OPTIONS in Model 2 explains an 
additional 3.1% of the variance in VDCGI, a statistically significant increase (F [1, 
270] = 14.715, p < 0.001). As shown in the top portion of the table, prior to and after 
consideration of the interaction term, each independent variable has a statistically 
significant effect on VDCGI. Indeed, CGQ (centred) and LSIZE have a large effect 
on VDCGI, and SC-OPTIONS (centred) has a moderate positive effect on VDCGI. 
The interaction term of CGQ*SC-OPTIONS also has a moderate effect on VDCGI 
as presented in the lower part of column 2 of the Table 5.17.  
Table 5.17: Regression results testing for interaction term CGQ*SC-OPTIONS on VDCGI 
 
       
  
Model 1 Model 2 
   Intercept (Constant) 
 
-6.005 -6.555 
   LSIZE 
 
0.317 0.328 
   
  
(6.606)*** (6.990)*** 
   CGQ_Cent 
 
0.444 0.445 
   
  
(9.238)*** (9.575)*** 
   SC-OPTIONS_Cent 
 
0.199 0.181 
  
  
(4.185)*** (3.877)*** 
   CGQ*SC-OPTIONS 
  
0.179 
   
   
(3.875)*** 
   Adjusted R2 
 
0.391 0.421 
  F statistic 
 
59.268 50.379 
   
R Square   0.396 0.427 
   R Square Change 
 
0.396 0.031 
   F Change 
 
59.268 14.715 
   
Sig. F Change   0.000 0.000 
  The table shows standardised coefficient and t statistics (in parentheses) for the 
respective independent variable in the model. 
** Significant at 0.01 
      *** Significant at 0.001 
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Finally, VDCGI was regressed on LSIZE, SH-OWN (centred), and CGQ (centred) in 
a simultaneous regression, with the CGQ*SH-OWN interaction term in a second 
sequential step. The results are presented in Table 5.18 which reports that the first 
three independent variables account for 37.6% of the variance in VDCGI (F [ 3, 271] 
= 54.509, p < 0.001). When CGQ*SH-OWN is included, this interaction term 
explains an additional 0.5% only of the variance in VDCGI but not statistically 
significant (F [1, 270] = 2.245, p = 0.135). This indicates that the interaction term of 
CGQ*SH-OWN is not statistically significant in explaining VDCGI in the model. 
Table 5.18:  Regression results testing for interaction term CGQ*SH-OWN on VDCGI 
 
       
  
Model 1 Model 2 
   Intercept (Constant) 
 
-5.894 -5.904 
   LSIZE 
 
0.315 0.313 
   
  
(6.361)*** (6.353)*** 
   CGQ_Cent 
 
0.423 0.413 
   
  
(8.609)*** (8.351)*** 
   SH-OWN_Cent 
 
-0.138 -0.148 
   
  
(-2.488)** (-2.945)** 
   CGQ*SH-OWN 
  
-0.073 
  
   
(-1.498) 
   Adjusted R2 
 
0.396 0.372 
  F statistic 
 
54.509 41.631 
   R Square   0.376 0.381 
   R Square Change 
 
0.376 0.005 
   F Change 
 
54.509 2.245 
   Sig. F Change   0.000 0.135 
  The table shows standardised coefficient and t statistics (in parentheses) for the 
respective independent variable in the model. 
** Significant at 0.01 
      *** Significant at 0.001 
       
Overall, these results indicate that interaction terms CGQ*S-ISS, CGQ*D-ISS and 
CGQ*SH-OWN are not statistically significant. These interaction terms have no 
effect on VDCGI and thus should not be added to the model. CGQ*SC-OPTIONS on 
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the other hand has a statistically significant effect on VDCGI, and as such this 
interaction term is included in the final model.  
 
5.5  Regression analysis results 
The regression analysis is run with assumption that the conditions of linearity, 
homoscedasticity and normality are met. Discussion on whether the underlying 
regression assumptions are met is presented on Section 5.6. The results obtained 
from regressing the voluntary disclosure (VDCGI) on the various independent, 
moderating and control variables are now related to the regression model (equation) 
that is specified in Chapter 4 that is used to test each hypothesis. The regression is 
run to examine whether corporate governance quality (CGQ), in-house qualified 
company secretary (CSEC), issuance of new shares (S-ISS) and debt capital (D-ISS), 
stock-based compensation (SC-OPTIONS) and CEO shareholdings (SH-OWN) 
influence voluntary disclosure of  corporate governance information (VDCGI) after 
controlling for firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), family member (FMB), Malay 
directors (BOARD-M), return on equity (ROE), industry type (TRA) and cross 
listing (LIS). All the above variables are entered into the equation as well as the 
interaction term between corporate governance quality and stock-based 
compensation (CGQ*SC-OPTIONS) which was shown earlier to have a statistically 
significant effect on VDCGI. 
The regression results are presented in Table 5.19. The F value of 21.312 for the 
model is significant at the 0.001 level and the adjusted R² is 0.509. Both of these 
values suggest that the model explains variations in the VDCGI very well. The 
regression coefficient for CGQ (ß = 0.359) is positive and statistically significant (p 
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< 0.001), suggesting that companies with high corporate governance quality are 
associated with more voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information. It is 
noteworthy that corporate governance quality is an important explanatory variable in 
the regression model, as indicated by its coefficient value. This provides strong 
support for Hypothesis 1 that there is a positive relationship between companies‟ 
corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosures of corporate governance 
information. 
SC-OPTIONS has a positive and statistically significant effect on VDCGI (ß = 
0.189, p < 0.001). In addition the interaction term CGQ*SC-OPTIONS also 
significantly influences the relationship between corporate governance quality and 
voluntary disclosures of corporate governance practices (ß = 0.157, p < 0.001). Thus, 
Hypothesis 3(a) that stock-based compensation moderates the relationship between 
companies‟ corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance information is also supported. 
However, the other predictors such as in-house qualified company secretary, 
issuance of new shares and debt capital, and CEO shareholdings are not statistically 
significant in explaining voluntary disclosures. The relationship between CGQ and 
VDCGI is so strong that the other independent variables become insignificant when 
it is controlled (in contrast to correlation analysis results). This implies that CGQ 
strongly influences VDCGI compared to the other independent variables except for 
SC-OPTIONS. Therefore Hypotheses H1(a), H2(a), H2(b) and H3(b) are not 
supported. 
In addition, the control variable firm size is positively and significantly related to 
voluntary disclosure information (ß = 0.255, p < 0.001). Similarly, return on equity is 
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also significantly positively related to voluntary disclosure information (ß = 0.215, p 
< 0.001). The proportion of family members on boards is negatively and significantly 
related to voluntary disclosure (ß = -0.144, p < 0.01). The proportion of Malay 
directors on boards‟ variable is positively related to voluntary disclosure (p < 0.1). 
However, the regression coefficient of this variable is very small (ß = 0.087). The 
remaining control variables (leverage, trading/services sector and cross listing) are 
not significantly related to voluntary disclosures. 
The regression results in this research show that the intercept value is negative. The 
general meaning of the word „intercept‟ is the point where a given line intersects the 
Y axis. The Y intercept is the Y value of the line when X equals zero (Motulsky & 
Christopoulos 2003). It defines the elevation of the line. Thus the negative intercept 
of -15.682 in this regression model means that if the predictor variables are of zero 
value, it would have negative voluntary disclosures. Prior studies of voluntary 
disclosure in Asian countries have also documented negative intercept value in their 
regression analysis, for example Eng and Mak (2003); Leung and Horwitz (2004) 
and Hossain, Tan and Adams (1994). 
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Table 5.19: Regression results for total sample and overall VDCGI 
          
  
Predicted 
sign 
 
All variables plus 
Interaction term 
Intercept 
  
-15.682 
Variables: 
   CGQ  + 
 
0.359 
   
(7.943)*** 
CSEC D + 
 
0.023 
   
(0.532) 
S-ISS D + 
 
0.035 
   
(0.673) 
D-ISS D + 
 
0.031 
   
(0.643) 
SH-OWN  - 
 
-0.077 
   
(-1.622) 
SC-OPTIONS  + 
 
0.189 
   
(3.768)*** 
LSIZE + 
 
0.255 
  
 
(4.949)*** 
LEV  + 
 
-0.041 
  
 
(-0.836) 
FMB  - 
 
-0.144 
  
 
(-2.796)** 
BOARD-M  + 
 
0.087 
  
 
(1.717)† 
ROE + 
 
0.215 
  
 
(4.915)*** 
TRA D + 
 
0.045 
  
 
(0.966) 
LIS D + 
 
0.031 
   
(0.678) 
CGQ*SC-OPTIONS + 
 
0.157 
  
 
(3.546)*** 
N  
 
275 
Adjusted R² 
  
0.509 
F statistic   
 
21.312*** 
Notes:   
  The table shows standardised coefficient and t statistics (in parentheses) for the respective 
independent variable in the model. 
†Significant at 0.1; *Significant at 0.05; **Significant at 0.01; ***Significant at 0.001 
 VDCGI is the total score of IBP component that represent voluntary disclosure score; CGQ is the total 
score of BCS component that represent corporate governance quality of a company; CSEC equals to 
1 if the company secretary hold a professional qualification and employed in-house and zero 
otherwise; S-ISS equals to 1 if the company issue new shares with 5% and above and zero 
otherwise; D-ISS equals to 1 if the company issue new debt capital with 5% and above and zero 
otherwise; SC-OPTIONS is the proportion of stock-based compensation over the total compensation; 
SH-OWN is the proportion of total CEO’s shareholdings; LSIZE is the company size as measured by 
the natural log of its total assets; LEV is a percentage of total debts to total assets; FMB is the 
percentage of total family members on boards; BOARD-M is the percentage of Malay directors on 
boards; ROE is the total shareholders’ returns on total equity; LIS equals to 1 if the company shares 
is cross listed in more than one stock exchanges and zero otherwise; and TRA equals to 1 if the 
company is a trading/services sector and zero otherwise. 
‘D’ stands for dummy variable. 
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5.6  Additional analysis  
5.6.1 Testing whether underlying regression assumptions are met 
To test whether the fundamental assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity in the 
multiple regression model are appropriate, an examination of scatter plots is 
undertaken. Analyses of the scatter plots indicate that assumptions of linearity and 
homoscedasticity are approximately met (Appendix 2). In addition, a histogram with 
curve and normal probability plots are used to test the normality of residuals. The 
histogram of regression standardised residual appears normally by distributed (a bell-
shaped curve). The normality probability plot also shows that most observed residual 
points lie on a normal distribution line (Appendices 3 and 4). As such the assumption 
of normality of the model is met. For any two observations the residual terms should 
be uncorrelated or independent. This assumption can be tested with a Durbin-Watson 
test. The result of a Durbin-Watson test informs that the assumption of independent 
errors has almost certainly been met. The closer the value to 2 the better, and for this 
data the value is 1.894 (Appendix 5). 
Residual statistics should also be examined for any extreme cases. In a normal 
sample, it is expected that 95% of cases will have standardised residuals within +2 
(Field 2009). With a sample of 275, it is reasonable to expect about 5% (14 cases) to 
have standardised residuals outside of these limits. From the Casewise Diagnostics 
table produced by SPSS, there are 13 (4.7%) cases that are outside the limits. 
Therefore, the research sample is within what is expected. In addition, 99% of cases 
should lie within +2.5 and so it is expected that only 1% of cases will lie outside of 
these limits. From the cases listed, it is clear that three cases (1%) lie outside the 
limits (cases 103, 130 and 221). These diagnostics give no real cause for concern of 
any possible outliers that may influence regression parameters because none of the 
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cases have a standardised residual greater than 3. Therefore the above sample 
appears to conform to what is expected for a reasonably accurate model (Appendix 
6).  
The F value in the initial model (without CGQ*SCOPTIONS), shows that the F-ratio 
is 21.050, which is highly significant (p < .001). For the final model (after including 
CGQ*SCOPTIONS), the value of F is slightly higher (21.312) and also highly 
significant (p < .001). This can be interpreted as meaning that the initial model 
significantly improves the ability to explain and predict the outcome variable, but 
that the final model (with interaction term effect of CGQ*SCOPTIONS) is slightly 
better because the F ratio is slightly more significant (Appendix 7). 
 
5.6.2 Sensitivity analysis tests 
A series of tests are conducted to test the model‟s sensitivity. First, additional 
analysis is undertaken by distinguishing the form of new share issues in the model 
(Employee Share Options Schemes (ESOS) and rights issues) and breaking-down the 
company secretary variable into two variables that capture its component parts (in-
house versus external; professional qualification versus licence holder). Table 5.20 
presents the regression results after replacing the in-house qualified company 
secretary (CSEC) dummy variable with professional qualified (ProQ) and in-house 
(InH) dummy variables. Similarly S-ISS dummy variable is replaced by dummy 
variables ESOS and rights issue (Rights). Again regression results show that the 
presence of different types of company secretary and issuance of new shares 
variables are not statistically significantly related to voluntary disclosure, which is 
consistent with the primary result.  
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Second, the study also investigates the effects of using alternative definitions for 
several variables. Specifically, the study replaces the dummy variables for issuance 
of new shares and debt capital with a measure of the percentage of new issuance of 
shares and debt relative to the existing balance. In addition, the ratio value of stock-
based compensation to total compensation and the ratio of market value of CEO 
shareholding are replaced by dummy variables as proxies for stock-based 
compensation and CEO shareholdings. The results are quantitatively similar to those 
using previous definitions except that the proportion of Malay directors on boards‟ 
variable is now no longer significant (Table 5.21). Tests using these alternative 
variable definitions do not alter the primary findings and conclusions of this research. 
Third, the study examines whether results are different by sub-categories of 
voluntary disclosures of corporate governance information. As shown in Table 5.22 
the amount of explained variations in voluntary disclosure ranges from 10.4% for the 
board of directors category to 39.3% for directors‟ remuneration category. Corporate 
governance quality is significant at the 0.01 level in explaining all categories of 
voluntary disclosures of corporate governance information. In-house qualified 
company secretary is not significant in any category of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosures, indicating that the presence of an in-house qualified 
company secretary does not influence voluntary disclosures. Issuance of new shares 
is significant in the shareholders category, but not for other categories. In contrast, 
issuance of new debt capital has no significant influence for any category of 
voluntary disclosures. CEO shareholdings have no significant influence on voluntary 
disclosure for all categories except for the shareholders category. On the other hand, 
stock-based compensation is statistically significant in explaining voluntary 
136 
 
disclosure for board of directors and directors‟ remuneration categories. In addition, 
the control variables such as size, proportion of family members on boards and return 
on equity continue to be significant in explaining at least two categories of voluntary 
disclosures. Overall the results of these additional tests are consistent with the results 
of primary findings and conclusions 
Fourth, a regression test was rerun to ascertain that CGQ is not driving the company 
secretary variable to become insignificant in the regression analysis. The 
measurement tool used to capture corporate governance quality in this study is based 
on the basic compliance score (BCS) component of Minority Shareholder Watchdog 
Group (MSWG). The BCS component of MSWG includes the company secretary‟s 
role in assessing a company‟s CGQ under the access to information variable of the 
board of directors‟ category (item number 19 of Table 4.3). Even though this 
measurement tool does not directly measure company secretary characteristics, it is 
necessary to conduct an additional test to ensure that CGQ is not driving the results. 
The regression was first rerun by including all variables except CGQ. The next 
regression was rerun by replacing the in-house qualified company secretary (CSEC) 
variable with in-house company secretary (InH). Results of tests are reported in 
Tables 5.23 and 5.24. The company secretary variable is not significantly related 
with voluntary disclosure even when CGQ is not controlled. Thus this suggests that 
the presence of an in-house qualified company secretary has no effect on voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information which is consistent with the primary 
findings. 
An analysis of the company secretary data (Table 5.10) of the sample reveals that 
more than half (150 companies accounting for 55% of the sample companies) of the 
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listed companies are employing more than one company secretary. In order to 
analyse the impact of having more than one company secretary on voluntary 
disclosures, another regression was run with the same variables. The coefficient on 
company secretary variable remains insignificant and the coefficient for other 
variables are similar with the primary finding. This indicates that the presence of 
company secretary has no effect on voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
information. 
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Table 5.20: Regression results according to different types of company secretary  
                    and new shares issues 
 
  Predicted sign All variables plus Interaction term 
Intercept 
 
-15.860 
Variables: 
  CGQ  + 0.363 
  
(7.956)** 
ProQ D + 0.008 
  
(0.165) 
InH D + 0.017 
  
(0.377) 
ESOS D + 0.024 
  
(0.424) 
Rights D + 0.035 
  
(0.772) 
D-ISS D + 0.029 
  
(0.583) 
SH-OWN  - -0.078 
  
(-1.625) 
SC-OPTIONS  + 0.187 
  
(3.580)*** 
LSIZE + 0.254 
  4.720)*** 
LEV  + -0.042 
  (-0.868) 
FMB  - -0.140 
  (-2.699)** 
BOARD-M  + 0.085 
  (1.669)† 
ROE + 0.215 
  (4.892)*** 
TRA D + 0.045 
  (0.955) 
LIS D + 0.320 
  
(0.700) 
CGQ*SC-OPTIONS + 0.162 
  (3.625)*** 
N  275 
Adjusted R² 
 
0.506 
F statistic   18.546*** 
Notes:   
 The table shows standardised coefficient and t statistics (in parentheses) for the respective 
independent variable in the model. 
†Significant at 0.1; *Significant at 0.05; **Significant at 0.01; ***Significant at 0.001 
VDCGI is the total score of IBP component that represent voluntary disclosure score; CGQ is the total 
score of BCS component that represent corporate governance quality of a company; CSEC equals to 1 if 
the company secretary hold a professional qualification and employed in-house and zero otherwise; S-
ISS equals to 1 if the company issue new shares with 5% and above and zero otherwise; D-ISS equals to 
1 if the company issue new debt capital with 5% and above and zero otherwise; SC-OPTIONS is the 
proportion of stock-based compensation over the total compensation; SH-OWN is the proportion of total 
CEO’s shareholdings; LSIZE is the company size as measured by the natural log of its total assets; LEV 
is a percentage of total debts to total assets; FCB is the percentage of total family members on boards; 
BOARD-M is the percentage of Malay directors on boards; ROE is the total shareholders’ returns on total 
equity; LIS equals to 1 if the company shares is cross listed in more than one stock exchanges and zero 
otherwise; and TRA equals to 1 if the company is a trading/services sector and zero otherwise. 
‘D’ stands for dummy variable. 
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Table 5.21: Regression results using alternative definitions for issuance of new shares  
                    and debt capital and stock-based compensation and CEO shareholdings  
 
  
  Predicted sign 
All variables plus  
Interaction term 
Intercept 
 
-12.674 
Variables: 
  CGQ  + 0.263 
  
(5.076)*** 
CSEC D + 0.029 
  
(0.661) 
S-ISS  + 0.037 
  
(0.820) 
D-ISS  + 0.023 
  
(0.490) 
SH-OWN D - -0.054 
  
(-1.016) 
SC-OPTIONS D + 0.220 
  
(4.904)*** 
LSIZE + 0.256 
  (4.849)*** 
LEV  + -0.034 
  (-0.705) 
FMB  - -0.151 
  (-2.977)** 
BOARD-M  + 0.076 
  (1.482) 
ROE + 0.22 
  (5.019)*** 
TRA D + 0.049 
  (1.042) 
LIS D + 0.030 
  
(0.657) 
CGQ*SC-OPTIONS + 0.188 
  (3.755)*** 
N  275 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.509 
F statistic   21.254*** 
Notes:   
 The table shows standardised coefficient and t statistics (in parentheses) for the respective independent 
variable in the model. 
†Significant at 0.1; *Significant at 0.05; **Significant at 0.01; ***Significant at 0.001 
VDCGI is the total score of IBP component that represent voluntary disclosure score; CGQ is the total 
score of BCS component that represent corporate governance quality of a company; CSEC equals to 1 
if the company secretary hold a professional qualification and employed in-house and zero otherwise; S-
ISS equals to 1 if the company issue new shares with 5% and above and zero otherwise; D-ISS equals 
to 1 if the company issue new debt capital with 5% and above and zero otherwise; SC-OPTIONS is the 
proportion of stock-based compensation over the total compensation; SH-OWN is the proportion of total 
CEO’s shareholdings; LSIZE is the company size as measured by the natural log of its total assets; LEV 
is a percentage of total debts to total assets; FCB is the percentage of total family members on boards; 
BOARD-M is the percentage of Malay directors on boards; ROE is the total shareholders’ returns on 
total equity; LIS equals to 1 if the company shares is cross listed in more than one stock exchanges and 
zero otherwise; and TRA equals to 1 if the company is a trading/services sector and zero otherwise. 
‘D’ stands for dummy variable. 
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Table 5.22: Regression results according to sub-categories of voluntary disclosure of  
                    corporate governance information 
            
  
Predicted 
sign 
Board of 
directors 
Directors' 
remuneration Shareholders 
Accountability 
and Audit 
Intercept 
 
-0.848 -2.582 -7.220 -5.126 
Variables: 
     CGQ  + 0.182 0.263 0.324 0.232 
  
(2.977)** (5.235)*** (6.406)*** (4.309)*** 
CSEC D + -0.012 -.0350 0.053 0.019 
  
(-0.212) (-0.728) (1.101) (0.376) 
S-ISS D + -0.080 0.037 0.113 0.008 
  
(-1.140) (0.635) (1.954)† (0.135) 
D-ISS D + -0.001 -0.054 0.049 0.041 
  
(-0.014) (-1.008) (0.910) (0.712) 
SH-OWN  - 0.065 -0.037 -0.150 -0.052 
  
(1.023) (-0.712) (-2.837)** (-0.915) 
SC-OPTIONS  + 0.160 0.461 0.063 0.05 
  
(2.353)* (8.254)*** (1.121) (0.828) 
LSIZE + 0.025 0.160 0.264 0.209 
  -0.364 (2.786)** (4.582)*** (3.395)** 
LEV  + 0.002 -0.015 0.030 -0.100 
  (0.028) (-0.278) (0.550) (-1.729)† 
FMB  - -0.168 -0.075 0.075 -0.219 
  (-2.422)* (-1.316) (1.306) (-3.570)*** 
BOARD-M  + -0.004 0.053 0.104 0.064 
  (-0.058) (0.943) (1.848)† (1.066) 
ROE + 0.110 0.105 0.126 0.212 
  (1.861)† (2.153)* (2.586)* (4.059)*** 
TRA D + -0.014 0.032 0.097 0.006 
  (-0.224) (0.604) (1.841)† (0.100) 
LIS D + 0.028 0.047 -0.046 0.065 
  
(0.456) (0.924) (-0.903) (1.193) 
CGQ*SC-OPTIONS + 0.221 0.039 0.063 0.111 
  (3.704)*** (0.783) (1.277) (2.094)* 
N  275 275 275 275 
Adjusted R² 
 
0.104 0.393 0.386 0.300 
F statistic   3.273*** 13.651*** 13.284*** 9.375*** 
Notes:   
    The table shows standardised coefficient and t statistics (in parentheses) for the respective independent 
variable in the model. 
†Significant at 0.1; *Significant at 0.05; **Significant at 0.01; ***Significant at 0.001 
  VDCGI is the total score of IBP component that represent voluntary disclosure score; CGQ is the total score 
of BCS component that represent corporate governance quality of a company; CSEC equals to 1 if the 
company secretary hold a professional qualification and employed in-house and zero otherwise; S-ISS equals 
to 1 if the company issue new shares with 5% and above and zero otherwise; D-ISS equals to 1 if the 
company issue new debt capital with 5% and above and zero otherwise; SC-OPTIONS is the proportion of 
stock-based compensation over the total compensation; SH-OWN is the proportion of total CEO’s 
shareholdings; LSIZE is the company size as measured by the natural log of its total assets; LEV is a 
percentage of total debts to total assets; FCB is the percentage of total family members on boards; BOARD-
M is the percentage of Malay directors on boards; ROE is the total shareholders’ returns on total equity; LIS 
equals to 1 if the company shares is cross listed in more than one stock exchanges and zero otherwise; and 
TRA equals to 1 if the company is a trading/services sector and zero otherwise. 
‘D’ stands for dummy variable. 
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Table 5.23: Regression results for testing the effect of in-house qualified company secretary  
                    (CSEC) on VDCGI when CGQ is excluded 
      
  Predicted sign All variables plus Interaction term 
Intercept 
 
-5.058 
Variables: 
  CSEC D + 0.066 
  
(1.378) 
S-ISS D + 0.056 
  
(0.966) 
D-ISS D + 0.025 
  
(0.457) 
SH-OWN  - -0.112 
  
(-2.142)* 
SC-OPTIONS  + 0.207 
  
(3.707)*** 
LSIZE + 0.273 
  (4.769)*** 
LEV  + -0.033 
  (-0.618) 
FMB  - -0.214 
  (-3.799)*** 
BOARD-M  + 0.116 
  (2.066)* 
ROE + 0.233 
  (4.801)*** 
TRA D + 0.045 
  (0.867) 
LIS D + 0.030 
  
(0.599) 
CGQ*SC-OPTIONS + 0.132 
  (3.692)** 
N  275 
Adjusted R² 
 
0.393 
F statistic   14.620*** 
Notes:   
 The table shows standardised coefficient and t statistics (in parentheses) for the respective independent 
variable in the model. 
†Significant at 0.1; *Significant at 0.05; **Significant at 0.01; ***Significant at 0.001 
VDCGI is the total score of IBP component that represent voluntary disclosure score; CGQ is the total score 
of BCS component that represent corporate governance quality of a company; CSEC equals to 1 if the 
company secretary hold a professional qualification and employed in-house and zero otherwise; S-ISS 
equals to 1 if the company issue new shares with 5% and above and zero otherwise; D-ISS equals to 1 if 
the company issue new debt capital with 5% and above and zero otherwise; SC-OPTIONS is the proportion 
of stock-based compensation over the total compensation; SH-OWN is the proportion of total CEO’s 
shareholdings; LSIZE is the company size as measured by the natural log of its total assets; LEV is a 
percentage of total debts to total assets; FCB is the percentage of total family members on boards; 
BOARD-M is the percentage of Malay directors on boards; ROE is the total shareholders’ returns on total 
equity; LIS equals to 1 if the company shares is cross listed in more than one stock exchanges and zero 
otherwise; and TRA equals to 1 if the company is a trading/services sector and zero otherwise. 
‘D’ stands for dummy variable. 
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Table 5.24: Regression results for testing the effect of in-house company secretary (InH)  
                    on VDECGI when CGQ is excluded 
      
  Predicted sign All variables plus Interaction term 
Intercept 
 
-4.524 
Variables: 
  InH D + 0.03 
  
(0.552) 
S-ISS D  + 0.062 
  
(1.085) 
D-ISS  D + 0.027 
  
(0.490) 
SH-OWN  - -0.11 
  
(-2.091)* 
SC-OPTIONS  + 0.203 
  
(3.630)*** 
LSIZE + 0.262 
  (4.522)*** 
LEV  + -0.032 
  (-0.594) 
FMB  - -0.211 
  (-3.739)*** 
BOARD-M  + 0.117 
  (2.084)* 
ROE + 0.232 
  (4.756)*** 
TRA D + 0.044 
  (0.849) 
LIS D + 0.032 
  
(0.633) 
CGQ*SCOPTIONS + 0.137 
  (2.787)** 
N  275 
Adjusted R² 
 
0.389 
F statistic   14.416*** 
Notes:   
 The table shows standardised coefficient and t statistics (in parentheses) for the respective independent 
variable in the model. 
†Significant at 0.1; *Significant at 0.05; **Significant at 0.01; ***Significant at 0.001 
VDCGI is the total score of IBP component that represent voluntary disclosure score; CGQ is the total 
score of BCS component that represent corporate governance quality of a company; CSEC equals to 1 if 
the company secretary hold a professional qualification and employed in-house and zero otherwise; S-ISS 
equals to 1 if the company issue new shares with 5% and above and zero otherwise; D-ISS equals to 1 if 
the company issue new debt capital with 5% and above and zero otherwise; SC-OPTIONS is the 
proportion of stock-based compensation over the total compensation; SH-OWN is the proportion of total 
CEO’s shareholdings; LSIZE is the company size as measured by the natural log of its total assets; LEV 
is a percentage of total debts to total assets; FCB is the percentage of total family members on boards; 
BOARD-M is the percentage of Malay directors on boards; ROE is the total shareholders’ returns on total 
equity; LIS equals to 1 if the company shares is cross listed in more than one stock exchanges and zero 
otherwise; and TRA equals to 1 if the company is a trading/services sector and zero otherwise. 
‘D’ stands for dummy variable. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the results obtained from the statistical tests undertaken in this 
research. These include descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, regression analysis 
and some additional tests. Three hypotheses and sub-hypotheses are formulated in 
relation to the relationship between corporate governance quality, in-house qualified 
company secretary, moderating role of capital market transactions and stock-based 
incentives, and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information. Based on 
the regression results and equation model developed in Chapter 4, the final model is: 
VDCGI = -15.682 + 0.359 CGQ + 0.189 SC-OPTIONS + 0.157 CGQ* SC-
OPTIONS + 0.255SIZE – 0.144 FMB + 0.087 BOARD-M + ß17 
0.215 ROE + εi 
Table 5.25 summarises the results of hypotheses testing. As illustrated in Table 5.25, 
Hypothesis 1 (a), Hypothesis 2 (a), Hypothesis 2 (b) and Hypothesis 3 (b) are not 
supported. This summary shows that there is a positive relationship between 
corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
information. In addition, the relationship between corporate governance quality and 
voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information is moderated by stock-
based compensation. As such, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3(a) are supported. 
Chapter 6 provides a discussion of these results and outlines conclusions drawn from 
major findings. A discussion of implications from this study for theory, policy and 
practice are also presented. 
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Table 5.25: Summary of hypotheses and results 
Hypothesis  Result 
Hypothesis 1: there is a positive relationship between corporate 
governance quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance information. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 1 (a): there is a positive relationship between the 
employment of in-house qualified company secretaries and 
voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 2 (a): the relationship between corporate governance 
quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
information is moderated by the intention to raise new share 
capital in the following year. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 2 (b): the relationship between corporate governance 
quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
information is moderated by the intention to raise debt fund in the 
following year. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 3 (a): the relationship between corporate governance 
quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
information is moderated by stock-based compensation. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3 (b): the relationship between corporate governance 
quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
information is moderated by CEO share ownership. 
Not supported 
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6 Discussions and Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
This study examines voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information 
practices in Malaysia to identify which incentive factors influence the relationship 
between corporate governance quality and corporate governance disclosure. It first 
examined the association between corporate governance quality and voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information. Next, the impact of capital market 
transactions and stock-based incentives on the relationship are examined. Finally, it 
explored the influence of in-house qualified company secretaries on the voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information. Chapter 5 reports results of 
hypotheses testing. This Chapter provides a discussion of these results and presents 
conclusions from the study. The Chapter is organised as follows: section 6.2 outlines 
and discusses major findings of the study. Section 6.3 draws the main conclusions. 
Sections 6.4 and 6.5 identify several implications from the findings for theory, policy 
and practice. Section 6.6 discusses limitations of the study and section 6.7 suggests a 
number of avenues for future research.  
 
6.2  Discussion of major findings  
6.2.1 Corporate governance quality 
Corporate governance quality has been advocated in prior studies to be one of the 
main factors that contribute to increased voluntary disclosure practices in general 
(Beekes & Brown 2006; Bushman et al. 2004; Karamanou & Vafeas 2005; Kent & 
Stewart 2008). Companies with high corporate governance quality are likely to be 
more forthcoming in disclosing corporate governance information voluntarily so as 
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to confirm/signal their higher corporate governance quality. In the context of Dye‟s 
(1985) voluntary disclosure theory, there are incentives for well governed companies 
to improve their corporate governance disclosures so as to separate themselves from 
average as well as lower quality companies.  
Regression analysis results show that corporate governance quality (CGQ) is 
substantially and significantly associated with the level of voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance information even after controlling for other variables. This 
strong relationship suggests that a Malaysian company with high corporate 
governance quality is more prepared to disclose more corporate governance 
information voluntarily compared to a company with lower corporate governance 
quality.  
This study employs Dye (1985) voluntary disclosure theory in developing and testing 
hypotheses that are identified in Chapter 3. In addition, the study uses agency theory 
to explain the impact of incentive factors and a company secretary‟s role on the 
association between corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosures. The 
finding of the study support the voluntary disclosure theory of Dye (1985). Thus this 
suggests that this theory does hold even in developing countries and in relation to 
disclosures of corporate governance information. 
Unlike previous studies, this research uses a broader corporate governance quality 
index in measuring a company‟s corporate governance quality. Most studies have 
used one or more corporate governance mechanisms in investigating the association 
between corporate governance and voluntary disclosures (Adams & Hossain 1998; 
Ajinkya et al. 2005; Bassett et al. 2007; Cheng & Courtenay 2006; Ho & Wong 
2001; Karamanou & Vafeas 2005; Kent & Stewart 2008; Stephens 2009). Brown and 
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Beekes‟ (2006) study is currently the only known published paper that has examined 
corporate governance quality using a broader index. In this research study, a 
corporate governance quality index is adopted from the Corporate Governance 
Survey Report 2008 of the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) in 
Malaysia. Consistent with Brown and Beekes results, high corporate governance 
quality companies in Malaysian tend to increase voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure practices than lower quality companies.  
In addition, this study focuses on a specific type of disclosure that is voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information. In contrast Brown and Beekes‟ 
(2006) study focuses on disclosure „informativeness‟ of price sensitive 
announcements. While several studies have examined factors associated with total 
voluntary disclosures (Barako et al. 2006; Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Haniffa & 
Cooke 2002; Ho & Wong 2001; Hossain & Masrur 2007; Hossain et al. 1995; 
Hossain et al. 1994; Meek et al. 1995), few analyse the determining factors 
associated with voluntary disclosures of corporate governance information in 
developed countries (Bujaki & McConomy 2002; Collett & Hrasky 2005; Labelle 
2002; Mallin & Ow-Yong 2009). However, no known published papers have directly 
examined this issue in Asian countries such as Malaysia. As such this research fills 
the gaps in prior research by investigating the association between corporate 
governance quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices in the 
Malaysian context. 
In brief, a company‟s voluntary disclosure of corporate governance is a good signal 
to gauge firm corporate governance quality. Using a broader corporate governance 
quality index enabled this research to measure company corporate governance 
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structures more comprehensively compared to the traditional approach of measuring 
corporate governance using one or several factors. Furthermore, the results of this 
study provide support that voluntary disclosure theory of Dye (1985) can also be 
applied to different types of disclosures and regulatory environments.  
6.2.2 In-house qualified company secretary 
Although it has the expected positive sign, the in-house qualified company secretary 
variable lacks statistical significance and therefore H1 (a) is not supported. Further 
analysis was run to examine the impact of the in-house qualified company secretary 
variable on the relationship between corporate governance quality and voluntary 
disclosure. In this additional analysis, the study divided the in-house qualified 
company secretary variable into (a) professional qualified versus license holder, and 
(b) in-house versus external. The results of the regression analysis show that different 
types or characteristics of a company secretary are not significantly related to 
voluntary disclosure when overall corporate governance quality and other factors are 
controlled. Further analysis was also run to determine whether the insignificant result 
is influenced by controlling for corporate governance quality. The regression analysis 
was rerun by excluding the corporate governance quality variable from the final 
model. The results of these tests confirm that an in-house qualified company 
secretary has no significant relationship with voluntary disclosure. 
This insignificant result may be due to a number of reasons. The close relationship 
between a company secretary with both management and board of directors may 
create confusion as to whom a company secretary should report. A company 
secretary‟s reporting role has a specific primary responsibility to the chairman of the 
board and an administrative function to management. This puts a company secretary 
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as a middle person in a company‟s organisation chart. The nature of a company 
secretary‟s working relationship involves both accountability to a board through the 
chairman and as a reporting relationship to management through the CEO. Hence, 
this complex working and reporting relationship may contribute to the insignificant 
results obtained from the study. 
A company secretary that is engaged full-time may be seen to lack independence, 
especially when he/she is employed full-time (in-house) by a company and earns a 
salary. This lack of independence may affect the confidence and trust of shareholders 
as well as future investors in relation to a company secretary‟s ability to persuade a 
board and management to adopt sound governance and compliance. Prior studies of 
director and audit committee characteristics have placed independence as the main 
factor that contributes to voluntary disclosures (Chen & Jaggi 2000; Lim et al. 2007; 
Turley & Zaman 2004). In this study, an in-house qualified company secretary fulfils 
both criteria of professionally qualified and employed in-house. Since an in-house 
company secretary is considered to lack independence this may explain the 
insignificant relationship between in-house qualified company secretary and 
voluntary disclosure practices in this study. As such, whether a company secretary‟s 
position can be made independent like non-executive directors, chairman or auditors 
is questionable.  
How a board and management view the role of a company secretary is an essential 
factor in ensuring they perform their duties and responsibilities effectively because it 
is these perceptions and respect that place a company secretary in the position of 
influence (Thambimuthu 2007). A company secretary must earn the respect and trust 
from all levels, as a person who can be relied upon to carry out duties and 
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responsibilities entrusted to her or him. This can only be achieved if they act 
professionally. In relating to the findings, this point may also be a contributor to the 
insignificant result. 
The company secretary profession is not like the accounting and legal professions 
which have their own statute such as the Accountant Act and the Legal Profession 
Act 1976 in Malaysia (Lee 2009). There is no specific statute governing the company 
secretary profession. The nonexistence of a statute permits the perception that the 
company secretary profession is not important and often misunderstood.  
Finally, if the status of a company secretary is maintained simply to fulfil compliance 
requirements and the position is not used by a company to gain strategic competitive 
advantage then the presence of an in-house qualified company secretary may not be 
able to promote good governance (Lee 2009). It is acknowledged that in publicly 
listed companies, company secretaries are only one of the many guardians of 
corporate governance. As described by Harrison (2007), corporate governance has 
four cornerstones or legs, being board of directors, management, auditors and 
company secretaries. The involvement and participation of all of these guardians can 
improve companies‟ governance quality as well as voluntary disclosure practices. 
6.2.3 Moderating roles of issuance of new share and debt capital 
The issuance of new shares does not significantly impact the relationship between 
corporate governance quality (CGQ) and voluntary disclosure practices (VDCGI). 
This result is inconsistent with results of prior studies which found that a company‟s 
intention to issue new share in the future increases voluntary disclosures (Bujaki & 
McConomy 2002; Collett & Hrasky 2005). Both the Pearson and Spearman‟s rho 
correlations presented in Chapter 5 show that this variable is significantly correlated 
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with VDECGI, but that it loses significance in the multivariate context when CGQ 
and other variables are considered. Thus CGQ may be the reason why the results of 
this research are different from prior research because they did not consider CGQ in 
their voluntary disclosure models.  
Further analysis was carried out to examine the impact of issuance of new shares. 
Issuance of new shares is divided into two different forms of new shares: Employee 
Share Option Scheme (ESOS) and rights issues. Similarly, results reveal that 
companies with an intention to issue new shares in the future either in the form of 
ESOS or rights are not related to higher voluntary disclosures of corporate 
governance information. Thus Hypothesis H2 (a) is not supported. 
Descriptive statistics of issuance of new shares (Table 5.9) showed that the most 
preferred method of issuing new shares in Malaysia is by ESOS and rights issues. 
More than half (61%) of the total issuance of new shares during the period of 2007 to 
2009 was in the form of ESOS and 17 (39%) of them were rights issues. The main 
reason for choosing these methods of issuing new shares rather than public issuance 
of new shares (such as public offerings) is likely to be that it is less time consuming 
and cheaper. Public offerings of new shares require shareholders‟ consent and 
applications for approvals to Securities Commission which may take 8-12 months. 
An issuing company is also required to issue a prospectus which is much more costly 
compared to ESOS (Malaysian Companies Act 1965). In addition the process of 
making a public offering is complicated and involves specialist assistance, guidance 
and practical physical necessities such as staff, space and stationery (Kang 2005). 
Another possible reason for Malaysian companies not choosing public offerings may 
be due to the market impact of the global financial crisis that occurred during the 
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years 2008 and 2009. Finally, descriptive statistics (Table 5.7) show that there are 
about 45% of sampled companies with family members on their boards. It can be 
assumed that these companies are family controlled firms. Family controlled firms 
tend to protect their dominant position by limiting the amount of capital contributed 
by other shareholders. This may be the reason why Malaysian companies prefer 
issuance of new shares in the form of ESOS or rights instead of public offerings. 
Hypothesis H2 (b) predicts that the relationship between a company‟s corporate 
governance quality and its voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information 
is moderated by its intention to raise debt capital in the following year. The effect of 
issuance of new debt capital is positive but has no significant impact on the 
relationship between corporate governance quality and voluntary corporate 
governance disclosures. Collett and Hrasky (2005) also found no significant 
relationship between debt capital and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
information of Australian listed companies. They suggest that the insignificant result 
is caused by the nature of the debt capital employed by companies in Australia which 
tends to be private debt compared to public debt. As such less disclosure may be 
expected because a private lender normally would have better access to a company‟s 
non-publicly disclosed information from other sources.  
In this research most issuance of new debt capital was in the form of bonds such as 
Islamic bonds (or SUKUK), irredeemable convertible unsecured loan stock (ICULS), 
redeemable convertible unsecured loan stock (RCULS) and non-convertible 
unsecured loan stock (NCULS) as well as Islamic debt which is a combination of 
both private and public debt. While incentives still remain to reduce information 
asymmetry and the risk of the debt issue, the disclosure of corporate governance 
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information in annual reports may not be of particular importance to a private lender. 
In addition as explained earlier about family controlled firms which tend to protect 
their dominant position in the company, the relationship between this type of firm 
with other private lenders becomes crucial. Therefore, for family controlled firms, 
private debt represents a major source of financing that can be used when needed as 
an alternative to public debt. 
6.2.4 Moderating role of stock-based incentives 
The next moderating variables that this research examines are stock-based incentives 
(stock-based compensation and CEO shareholdings). The study predicts that stock-
based compensation moderates the relationship between corporate governance 
quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information. The results 
show that stock-based compensation positively and significantly impact the 
association between corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance practices. This significant result for stock-based compensation 
is consistent with prior studies which documented that stock-based compensation 
increases voluntary disclosure practices (Aboody & Kasznik 2000; Nagar et al. 2003; 
Neo 1999). In addition, the interaction term of CGQ*SC-OPTIONS is also found to 
be highly significant and positively associated with the voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance information. This result indicates that companies that offer 
stock-based compensation as part of a CEO‟s compensation package are more likely 
to increase disclosures of corporate governance information in their annual reports 
than companies that do not offer this form of compensation. This result supports 
hypothesis H3 (a) and provides some evidence that incentive factors have a 
moderating impact on the relationship between CGQ and voluntary disclosure. 
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On the other hand, the CEO shareholdings do not significantly impact the 
relationship between corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance information. Thus hypothesis H3 (b) is not supported. Mallin 
and Ow-Yong (2009) also documented the lack of a significant relationship between 
directors‟ shareholdings and the level of corporate governance disclosure among 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) companies. Ghazali and Weetman (2006) 
examined the level of voluntary disclosure of Malaysian listed companies after the 
introduction of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance MCCG in 2001. They 
found that a company with a higher percentage of shares held by executive directors 
discloses less voluntarily. This result contradicts findings by Nanda, Nagar and 
Wysocki (2003), who reported a positive and significant relationship between CEO 
shareholdings and the frequency of management earnings forecasts and disclosure 
quality practices in the USA. However, it should be noted that this study examined a 
different type of voluntary disclosures compared to the Nanda, Nagar and Wysocki 
study. In addition the market environment in which a company operates may also 
contribute to inconsistent results. 
 
6.3 Conclusions from major findings 
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance quality and 
voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices in annual reports of 
Malaysian publicly listed companies. The impact of incentive factors: issuance of 
new shares and debt capital, stock-based compensation and CEO‟s shareholdings on 
the relationship between corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosure are 
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also evaluated. In addition, the study included the role of in-house qualified company 
secretary in the disclosure decision.  
Overall the study has found a positive and significant relationship between corporate 
governance quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information. 
The results suggest that companies with high governance quality are more likely to 
disclose corporate governance practices voluntarily. As such voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance practices is a good indicator of a company‟s actual corporate 
governance „quality‟. Further, results indicate that voluntary disclosure practices are 
higher in companies that offer stock-based compensation. Thus stock-based 
compensation does appear to provide incentives for managers of companies to 
disclose voluntarily. Finally, the presence of an in-house qualified company 
secretary, issuance of new shares or debt capital and CEO‟s shareholdings are not 
associated with increased levels of disclosure of corporate governance practices in 
annual reports.  
Other drivers of voluntary disclosure in annual reports are also included in this 
research as control variables. First, company size as log of total assets is a common 
firm-specific variable related to voluntary disclosures (Barako et al. 2006; Bujaki & 
McConomy 2002; Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Ho & Wong 2001; Labelle 2002; Mallin 
& Ow-Yong 2009). As predicted, company size is positively and highly significantly 
related to the voluntary disclosure of corporate governance in formation. Bigger 
companies would have better resources to employ and put in place sound governance 
compared to smaller companies.  
Second, it is expected that companies with higher leverage levels would have more 
disclosures of corporate governance in their annual reports. However the result from 
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this study shows leverage is insignificant and has a negative coefficient. This 
unexpected result is similar to the study of the level of voluntary disclosure by Hong 
Kong listed companies (Ho & Wong 2001). In contrast, studies of listed companies 
in Kenya and Canada found a positive and significant association with voluntary 
disclosures (Barako et al. 2006; Bujaki & McConomy 2002). These inconsistent 
results may be explained by different market environments in which companies 
operated and the type of voluntary disclosures made. 
Third, the proportion of family members on the board is negatively and strongly 
related to voluntary disclosures of corporate governance practices. This finding is 
consistent with the argument that companies with a higher proportion of family 
members on boards are more likely to have lower corporate governance disclosure 
practices (Chen & Jaggi 2000; Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Haniffa & Cooke 2002; 
Ho & Wong 2001).  
Fourth, the cultural factor (race) which is measured by the proportion of Malay 
directors on a board is significant and positively related to corporate governance 
disclosure. However the coefficient value is very small. This positive coefficient 
means voluntary disclosures of corporate governance practices by companies that 
have higher proportions of Malay directors on boards are better disclosures than 
those without Malay directors. This result is in line with expectations and consistent 
with a prior study in Malaysia that found one of the cultural factors (race) to be 
positively related with the extent of voluntary disclosures (Haniffa & Cooke 2002). 
A recent study by Wan-Hussin (2009) also found that a Malay CEO is associated 
with superior segmental disclosures prior to the introduction of the segment reporting 
standard in Malaysia. 
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Fifth, similar to prior studies (Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Haniffa & Cooke 2002), 
return on equity (ROE) is also found to be significantly and positively related to 
voluntary disclosures of corporate governance information. Hence, good governance 
companies with positive profit, which is represented by a positive ROE, can provide 
more corporate governance information voluntarily because stronger profits enable 
companies to invest more in governance practices.  
Sixth, the industry sector (trading/services) has an insignificant relationship to 
voluntary disclosures. Consistent with the result from Haniffa and Cooke‟s (2002) 
study, trading/services sector variable lacks a significant relationship with the level 
of voluntary disclosures. Finally, using a dummy variable to represent a company 
which is cross listed on more than one stock exchange, the coefficient produced is 
insignificant although prior studies have consistently found that a cross listed 
company has a higher level of voluntary disclosures (Collett & Hrasky 2005; Meek 
et al. 1995). This inconsistency may be explained by evidence that a very small 
number of sample companies (4%) had their shares listed on more than one stock 
exchange.  
 
6.4 Implications for theory 
The conclusions from this research have several theoretical implications. First, Dye‟s 
(1985) voluntary disclosure theory predicts that good quality companies in terms of 
governance quality are more likely to voluntarily disclose more information to 
distinguish themselves from poorer quality companies. The results provide empirical 
evidence to support Dye‟s voluntary disclosure theory even in a different regulatory 
environment such as Malaysia. Voluntary disclosure practices are used by companies 
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as a signal to communicate a company‟s corporate governance quality. This signal 
(voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information) is viewed by investors as 
good news that can reduce information asymmetry problems and lower investors‟ 
investment risks to provide additional funds. This research suggests that voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance practices may potentially reduce information 
asymmetry and agency problems which consequently reveal the actual company 
value (in term of corporate governance quality). 
Second, agency theory also suggests that the presence of an in-house qualified 
company secretary can monitor managers‟ behaviours and reduce agency costs. Prior 
literature suggests that some characteristics of in-house qualified company 
secretaries can enhance their ability to influence and monitor voluntary disclosure 
practices. This study uses academic qualifications and the position of either in-house 
or external as characteristics considered to be important to enhance voluntary 
disclosures. However, this research finds these characteristics are not statistically 
significantly related to voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information. In 
addition, signalling theory predicts that high quality companies are likely to employ 
an in-house-qualified company secretary to signal a company‟s quality. However 
results of this research suggest that variations in company secretary‟s characteristics 
may not influence their ability to monitor managers‟ behaviour or to provide a signal 
about company quality.  
Third, signalling theory claims that companies planning to raise capital in the future 
have incentives to increase voluntary disclosure for the purpose of reducing 
information asymmetry and cost of capital. This argument has been tested and 
supported by previous studies to be one of the main incentive factors that influence a 
159 
 
company to improve disclosures of corporate governance practices (Bujaki & 
McConomy 2002; Collett & Hrasky 2005). However, this study did not find 
consistent results with prior studies. This suggests that financing activity may not be 
the only driver that influences companies‟ disclosure decisions.  
Fourth, stock-based compensation is argued by agency theory to be able to improve 
an alignment of managers‟ interests with shareholders‟ interests. In addition, 
signalling theory suggests that stock-based incentives can provide signals about a 
company‟s quality. Results of this study show that stock-based compensation 
positively and significantly impact the relationship between corporate governance 
quality and voluntary disclosures. Findings of this research support the agency theory 
argument that stock-based compensation can provide an incentive for managers to 
voluntarily disclose more information by aligning managers‟ interests with the 
shareholders‟ interests. It also provides support to the signalling theory view that 
investors will infer companies that offer stock-based compensation are of high 
quality companies. Thus high quality companies are more likely to disclose 
voluntarily compared to lower quality companies. 
 
6.5 Implications for policy and practice 
There are several implications of this research for policy and practice. The Bursa 
Securities Malaysia Securities Berhad (BSMB) could find the results of this research 
useful in assessing improvements in a firm‟s corporate governance quality and 
voluntary disclosures of corporate governance practices. The implementation for the 
Malaysian Codes on Corporate Governance (MCCG) and Bursa Securities Listing 
Requirements (BSLR) that came into effect from June 2001 and the Best Practices in 
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Corporate Disclosure (BPCD) on July 2004 have been shown to be effective and 
have also increased levels of voluntary disclosures in annual reports. This increase is 
supported by the results from this research showing that a company with high 
corporate governance quality is significantly better in disclosing corporate 
governance practices. Therefore, there are benefits for companies to improve their 
corporate governance structures in compliance with MCCG, BSLR and BPCD. 
MCCG and BSLR also require all listed companies to employ qualified persons as a 
company secretary and ensure that a chairman and all directors of a company have 
access to expert advice and services of a company secretary. This research finds that 
the presence of an in-house qualified company secretary is not directly related to 
increased voluntary disclosures. So, while, it is unclear that benefits exist from 
employing an in-house qualified company secretary the benefits will only be more 
obvious if the position is strategically used to a company‟s advantage. Mere 
compliance by companies with statutory requirements for the appointment of 
company secretary may not provide benefits to them in improving voluntary 
disclosure practices. Therefore, the BSLR may perhaps consider reassessing the 
requirements in light of these results.  
Finally, company policies on remuneration and performance systems for both 
management and directors often consider using stock-based compensation as a way 
to rewarding and motivating high level executives to perform better. This study 
provides evidence that companies that offer stock-based compensation to their 
managers are more willing to disclose more information. While the MCCG and 
BSLR can influence a company to disclose more, offering appropriate incentives for 
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management in the form of stock rather than cash provides incentives for them to 
voluntarily disclose more corporate governance information.  
 
6.6 Limitations 
Despite several strengths of this research, a number of limitations require 
mentioning. The first limitation of this study is that findings are based on Malaysian 
companies which may limit the generalisability of results to other jurisdictions such 
as to developed countries. The population from which the sample is drawn was all 
listed companies on the Bursa Securities Malaysia Berhad (BSMB) in 2007. 
Companies listed on the BSMB were selected because of the wider availability of 
annual report information from databases used for this research. Therefore, results of 
this study may not be generalisable to smaller and non-listed companies. In addition, 
only those companies that have corporate governance quality data published by the 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group in its 2008 corporate governance survey 
report were included in the sample for the research. This is because there is no 
corporate governance quality data available for a large number of companies before 
2007. Consequently, results may not be generalisable to companies‟ corporate 
governance quality data prior to 2007. Furthermore, 2007 was selected as the base 
year to avoid any effects of the global financial crisis which happened in year 2008. 
Some of these sample companies may no longer exist due to the financial crisis and 
results may be different after the crisis.  
Second, the BCS component of MSWG measures „quality‟ in term of a firm‟s 
compliance with the MCCG and BSLR. However it also includes some disclosure 
items. Thus the measure used for corporate governance quality in this study may also 
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be capturing disclosure items rather than indicators of actual governance quality. The 
measurement used to measure corporate governance quality in this study is not a 
perfect measure but never the less a further check has been carried out to ensure that 
it actually measures quality rather than box-ticking. Discussion on this is given on 
page 85-86. 
Third, the measurement used to measure voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance information may also capture corporate governance quality. As 
explained above, corporate governance quality is measured as firm conformance to 
mandated items which also captures some disclosure items. Thus these two variables 
may be related simply because they each capture some aspects of quality and some 
aspects of disclosure. Even though in this research voluntary disclosure is referring to 
additional disclosure items in relation to corporate governance information, this 
study acknowledges this limitation in terms of measurement as there always are with 
this kind of research.  
Fourth, this research relies on companies annual reports for the data necessary to test 
hypotheses. Since the study has used this information, it can only measure 
characteristics of a company secretary, capital market transactions and stock-based 
incentives based on information disclosed. Therefore relevant information which is 
published in companies‟ websites or other forms of media may have been excluded 
by this study. 
Fifth, in order to measure the in-house qualified company secretary variable, the 
study divided company secretaries into two categories: professional qualified versus 
license holder and in-house versus external. Even though these characteristics can 
accurately describe company secretary qualities, there are other characteristics which 
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may be important and should be included in measuring an in-house qualified 
company secretary. The other characteristics are years of work experience, type of 
skills and other positions held by a company secretary within the same company. 
Sixth, the main focus of this study is specifically on voluntary disclosures of 
corporate governance information. As such results may not be generalisable to other 
types of disclosures. Higher disclosures of corporate governance practices do not 
mean that they are credible or reflective of the true state of affairs of a company in 
disclosing total voluntary disclosures. Also more disclosures do not necessarily 
imply better disclosure quality of total voluntary disclosure practices of a company. 
Therefore, the findings should be interpreted with care. 
 
6.7 Future research 
Based on the findings and limitations of the study, there are several avenues for 
future research. It would be interesting to know whether results can be replicated for 
smaller Malaysian listed and non-listed companies to find out if capital market 
transactions and stock-based incentives significantly impact on the relationship of 
corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosure practices. A similar study can 
also be conducted in other settings with similar market environments for example in 
other Asian countries as well as developed countries. This may be possible only if 
the corporate governance quality data are available. 
The data collection could be extended to include other forms of media. This would 
improve accessibility and accuracy of information obtained. It would also ensure that 
researchers would get the most recent information about companies‟ corporate 
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governance practices. As such this will reduce the possibility of having missing 
values in data analysis.  
Future research should also explore other characteristics such as experience, skills, 
other positions held and the number of company secretaries employed, in measuring 
the effectiveness of a company secretary role in corporate governance disclosures. 
This could involve attending companies‟ annual general meetings, and conducting 
interviews or distributing questionnaires. A comparison study of the importance of 
the role of each of the guardians of corporate governance in an organisation can 
enable future researchers to measure appropriately the relationship between each 
guardian of corporate governance with voluntary disclosures. 
Finally, future studies in this area should examine whether corporate governance 
quality, capital market transactions and stock-based incentives are positively related 
to the total voluntary disclosures and other specific types of disclosure. This may 
only be possible if data concerning different types of information is widely available. 
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Appendix 1 – Tests for multicollinearity 
            
              Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Zero-
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -15.682 2.734   -5.737 .000 -21.065 -10.299           
CGQ (BCS) 40 .393 .050 .359 7.943 .000 .296 .491 .494 .442 .336 .878 1.138 
CSEC D .188 .353 .023 .532 .595 -.507 .884 .089 .033 .023 .952 1.051 
S-ISS D .387 .575 .035 .673 .502 -.746 1.520 .215 .042 .028 .666 1.500 
D-ISS D .349 .543 .031 .643 .520 -.720 1.419 .244 .040 .027 .762 1.312 
SC-OPTIONS 2.298 .610 .189 3.768 .000 1.097 3.499 .266 .228 .159 .709 1.410 
SH-OWN  -1.459 .900 -.077 -1.622 .106 -3.231 .312 -.293 -.100 -.069 .800 1.249 
LSIZE .873 .176 .255 4.949 .000 .526 1.220 .403 .293 .209 .676 1.479 
LEV  -.734 .878 -.041 -.836 .404 -2.462 .995 .173 -.052 -.035 .758 1.320 
FMB  -2.661 .952 -.144 -2.796 .006 -4.535 -.787 -.349 -.171 -.118 .679 1.472 
BOARD-M  1.251 .729 .087 1.717 .087 -.184 2.686 .306 .106 .073 .703 1.423 
ROE 3.820 .777 .215 4.915 .000 2.290 5.351 .250 .292 .208 .938 1.066 
TRA D .419 .434 .045 .966 .335 -.436 1.274 .234 .060 .041 .814 1.228 
LIS D .672 .991 .031 .678 .498 -1.280 2.624 .154 .042 .029 .861 1.161 
CGQ*SC-OPTIONS .510 .144 .157 3.546 .000 .227 .794 .166 .215 .150 .915 1.093 
a. Dependent variable: VDCGI (IBP)35 
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Appendix 2 – Test of linearity and homoscedasticity 
 
177 
 
Appendix 3 - Test of normality of standardised residual 
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Appendix 4 - Test of normality of the model 
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Appendix 5 - Test of assumption of independent errors 
Model Summaryb 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
  1 .731 .534 .509 2.856 .534 21.312 14 260 .000 1.894 
a. Predictors (Constant): CGQ*SC-OPTIONS, BOARD-M, ROE, SC-OPTIONS, CSEC D, LIS D, LEV, CGQ (BCS) 40, SH-OWN, TRA D, D-ISS D, FMB, LSIZE, S-ISS D. 
b. Dependent variable: VDCGI (IBP) 35 
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Appendix 6 - Test for any extreme cases which may be an outlier. 
Casewise Diagnosticsa 
Case Number 
Std. 
Residual 
VDCGI 
(IBP) 35 
Predicted 
Value Residual 
  
16 -2.054 4 9.87 -5.866 
28 2.066 17 11.10 5.898 
97 -2.041 3 8.83 -5.828 
103 2.896 19 10.73 8.269 
130 2.581 21 13.63 7.369 
143 -2.319 4 10.62 -6.621 
158 2.294 17 10.45 6.549 
192 -2.279 5 11.51 -6.509 
221 2.533 23 15.77 7.232 
233 2.144 13 6.88 6.123 
235 2.321 17 10.37 6.628 
236 -2.049 9 14.85 -5.851 
242 -2.098 1 6.99 -5.990 
a. Dependent variable: VDCGI (IBP) 35 
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Appendix 7 - The F ratio test results. 
Results before including interaction term CGQ*SCOPTIONS 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2330.326 13 179.256 21.050 .000
a
 
Residual 2222.583 261 8.516   
Total 4552.909 274    
a. Predictors: (Constant), LIS D, CSEC D, ROE, SC-OPTIONS, TRA D, SH-OWN, LEV, CGQ 
(BCS) 40, D-ISS D, BOARD-M, FMB, S-ISS D, LSIZE 
b. Dependent Variable: VDCGI (IBP) 35 
 
 
Results after including interaction term CGQ*SCOPTIONS 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2432.863 14 173.776 21.312 .000
a
 
Residual 2120.046 260 8.154   
Total 4552.909 274    
a. Predictors: (Constant), CGQ*SC-OPTIONS, BOARD-M, ROE, SC-OPTIONS, CSEC D, LIS D, 
LEV, CGQ (BCS) 40, SH-OWN, TRA D, D-ISS D, FMB, LSIZE, S-ISS D 
b. Dependent Variable: VDCGI (IBP) 35 
 
